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Strict scrutiny has become something of a talisman.I While some
"Strict scrutiny" is the name given to the method by which courts purport to
evaluate governmental actions that classify people on a "suspect" basis, such as race, or
that infringe upon fundamental rights. Although run-of-the-mill government action
will be subjected to what is called the "rational basis test," and upheld if it is "rationally
related to a legitimate governmental purpose," when strict scrutiny is applied, a court
must ask whether the challenged government action is "narrowly tailored" to serve a
"compelling government interest." If it is not, it will be invalidated. The phrase "strict
scrutiny" made its first appearance in modern constitutional law in Justice Douglas's
opinion for the Court in Skinner v. Oklahoma. 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (applying strict
scrutiny and then invalidating a law that punished with sterilization individuals con-
-icted of larceny but not those convicted of embezzlement because the law "in-
volved [d] one of the basic civil rights of man"); see also Korematsu v. United States, 323
U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (concluding that "all legal restrictions which curtail the civil
rights of a single racial group are immediately suspect" and that "courts must subject
them to the most rigid scrutiny"). Although the formal concept of strict scrutiny de-
veloped in the area of equal protection, it now pervades many areas of constitutional
law. See, e.g., United States v. Playboy Entn't Group, Inc., 120 S. Ct. 1878, 1886 (2000)
(applying strict scrutiny under the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment to a
content-based speech restriction); Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. Hialeah, 508
U.S. 520, 532 (1993) (applying strict scrutiny under the Free Exercise Clause to a law
whose object was the suppression of religious conduct).
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commentators score debating points by identifying those rare cases in
which governmental actions have survived it,2 most have concluded
that a judicial determination to apply "strict scrutiny" is little more
than a way to describe the conclusion that a particular governmental
action is invalid: Professor Gunther's "'strict' in theory and fatal in
fact" formulation' must rank with Justice Stewart's subjective test for
obscenity4 as one of the most famous epithets in American constitu-
tional law.
In the courts, strict scrutiny is essentially invoked, not employed.
Despite its name-strict "scrutiny"--it ordinarily amounts to a finding
of invalidity, not a tool of analysis. Moreover, discussion about the
propriety of invoking strict scrutiny is typically divorced from any con-
cern about the purposes that close judicial examination of a constitu-
tionally troublesome statute or regulation might actually serve. The
application of strict scrutiny thus threatens a cookie-cutter approach
to questions of constitutional dimension. While this is, at the present
moment, of most obvious importance in relation to the constitutional
status of race-based plans of affirmative action, its significance goes
well beyond that.
The goal of this Article is to suggest a comprehensive solution to
the problem of the nature of strict scrutiny. The Article will set forth
a conceptual framework for analysis of governmental actions that raise
concerns of constitutional moment. This framework is designed to
preserve the multidimensionality of the problems such governmental
actions present. Although it will refer frequently to judicial evaluation
of governmental action, my hope is that the tools it describes will be as
useful ex ante to legislators and officials of the executive branch who
may be considering certain actions as to courts called upon to review
them in the face of subsequent legal challenges.
This Article will synthesize some extraordinarily important but
fragmentary insights various people-including, perhaps most signifi-
2 See, e.g., Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191 (1992); Austin v. Michigan State Cham-
ber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 666 (1990); Local 28, Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n
v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421 (1986); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265
(1978) (controlling opinion of Powell, J.); Bums v. Fortson, 410 U.S. 686 (1973) (per
curiam); Marston v. Lewis, 410 U.S. 679 (1973); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973)
(stating that after viability a state's interest in potential life becomes "compelling");
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
3 Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term: Foreword: In Search ofEvolvingDoc-
trine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8
(1972).
4 SeeJacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring) ("I know
it when I see it.").
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candly, John Hart Ely-have had about what strict scrutiny is for and
how it should be applied. Because these insights have, indeed, been
fragmentary (even when offering themselves as breathtakingly global),
they require supplementation and integration. The examples in the
Article will come primarily from the various settings in which the gov-
ernment may seek to take race-conscious action, but it will also make
use of examples beyond race to show what is involved, drawing exten-
sively on the Court's own jurisprudence to demonstrate the explana-
tory power of the ideas put forth. And, although it will be most im-
mediately concerned with strict scrutiny in the context of race, many
of the insights and conclusions included in it should have salience be-
yond that context.
This Article will also use a detailed evaluation of the case of race-
conscious districting to demonstrate the appropriate application of
the framework it sets forth. At the same time it will address some of
the harder theoretical problems lurking beneath the Court's analysis
in its recent series of voting rights cases. In the end, this Article con-
cludes that, even when formally strict, judicial scrutiny under the
Equal Protection Clause must be ever sensitive to the circumstances in
which government seeks to act and to the methods by which it seeks to
achieve even its legitimate ends. If it fails to do so, "strict scrutiny"
may become little more than a Procrustean bed, rigidly invalidating
certain government actions regardless of the consequences for the
very equality that is the animating principle behind the Equal Protec-
tion Clause.
INTRODUCTION
I have chosen to focus on race and equal protection in this Article
because, at present, the question of the nature of strict scrutiny is es-
pecially important in that context. With the announcement in Ada-
rand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena that all racial classifications by govern-
ment including those used in plans of affirmative action henceforth
will be subject to strict scrutiny,' the most important question involv-
ing race and the Constitution now facing the Supreme Court is what
that strict scrutiny will look like.
Applying the test articulated in Adarand and its precursor, City of
515 U.S. 200, 235 (1995) ("Our action today makes explicit [that] Federal racial
classifications, like those of a State, must serve a compelling governmental interest, and
must be narrowly tailored to further that interest.").
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Richmond v. JA. Croson Co.,6 lower courts recently have invalidated sev-
eral affirmative action plans. Most notably, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held in Hopwood v. Texas that race may
never be taken account of in admissions to state institutions of higher
learning for the purpose of fostering diversity.7 This holding essen-
tially concluded that the portion of Justice Powell's controlling opin-
ion in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke that had for a gen-
eration delineated the permissible scope of affirmative action in state-
run higher education did not state the law. Rather, the Fifth Circuit
found that Croson and Adarand had adopted a stricter standard under
which the use by the state of Texas of race for purposes of affirmative
action in university admissions could not be consttutionallyjustified.
The Fourth Circuit has held that, under Croson, the Constitution does
not permit a state to create merit-based college scholarships for which
only African Americans are eligible.9 And, most recently, the First
Circuit has held that, although it may be designed to ensure diversity
in the student body, the affirmative action plan of the Boston Latin
School likewise fails strict scrutiny because its use of race cannot be
justified.' °
Although the Adarand Court insisted that the strict scrutiny it re-
quires is not to be "strict in theory, but fatal in fact,"" the Court has let
those of these decisions that have come before it stand. With the
Courts of Appeals each likely to face the question whether affirmative
action, particularly affirmative action in higher education, is constitu-
tionally permissible-a question that was long thought to have been
answered in the affirmative by the Supreme Court in Bakke-the Su-
preme Court will eventually have to face the hard question head on:
In application, what form will the strict scrutiny called for by Adarand
and Croson take?
6 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (holding that affirmative action plans adopted by the States
are subject to strict scrutiny).
7 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1033 (1996).
See id. at 944-46.
See Podberesky v. Kirwan, 38 F.3d 147 (4th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1128
(1995).
19 SeeWessmann v. Gittens, 160 F.3d 790 (1st Cir. 1998).
Adarand, 515 U.S. at 237 (citation omitted). In fact, the Court professed that
"[s] trict scrutiny... evaluates carefully all governmental race-based decisions in order to
decide which are constitutionally objectionable and which are not." Id. at 228. On the
same day that Adarand was decided, Justice O'Connor, the author of the Court's Ada-
rand decision, wrote another opinion in which she again expressed the view that "it is
not true that strict scrutiny is 'strict in theory, but fatal in fact.'" Missouri v. Jenkins,
515 U.S. 70, 112 (1995) (O'ConnorJ., concurring) (citation omitted).
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There is reason for concern about the Court's ability to provide an
adequate answer to this question. The Court has had a particularly
difficult time answering the parallel question-what should the nature
of strict scrutiny be?-in the related context of race-conscious elec-
toral districting. In a spate of decisions beginning with Shaw v. Reno
(Shaw or Shaw 1),12 the same five-Justice majority that decided Adarand
has held over the last several years that strict scrutiny must be the
norm in at least most cases where the government consciously uses
race in drawing electoral district lines.13 Although the controlling
opinions of the Court always suggest that there are circumstances in
which the intentional use of race in electoral districting may be justi-
fied-for example, where it is necessary to prevent discriminatory "di-
lution" of the votes of members of a racial minority group-in prac-
tice, the Court since Shaw Ihas invalidated every district line drawn on
the basis of race brought before it in a fully briefed and argued case.14
This has been true even though the districts at issue have been drawn
precisely to comply with the antidiscrimination command contained
in the Voting Rights Act of 1965 ("V.R.A." or the "Act").5 The Su-
preme Court has thus not only held that the intentional creation of
majority-black electoral districts is presumptively unconstitutional-
that is the reason such districts must be subjected to strict scrutiny-it
has at least laid the groundwork for an argument that the practical ef-
fect ofjudicial scrutiny of such districts will always be the invalidation
of the government's use of race, regardless of the justifications that
) 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
1- See Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952 (plurality opinion) (1996); Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S.
899 (1996) (Shawl); Miller v.Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995).
14 The Court has, however, summarily affirmed a three-judge district court deci-
sion upholding a districting plan that intentionally used race. See DeWitt v. Wilson,
515 U.S. 1170 (1995) (summary affirmance). The Court also reversed a grant of sum-
maryjudgment in favor of plaintiffs challenging the new districting plan drawn up to
replace the plan that was before the Court in Shaw I, a plan that was ultimately held
invalid in Shaw I, 517 U.S. 899 (1996). See Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541 (1999)
(Cromnartie 1). In Cromartie I, the Court remanded the case to the three-judge district
court for trial on the question whether race was in fact the predominant factor moti-
vating the legislature's districting decision. See Cromartie 1, 526 U.S. at 554 ("Perhaps,
after trial, the evidence will support a finding that race was the State's predominant
motive. ... ").
' Cf Johnson v. DeGrandy, 512 U.S. 947, 1020 (1994) (noting that "society's racial
and ethnic cleavages sometimes necessitate majority-minority districts to ensure equal
political and electoral opportunity" guaranteed by section 2 of the Act). The Court
has not formally invalidated any part of the V.RA., but has repeatedly resolved con-
flictms between the V.R.A. and the Shaw cause of action by weakening the antidiscrimi-
nation requirements imposed by the Act. See infra notes 136-37 and accompanying
text.
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support it.
On the other side, those members of the Court who disagree with
Shaw have offered no approach that would preserve the V.RA. while
at the same time proving satisfactory to a Court majority that is over-
whelmingly concerned with the use by government of racial classifica-
tions. Beginning with Justice Stevens's dissent in Shaw I, and in all the
succeeding dissents in the Shaw line of cases, no constitutional alter-
native has been proposed except to permit the use of race in district-
ing, subject only to rational basis review, unless and until it reaches
the point of diluting the votes of the members of one or another ra-
cial group, that is, so submerging their votes among those of a hostile
majority that they are denied the opportunity to participate equally in
the process of electoral politics. But in an age in which a majority of
the Supreme Court is inherently skeptical of the use of race by gov-
ernment-where, indeed, the Court purports virtually always to
"strictly" scrutinize race-based governmental action-rational basis
scrutiny is neither an adequate nor a realistic alternative.
A solution to the problem of strict scrutiny is thus needed both
urgently and for the long haul. With respect to voting rights, the new
decennial census, which will be accompanied by redistricting, is al-
ready underway. The Court has recently granted review to consider
for a third time the congressional district lines drawn in North Caro-
lina under the 1990 census in order to comply with the V.RA,. This
will provide it a final opportunity to clarify the meaning of Shaw, and
its relationship to the V.R.A., before the flood of lawsuits that redis-
tricting in light of the 2000 census will inevitably generate. Without
some rethinking, the continued vitality of Shaw may well result in the
evisceration of the V.R.A., a landmark civil rights statute. Yet that pro-
vision has proven an extraordinarily successful tool for breaking down
the patterns of racially polarized voting that have historically led to
the exclusion of members of racial minority groups from the political
process.
Even more significantly, as to the broader question of strict scru-
tiny, the Court will undoubtedly soon have to confront the meaning of
Croson and Adarand for affirmative action in higher education, in gov-
ernment employment, and in contracting. Its decisions will have re-
16 See Hunt v. Cromartie (Cromartie fl), 120 S. Ct. 2715 (2000) (noting probable
jurisdiction). The Court considered the constitutionality of North Carolina's district
lines in Shaw Iand Shaw I. It did not reach their merits in Cromartie I, 526 U.S. 541
(1999), where it concluded that the district court should not have invalidated on a mo-
tion for summary judgment the new lines adopted in response to Shaw II.
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percussions far beyond the governmental contexts in which they ap-
ply. And the Court's failure to conceive a workable version of strict
scrutiny in the context of electoral districting bodes ill for the far
more pervasive problem of strict scrutiny of affirmative action plans
called for by the decisions in Croson and Adarand.
The goal of this Article is to reconnect the idea of searching judi-
cial examination of governmental actions to its theoretical moorings.
Returning to first principles, I seek to articulate an approach to strict
scrutiny that is tailored to the concerns that legitimately give rise to a
need for close judicial examination of certain governmental actions
and that will predictably lead to defensible results regardless of the
context in which it is used.
In Part I of this Article, I propose a unified framework for strict
scrutiny of race-conscious government action. The framework is sen-
sitive to the contexts in which race may be used by government and is
appropriately tailored to address the concerns raised by the use of
race in each of those distinct contexts, the very concerns that justify
the use of strict scrutiny in the first place.
I begin in Part I.A.1 by identifying the question that equal protec-
tion analysis is designed to answer. Without this basic grounding,
there can be no principled basis for assessing any approach to the
close judicial scrutiny of governmental classifications under the Equal
Protection Clause. In Part I.A.2 I then examine the costs-the harms
and risks-that actuallyjustify strict scrutiny of classifications that are
based on race. I propose an analysis that avoids some of the pitfalls
that have plagued analyses that rely, for example, solely, or at least
principally, on conditions of prejudice or of political powerlessness to
justify' the use of strict scrutiny. 7 These analyses, while pathbreaking
at the time they were undertaken and a source of continuing illumina-
tion, may in retrospect be seen to lump together phenomena that are
in fact quite distinct and to sometimes smooth over analytical difficul-
ties without shedding much helpful light on the several discrete pur-
poses strict scrutiny properly serves.
In Part I.B I put forward the framework for strict scrutiny of race-
17 Set" e.g., United States v. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938);JOHN
HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980).
1. See, e.g., Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REv. 713
(1985) (observing that discreteness and insularity may actually help a group in coali-
tion building); Lea Brilmayer, Carolene, Conflicts, and the Fate of the "Inside-Outsider",
134 U. PA. L. REv. 1291, 1331-33 (1986) (arguing that there must be substantive con-
tent in any theory that lets unelected judges say what result a properly functioning
democratic process should have produced).
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conscious government action I have described, a framework that is re-
sponsive to the harms that are present or absent in the particular con-
texts in which race is used by government. I examine the way in which
the tools of strict scrutiny-ordinarily phrased in an undifferentiated
way as a search for "compelling" interests and an examination of "nar-
row tailoring"-should operate along different dimensions if they are
to serve the purposes for which that scrutiny is properly employed.
The undifferentiated labels placed on these tools may hide the several
discrete operations that they perform, operations that should be more
demanding or more relaxed depending upon the circumstances they
have been invoked to address.
Central to my analysis, I develop a taxonomy of race-conscious
government action, identifying the ways in which different types of
race-conscious action raise different concerns. In particular, I identify
some harms that have ordinarily been neglected in the literature,
harms that are present whenever race is used and that, I conclude, jus-
tify some form of close judicial examination of all governmental uses
of race.
I then demonstrate by concrete example the approach I have de-
scribed under which close judicial evaluation of the government's use
of race could best be tailored to address the particular concerns or
harms that are present when race is used in various contexts. In con-
trast to theories that posit, under whatever label, a continuous, one-
dimensional spectrum of standards of review ranging from minimum
rationality through intermediate and up to strict, varying in accord
with the degree of supposed "suspectness" or "invidiousness" of the
criterion of classification employed and in response to the level of
"importance" or "fundamentality" of the right or interest distributed
or affected,19 and in contrast to the cookie-cutter version of strict scru-
tiny some of the Court's recent decisions now threaten to impose (a
version that essentially equates the need for close examination with
the imperative of constitutional invalidation),0 this study explores di-
mensions along which appropriately "strict" scrutiny of governmental
actions should rationally be calibrated to address in each different
context the particular concerns that warrant close examination in the
first place.
In Part I.B I also test the validity of the framework I propose both
against Supreme Court case law from outside the voting rights area-
19 See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 98-110 (1973)
(Marshal,J., dissenting) (arguing that the Court's cases describe such a spectrum).
20 See supra text accompanying notes 13-15.
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some of it familiar, some of it largely overlooked-and against factual
situations taken from real life, concluding not only that that frame-
work will consistently lead to sensible results, but also that, at least un-
til Shaw Iwas decided, the Court's equal protection jurisprudence de-
scribed an approach much like the one I propose.
In Parts II and ELI, I address the case of race-conscious electoral
districting. Part II sets out in detail some of the background. In Part
H.A I describe the legal landscape in the area of voting rights in the
pre-Shaw era: specifically, I describe the requirements contained in
sections 2 and 5 of the V.R.A., the constitutional prohibition on racial
vote dilution, and the way in which the V.R.A. may require states or
their political subdivisions to draw electoral district lines on the basis
of race in order to combat discrimination in the form of racially polar-
ized voting. In Part II.B I examine the superimposition upon the law
of voting rights of the racial-gerrymandering cause of action recog-
nized in Shaw . I describe and assess the Court's evaluation of the
race-conscious districts at issue in Shaw I and its follow-on cases, par-
ticularly Miller v. Johnson and Bush v. Vera.2 I also describe and cri-
tique the approach advocated by the dissenters in those cases.
In Part I I apply the analytical framework set out in Part I to the
case of race-conscious electoral districting. Part IA describes the
way in which race-conscious electoral districts would properly fit into
that framework. Part IH.B addresses two of the most puzzling aspects
of the Shaw line of cases: the on-again off-again concern with the bi-
zarre shapes of the electoral districts at issue and the use of words like
"apartheid" to describe districts with a slight African American major-
ity.2 '3 I suggest there that the two may be related, and explore the in-
tuition reflected in the cases, but which the Court has never ade-
quately explained, that there is something different and worse about
bizarrely shaped majority-minority electoral districts. I try to fit the
concern about district shape into the long line of race-discrimination
cases decided by the Court including Brown24 and Bakke,' and I con-
clude that, although it may be based upon a mistaken understanding
of the facts in the race-conscious districting cases, the idea that the bi-
zarre shape of a district could cause additional harm may provide a
way to rationalize the Shaw line of cases and to harmonize it both with
515 U.S. 900 (1995).
517 U.S. 952 (1996).
Shawl, 509 U.S. 630, 647 (1993).
24 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
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the approach I put forward here and with the Court's other equal pro-
tection jurisprudence.
Finally, in Part III.C I return to the application of strict scrutiny to
race-conscious districts, and particularly to the question of "narrow tai-
loring" in light of the availability of race-neutral means of addressing
discrimination in voting-that is, the availability of systems of cumula-
tive voting and the like that do not depend on governmental creation
of electoral districts at all. These systems, advocated by some com-
mentators and embraced by some courts, would permit states to com-
ply with the antidiscrimination commands of the V.RA. and the pre-
Shaw vote dilution cases without the use of racial classifications. In-
deed, unless the rigidity expressed thus far in the Shaw line of cases is
relaxed, or our commitment to end discrimination against minorities
in voting is abandoned, the use of such systems may ultimately stand
as one of the few alternatives for conducting elections legally open to
the states in the presence of racially polarized voting.
Despite the superficial appeal of such solutions, I conclude that,
although the adoption of systems that do not rely on districting would
indeed eliminate some of the problems of discrimination in voting,
they might also remove some of the stabilizing aspects of the tradi-
tional system of district-based elections. In particular, they could
lower the bars to election that have tended to keep extremist candi-
dates from succeeding in obtaining elective office. I conclude that
these mechanisms of non-district-based voting are not narrowly ad-
dressed to the problem of discrimination in voting on the basis of
race, and that they could work an undesirable and radical transforma-
tion in the nature of representative democracy in the United States. I
therefore argue that an appropriately constructed strict scrutiny would
not require governmental authorities seeking to comply with the anti-
discrimination command of the V.R.A. to adopt these race-neutral al-
ternatives instead of drawing district lines that take race into account.
I. A BETTER EQUAL PROTECTION: A COMPREHENSIVE METHOD FOR
EVALUATING RACE-CONSCIOUS GOVERNMENT ACTION
UNDER THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE
A. Evaluating Race-Conscious Government Action: Cataloguing
the Harms That Justify Strict Scrutiny
1. What is Strict Scrutiny?
Take a step back from the formulae and standards of review for
Vol. 149: 1
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evaluating racial classifications about which courts and constitutional
law commentators always debate. In evaluating any racial classifica-
tion by government under the Equal Protection Clause,"5 the question
is always the same: Is there a genuine difference between the groups
that are treated differently that renders the difference in treatment
rational, and does the disparate treatment serve a sufficiently impor-
tant goal that it transcends whatever harm is done by the use of the
line drawn by the particular law?2' Although reasonable people may
differ in the judgments they will make in answering this question, it is
asked by judges all along the ideological spectrum, from those most
sympathetic to the use of race by government in certain circum-
stances, such as in plans of affirmative action,'s to those who are most
!" U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
27 The formulation I have used is my own. After thinking about this question for
some time both inside and outside the classroom, I have concluded that it comes clos-
est to capturing what judges and others do when they evaluate a line drawn on the ba-
sis of race. It owes a lot to Justice Stevens's formulation, although it departs from it in
some ways. Justice Stevens, of course, has written that the very use of formalized stan-
dards of review obfuscates, rather than clarifies, the inquiry into the constitutional va-
lidity of various governmental classifications. He has argued that the equal protection
inquiry is always the same:
I am inclined to believe that what has become known as the [tiered] analysis
of equal protection claims does not describe a completely logical method of
deciding cases, but rather is a method the Court has employed to explain de-
cisions that actually apply a single standard in a reasonably consistent fashion.
Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 212 (1976) (StevensJ., concurring). He has written fur-
ther that:
In my own approach to these cases, I have always asked myself whether I
could find a "rational basis" for the classification at issue. The term "rational,"
of course, includes a requirement that an impartial lawmaker could logically
believe that the classification would serve a legitimate public purpose that
transcends the harm to the members of the disadvantaged class. Thus, the
word "rational-for me at least-includes elements of legitimacy and neutral-
ity that must always characterize the performance of the sovereign's duty to
govern impartially.
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 452 (1985) (Stevens,J.,
concurring) (citations omitted).
This formulation, which requires only that an "impartial lawmaker could logically
believe" both that the classification served a legitimate purpose and that the benefit
wrought by its use transcends its harm, seems to me unduly deferential to the chal-
lenged governmental action in light of my conception of the appropriate role of the
judiciary both in evaluating the reality of the difference between groups treated differ-
ently and in determining whether the benefits wrought by the governmental classifica-
tion actually outweigh its cost.
" See, e.g., City of Richmond v. JA. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 535 (1989) (Mar-
shall,J., dissenting) (stating that "race-conscious classifications designed to further re-
medial goals are permissible if they are 'substantially related to achievement' of 'im-
portant governmental objectives'") (citations omitted).
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opposed to it. Strict scrutiny is, necessarily and inescapably, a tool to
help in reaching an answer to this question.
The traditional formulation, however, of the inquiry made by
courts employing strict scrutiny--is the classification at issue narrowly
tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest?-masks the sev-
eral dimensions in which this tool actually operates. In terms of strict
scrutiny, the requirement of a "compelling governmental interest"
serves at least two purposes. First, it permits a reviewing court to make
a determination concerning the importance of the government's goal.
Second, the use of the "compelling" label incorporates the idea that
the costs of using a particular type of classification are great enough
that the achievement even of most legitimate governmental purposes
will not outweigh the harm wrought by use of the classification.
By contrast, the inquiry into narrow tailoring-into the fit be-
tween classification and proffered goal-serves at least three distinct
purposes. First, it ensures that the stated purpose was indeed the ac-
tual purpose behind the classification. A narrow tailoring inquiry can
help to "smoke out" illegitimate purposes by demonstrating that the
classification does not, in fact, serve the stated, legitimate purpose.
Second, it checks stereotyped thinking. When a classification is based
not on a factual distinction between one and another group, but on a
stereotype, that classification will fail the narrow tailoring inquiry. Fi-
nally, even when the classification does correlate with some genuine
distinction between the two groups, the narrow tailoring inquiry as-
sures that the classification only will be used when there is some de-
gree of necessity for its use if the governmental purpose is to be
achieved. This aspect of the narrow tailoring inquiry is not really
about "fit," but about comparing the marginal benefits and costs of
the use of a particular classification with those of some alternative if
there is one. (Thus, in the context of a racial classification, if there
were no race-neutral alternative we might say that the classification is
"narrowly tailored" in the sense that it is "necessary" to serve its pur-
pose or, put another way, the "least restrictive" alternative.) In this fi-
See, e.g., id. at 520-21 (Scalia, J., concurring) (concluding that "a social emer-
gency rising to the level of imminent danger to life and limb-for example, a prison
race riot, requiring temporary segregation of inmates" could justify the use of a racial
classification by a state or local government, even though such a classification would
ordinarily be impermissible because it aggravates the "tendency ... to classify and
judge men and women on the basis of their country of origin or the color of their
skin").
30 Cf id. at 493 (plurality opinion) ("[T]he purpose of strict scrutiny is to 'smoke
out' illegitimate uses of race ....").
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nal regard, the narrow tailoring inquiry prevents the use of certain
classifications, even when they make sense, or are "rational" in the
economic sense, with regard to the government's immediate purpose,
because the costs of their use are so great that they should not be used
without some degree of necessity.
2. What Actually Triggers Strict Scrutiny?
a. A New Approach to Suspectness
If the question in all equal protection cases is the same, why do we
only sometimes use the tool of strict scrutiny? The answer must be
that certain lines drawn by government cannot be permitted before
they have undergone particularly close examination. But which ones?
In order to figure out the appropriate shape that close judicial exami-
nation of classifications like those based on race should take, we must
unpack the various reasons such government actions should be viewed
with a "skeptical" eye. 3'
Racial classifications of course form the paradigmatic case for
strict scrutiny. And, since not all classifications trigger strict scrutiny,
there must be something about the character of race that renders it
different for equal protection purposes from other characteristics.
Precisely what this "something" is has frequently been addressed as
part of the question of what renders the use of a particular character-
istic an "inherently suspect" basis upon which to make a governmental
distinction."
The reasons the use of race may have been deemed "suspect" has
generated an enormous amount of comment and literature.3 But al-
though this discussion by courts and commentators has focused upon
the abstract characteristics of various classifications, strict scrutiny, as I
will describe, must be triggered by-and, indeed, the Court's cases
demonstrate that it is in fact utilized in response to-the presence of
A Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 228 (1995).
_! Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971) (discussing alienage); see also
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (announcing that "all legal re-
strictions which curtail the civil rights of a single racial group are immediately sus-
pect").
' See, e.g., ELY, supra note 17, at 145-72; Ackerman, supra note 18, at 742-46; Mark
Tushnet, "... And Only Wealth VWI Buy You Justice'--Some Notes on The Supreme Court,
1972 Term, 1974 WIsc. L. REv. 177, 181 (suggesting that at least some findings of sus-
pectness can best be explained as reflecting a desire to help the middle class); Kenji
Yoshino, Suspect Symbols: The Literary Argument for Heightened Scrutiny for Gays, 96
COLUM. L. REv. 1753, 1755 & n.5 (1996).
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particular risks and harms that have constitutional dimension.
The Supreme Court has never provided a comprehensive explana-
tion of the concept of suspectness, but it has taken the approach that
certain abstract characteristics of particular classes render constitu-
tionally suspect laws that disadvantage members of those classes.
Among the relevant criteria identified in Court decisions have been
"discrete [ness] and insular[ity]," inability to compete on an equal
footing in the political process,"5 possession of "obvious, immutable or
distinguishing characteristics" essentially irrelevant to the purpose for
which a government decision is made, 36 "status of birth" for which the
individual bears no responsibility,37 a history of "prejudice"", or "dis-
crimination against the group in question, and the risk of stigma",
or stereotype.
But explanations for close judicial scrutiny that turn on abstract
categorization of governmental action are not adequate. For exam-
ple, despite its continued appeal and undoubted relevance, failure of
the political process-the first index of constitutional suspectness ar-
ticulated by the Court in the modern era, 2 and, thanks largely to
Dean Ely's landmark work,43 the one most fully explored in the litera-
ture-cannot be a sufficient explanation for the decision to apply
strict scrutiny to racial classifications.
This is not so merely because public choice theory concludes, in
essence, that discrete and insular minorities are, in fact, unusually
likely to be advantaged in the representative political process,a4 nor
because of the holdings in cases like Adarand and Croson-holdings
that cannot be explained by any theory of representation reinforce-
ment-that racial classifications that are harmful to whites must be
34 United States v. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938) (dictum).
3 See Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U.S. 635, 638 (1986) (referring to "political[] power-
less[ness]").
36 Id.
37Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 176 (1972).
38 CaroleneProds., 304 U.S. at 152-53 n.4.
39 Lyng, 477 U.S. at 638.
40 See, e.g., City of Richmond v.J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989); Regents
of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 360 (1978) (Brennan, White, Marshall, &
Blackmun,JJ.).
41 See, e.g., Croson, 488 U.S. at 493-94.
42 See Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. at 152-53 n.4 (1938).
43 ELY, supra note 17.
44 See Samuel Issacharoff, Polarized Voting and the Political Process: The Transformation
of Voting RightsJurisprudence, 90 MiCH. L. REV. 1833, 1884-90 (1992); see also Ackerman,
supra note 18, at 723-24.
[Vol. 149: 1
2000] A COMPREHESJS1E APPROACH TO STRJCT SCRUTINY 17
subject to strict scrutiny. To begin with, whatever the empirical truth
about public choice theory, and whatever one thinks of the merits of
the Court's decisions in Croson and Adarand, surely an invidious, ra-
cially discriminatory law would not lose its abhorrent quality simply
because it was the product of a smoothly functioning democratic pro-
cess. Similarly, discrimination against an historically disadvantaged
minority group such as African Americans would be no less immoral
simply because it could be shown that the members of that group no
longer constitute a "discrete and insular" minority within the broader
American community. And finally, in light of the deeply rooted his-
tory of prejudicial attitudes toward African Americans, it is utterly un-
realistic to assume that the full participation by African Americans in
the political process would eradicate all official acts of racial discrimi-
nation.
Ultimately, no approach that relies on the abstract characteristics
of the classification or the disadvantaged class in order to determine
when strict scrutiny should apply is satisfactory. Although the charac-
teristics to which the Court has pointed are of undoubted relevance,
the Court's cases make it clear that no constellation of one or more of
them necessarily renders a classification suspect. Some classifications
made on the basis of immutable characteristics, of status that is not of
the individual's own making, or of characteristics that have historically
engendered discrimination have not been deemed suspect and have
not been subjected to strict scrutiny. At the same time, classifications
based on certain characteristics that have formally been reviewed un-
der a deferential rational basis test because they have not been
deemed suspect under the Court's current approach have nonetheless
sometimes been subjected to closer examination.4' From the other side,
despite reaching the conclusion that alienage is "inherently suspect,"
the Court has found it necessary to create an ad hoc exception so that
in many circumstances that purportedly suspect classification is itself
4-" See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 219 n.19 (1982) (illegal alienage); Mass. Bd.
of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313-14 (1976) (age); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973) (wealth).
" Compare, for example, City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432
(1985), applying covertly heightened scrutiny to a zoning ordinance applied to deny a
use permit for a group home for the mentally retarded, with Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312
(1993), applying deferential rational basis scrutiny to a distinction between the men-
tall, retarded and the mentally ill that bore more heavily on the former. See also Ro-
mer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (examining closely the fit between a state constitu-
tional amendment that discriminated against homosexuals and its asserted purpose
before invalidating it under what was formally called rational basis scrutiny).
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subject only to rational basis scrutiny." Indeed, the inadequacy of re-
liance on abstract characterization of classifications is reflected, too, in
the Court's very inability even to articulate consistently the list of the
characteristics that are supposedly relevant to a conclusion of suspect-
48ness.
The theoretical inadequacies of any approach based on considera-
tion in the abstract of the characteristics of a particular class or classi-
fication, and the Court's inability to apply this approach with any even
apparent consistency, suggest that there is a need for a different way
of understanding what should and does trigger strict scrutiny. An ex-
amination of the Court's cases provides just such an understanding:
the only comprehensive explanation for the Court's decisions in this
area must be that a decision to examine a classification closely reflects
a judgment that there are particular harms or risks that may render
the use of a characteristic in the particular way at issue inconsistent
with basic principles of human dignity.
b. Constitutionally Significant Risks and Harms Associated with
Government's Use of Race
The only adequate explanation-as both a descriptive and a nor-
mative matter-for application of strict scrutiny to classifications
47 Compare Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371-72 (1971) ("[C]lassifications
based on alienage... are inherently suspect and subject to close judicial scrutiny."),
with Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 295-97 (1978) (describing an exception under
which classifications that deny aliens the right to hold jobs that "involve[] discretionary
decisionmaking, or execution of policy, which substantially affects members of the po-
litical community"-a category so broad it was held to include the job of state highway
patrolman-are subjected only to rational basis scrutiny).
48 Compare, for example, the formulations used in Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents,
120 S. Ct. 631, 645-46 (2000) (asserting that "age is not a suspect classification" because
it "cannot be characterized as so seldom relevant to the achievement of any legitimate
state interest that laws grounded in such considerations are deemed to reflect preju-
dice and antipathy;" "older persons ... have not been subjected to a history of pur-
poseful unequal treatment;" and "[o]ld age also does not define a discrete and insular
minority" (quotation marks and citations omitted)), Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U.S. 635, 638
(1986) ("Close relatives are not a 'suspect' or 'quasi-suspect' class. As a historical mat-
ter, they have not been subjected to discrimination; they do not exhibit obvious, im-
mutable, or distinguishing characteristics that define them as a discrete group; and
they are not a minority or politically powerless."), and Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena,
515 U.S. 200, 218 (noting that Justice Powell's controlling opinion in Bakke had re-
jected the argument "that 'strict scrutiny' should apply only to classifications that dis-
advantage discrete and insular minorities" and had concluded that "racial and ethnic
distinctions of any sort are inherently suspect and thus call for the most exacting judi-
cial examination," regardless of whether the disadvantaged group met that description
(quotation marks and citations omitted)).
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based on race must be that the government's use of race is frequently
inconsistent with notions of human dignity. It is essential to any ra-
tional approach to strict scrutiny of racial classifications to articulate
the costs that may be associated with the government's use of race that
may render it so. What risks may it carry with it? What harms does it
work? Because the Equal Protection Clause is concerned both with
governmental purposes and with weighing marginal costs and bene-
fits, the requirements even of formally "strict" judicial scrutiny should
vary with the context in which the government seeks to use race, de-
pending upon the particular risks and harms the use of race at issue
may entail. It is therefore essential to any rational approach to strict
scrutiny of racial classifications to articulate the risks and harms that
may be imposed by those classifications. In Croson, the plurality con-
cluded that "searching judicial inquiry" was necessary to distinguish
legitimate from illegitimate uses of race by government! 9 Only by
understanding the harms that race-conscious government action can
cause-the things that ordinarily render it illegitimate-can one de-
termine the appropriate nature of that close judicial scrutiny.
The harms that justify strict scrutiny of racial classifications are
broader than a mere list of "cognizable" injuries. 5 Strict scrutiny
amounts to judicial intervention to address society-wide injuries with-
out regard for whether the plaintiff could allege these harms under
the traditional rules of standing. Indeed, to some extent the very idea
of strict scrutiny gives the lie to the narrow conception of the judicial
role often expressed in the law of standing. Undoubtedly, a plaintiff
who is himself injured by the government's use of race must meet the
requirements of Article III standing. But once a plaintiff with stand-
ing comes on the scene, society-wide injuries that might not be re-
dressable within some notions of individualized injury in fact are a
but-for trigger for judicial investigation into, and possible invalidation
of, statutes, regulations, and other governmental acts. Strict scrutiny,
and the potential invalidation of government action it entails, is nec-
essarily concerned with a wide class of injuries-some of which are so-
ciety-wide and some of which are imposed only on the individual.
Race, of course, is rarely relevant to any appropriate governmental
4, City of Richmond v.J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989); see also Adarand,
515 U.S. at 230 (noting that the job of the court applying strict scrutiny is to determine
the "ultimate xalidity" of the law before it).
See, e.g., Allen v. Knight, 468 U.S. 737, 755-56 (1984) (holding that "abstract
stigmatic injury" is not cognizable and that the plaintiffs therefore lacked Article III
standing).
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decision. But this alone does not support the conclusion that it must
be subjected to strict scrutiny. A decision to deny all people who
share some apparently irrelevant characteristic-say they were born
on a Monday--might be deemed arbitrary and therefore unlawful, but
the usual irrelevance of that characteristic alone would not render its
use inherently suspect.
In addition, there is the historical and current cultural signifi-
cance of this particular, ordinarily irrelevant characteristic: unlike the
status of being born on a Monday, race has been used for hundreds of
years to deny people individualized consideration-for jobs, housing,
places in school, and the like. Historically, despite its rare relevance,
skin color has often been understood to signify inferiority and to carry
a badge of stigma. African Americans have been understood to be
"degraded"5' and contact with them has sometimes been regarded by
members of the socially dominant racial group as disgusting."2 This
history gives race cultural significance today. Racial divisions are also
persistent, and feelings of hostility between racial groups can be par-
ticularly virulent.
In light of this history, then, what are the harms and risks that may
accompany the use of race by government to classify individuals?
First, there is a risk that, when race is used to classify, it is being
used as it traditionally was: to harm an unpopular group, to indicate
that the members of that group are unfit to partake of something
given to others or to associate with members of the group to which the
lawmakers belong, and to convey in this way the community's judg-
ment about the inherent worth of people of different kinds. The use
of race is suspect, in part, because in light of the principles that un-
derlie our nation-principles codified in the Equal Protection
Clause-the goal of harming members of a particular racial group on
the basis of stereotypical views about differences in human worth is
illegitimate. This risk suggests that all uses of race must be scrutinized
to ensure that race is not in fact being used to harm the disadvantaged
group for no reason other than racial hostility.
Second, and relatedly, there is the risk that the use of race reflects
nothing more than racial politics, a desire to reward the members of
(at least ordinarily) one's own racial group. In light of the continued
salience of racial categories in our society, and the immutability of
r1 Plessyv. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 560 (1896) (Harlan,J., dissenting).
52 See generally Peter J. Rubin, Equal Rights, Special Rights, and the Nature of Antidis-
crimination Law, 97 MICH. L. REV. 564, 590-91 (1998) (discussing the belief underlying
segregation that contact with blacks would corrupt or contaminate whites).
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race, the divisions such politics will reinforce along racial lines are
likely to have an enduring and deeply personally significant cast. Ra-
cial politics means that members of the out group are-or at least are
likely to feel as if they are-not full members of the polity. At bed-
rock, the exclusion of individuals from the polity on the basis of a trait
so tied up ith identity is inconsistent with the very notion of Ameri-
can democracy. It sends the message that we are not one people
comprised of myriad individuals, but several competing peoples. This
reinforces racial hostility. In light of the history of race, the perpetua-
tion of racial divisions that would be wrought by racial politics is likely
to be particularly harmful, both to the historically disadvantaged
group and to society at large. Close examination of racial classifica-
tions is therefore necessary to ensure that they reflect something more
than "simple racial politics.
' 3
Third, there is a risk that race is being used for reasons that reflect
nothing more than erroneous stereotypes. Maybe, even if its purpose
is not to impose harm, the use of race reflects an unjustified presump-
tion about the group. Strict scrutiny serves, in part, to address the
special risk that the decisionmaker has assumed something about a
racial group that is untrue. It requires a reviewing court to examine
the decision closely, and to check itself to ensure that the same type of
thinking does not infect its own decision whether to permit the classi-
fication to stand.
Concerns about a particular group's representation in the politi-
cal process are significant because they are relevant to these three
risks. Where a group is persistently outvoted because of prejudice'-
or is not represented at all--the likelihood that a classification is be-
ing used in these ways increases.
Although I have referred to the risk of erroneous stereotype, skep-
ticism about the use of race cannot be overcome merely by a showing
that race is "relevant" in the sense that it accurately correlates with
some consideration related to a legitimate governmental purpose.
That is, even accurate racial generalizations may not ordinarily form
Croson, 488 U.S. at 493.
This is the type of process failure suggested by footnote 4 in Carolene Products,
which speaks of "prejudice against discrete and insular minorities" as a "special condi-
tion, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinar-
ily to be relied upon to protect minorities." United States v. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S.
144, 152-53 n.4 (1938).
This may have been a concern, for example, that led the Court to closely exam-
ine the discrimination against the mentally retarded struck down in City of Cleburne v.
Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
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the basis for governmental decisionmaking if they deny individualized
consideration on the basis of race. For example, even if the percent-
age of African Americans among Ph.D.s in a particular field is, for
whatever reason, disproportionately small, a governmental employer
seeking only such Ph.D.s to fill ajob could not limit his consideration
only to white people. The use of race would not be considered "nar-
rowly tailored" to serve any "compelling governmental interest."
Where entitlement to a benefit turns on a certain skill or personal
quality, consideration for that benefit cannot be denied on the basis
of race, just because the use of race might be deemed, in a mathe-
matical sense, "rational." Race cannot be used as a proxy for some
other characteristic when that other characteristic itself can be meas-
ured. Race thus is treated differently than other proxies for relevant
characteristics, which may ordinarily be used by government.16
This reflects at least two additional risks. Fourth, the use of race,
even if it could be said rationally to further some legitimate purpose,
may perpetuate a negative racial stereotype. Even where race is not
being used to deny a benefit, every use of race carries the risk that it
will reinforce a badge of racial inferiority by perpetuating a negative
racial stereotype. Racial classifications that serve to reinforce a nega-
tive racial stereotype will not always obviously reflect a judgment of in-
feriority. They may reinforce stereotypes that are double-edged
swords-apparently positive traits that can be turned against members
of the group. Thus, negative racial stereotypes may include the belief
that members of a group are inherently "more clever," for example, or
"more friendly." Identification of such negative racial stereotypes may
require some knowledge of the history of social attitudes toward the
group in question.
Fifth, and perhaps more fundamentally, to make a decision to
grant or deny someone something on the basis of a characteristic such
as race, which is loaded with cultural significance, denies a person
treatment as an individual in a way that other sorting mechanisms do
not. This is in part because of the ordinary irrelevance of the charac-
teristic, but it is also because the use of a trait that has a great deal of
(especially negative) cultural significance-even when that character-
istic correlates with some real and relevant difference-is likely to re-
inforce an individual's sense that he or she is perceived simply as an
56 See Rubin, supra note 52 at 572-73 ("'Ae routinely and necessarily make decisions
on the basis of generalizations about various characteristics of the people we
meet.... [However,] when an antidiscrimination law is passed suddenly one charac-
teristic can no longer permissibly be used in decisionmaking.").
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indistinct and fungible member of his or her racial or ethnic group.
In this regard it is also significant that race and ethnicity, again, re-
main closely tied up with many individuals' sense of identity. Thus, if,
as one perhaps apocryphal story has it, it turned out that likingJell-O
for dessert was the best predictor of who would be a good fighter pi-
lot, and if the Air Force took to using enjoyment ofJell-O as a screen-
ing mechanism for determining who could be considered for pilot
training, those excluded from that one opportunity on this basis likely
would not feel the sting of being denied evaluation as an individual in
the same way they would if they had been denied the opportunity on
the basis of race-or at least not feel it as strongly.
Finally, there are two distinct harms that will always be caused by
the very use of a racial classification, regardless of whether it is being
used to disadvantage any individual. Although the Supreme Court
has not identified these as distinct harms, their presence means that
the government's use of race should always require justification:
Sixth, at the broadest level, the very use of race to identify people,
whether by government or by anyone else, will, at the margin, inevita-
bly have some divisive effect on the races by reinforcing the belief in
inherent racial differences, regardless of its correlation with tradi-
tional stereotypes. This will be so regardless of the particular law's
impact on the individual so classified. Any use of race may perpetuate
the type of stereotyped thinking that lies at the heart of discriminatory
attitudes. The belief in inherent racial difference that may be fostered
or reinforced by the use of race is antithetical to the American vision
of equality.
Seventh, at the most personal level, the use of race to classify indi-
viduals may well cause a dignitary harm to individuals who are classi-
fied according to race, regardless of whether anyone is disadvantaged
on the basis of their racial identity. This is something like the denial-
of-individual-treatment harm, but it does not depend upon the pur-
pose for which race is being used. In a nation in which, according to
a fundamental organizing principle of society, ideally skin color would
have no significance, the very identification of a person on the basis of
his or her race may well be felt as an affront.
Of course, as their descriptions make clear, these risks and harms
overlap and are interrelated. But it is the presence or absence of
these seven distinct harms that justifies close judicial examination of
race-conscious acts by government-and it is the presence or absence
of the same or similar risks and harms that will properly lead to a con-
clusion that any classification should be subject to searching review.
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Determining the point at which a particular classification inevita-
bly presents a sufficient constellation of such risks and harms that it
should be deemed "suspect" and always subjected to what can be de-
scribed as formally strict scrutiny is beyond the scope of this Article. It
is worth observing, however, that the conclusion that what is impor-
tant are the particular risks and harms inherent in any governmental
action suggests that the name "suspect classification" may be of less
utility than its prominence in the current jurisprudence of equal pro-
tection suggests. In certain circumstances, the use of even otherwise
insignificant lines may give rise to concerns that call for close exami-
nation. This can explain, for example, the Court's decisions in cases
like United States Department ofAgriculture v. MorenO7 and City of Cleburne
v. Cleburne Living Center to closely examine classifications that it has
not deemed inherently suspect. On the other hand, even acknowl-
edging that it is the harms and risks involved in particular cases that
justify close scrutiny rather than anything that can definitively be said
in the abstract about a particular classification, the use of the "sus-
pect" label and the invocation of formally strict scrutiny may well play
an important role in giving guidance to courts and government offi-
cials about what the Equal Protection Clause requires of them.
In any event, the important conclusion for present purposes is
that, if properly structured, the strict scrutiny called for by Adarand
and Croson, as well as by Shaw I and its progeny, should provide a re-
viewing court with an answer to the equal protection question ("Is
there a genuine difference between the two groups that renders the
difference in treatment rational, and does the disparate treatment
serve a sufficiently important goal that it transcends whatever harm is
done by the use of the line drawn by the particular law?") in light of
the particular constellation of harms that may be wrought by the use
of race before it. This is the only way that "strict scrutiny" can serve
the purpose for which it is inescapably designed.
Whatever the formal description of the scrutiny applied to race-
conscious government decisionmaking, the strength of the justifica-
tion that is required will necessarily vary with the context in which the
government seeks to use race and the types of risks and harms its use
57 413 U.S. 528 (1973) (purporting to apply "rational basis" scrutiny, but then
closely examining and invalidating a classification designed to deny food stamps to
"hippies" who had chosen to live together despite being unrelated to each other).
473 U.S. 432 (1985) (purporting to apply "rational basis" scrutiny, but then
closely examining and invalidating a denial of a use permit for a group home for the
mentally retarded).
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of race may entail. Similarly, the extent to which racial classification
must not be used in favor of available, but inferior, race-neutral alter-
natives will vary in the same way. For example, the strength of the in-
terest required to justify the collection of racial data for statistical
purposes will undoubtedly be less than the strength of the interest re-
quired for denying a person a government benefit on the basis of
race.
Despite the Court's potentially confusing insistence in Adarand
that in reviewing race-conscious classifications, courts must use a "con-
sisten[t]" standard,54 the Court's decisions demonstrate the vitality of
this principle. Indeed, it appears to have been explicitly recognized
by the Adarand Court, which said that it understood "the difference
between 'an engine of oppression' and an effort 'to foster equality in
society,'" and explained that the uniform use of "strict" scrutiny did
not mean automatic invalidation of laws that classify on the basis of
race.
B. A Proposal for a Strict Scrutiny That Serves Its Purpose
In any approach to strict scrutiny, the touchstone for analysis must
be equality-after all, the text of the constitutional provision at issue
guarantees "equal protection of the laws. " 6' As described above, in
light of the history of racial discrimination in the United States, the
harms that inescapably inhere in the classification of persons by race,
and the dangers that always accompany it, any use of race in govern-
ment decisionmaking requires substantial justification. Indeed, if the
need for racial classification were ever presumed, the law could work
to hamper the evolution of racial equality, rather than to further it.
The costs of race-conscious government action, however, will vary
with the circumstances and the particular way in which race is used.
Given the purpose of equal protection analysis, the amount of leeway
given government officials to address problems, even through race-
conscious action, should vary with the costs of the particular action
the government seeks to undertake. At one extreme are racial classi-
fications used to deny members of a traditionally disfavored group,
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 224 (1995) (asserting that
.consistency" of approach is one of the "three general propositions" about review of
governmental racial classifications established by the Court's precedents).
Id. (quoting id. at 243 (Stevens,J., dissenting)).
U.S. CONST. amend. XlV, § 1.
26 UNIVERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA LA WREVEW
classically African Americans, some good enjoyed by everyone else. '
These impose all of the traditional harms of old-fashioned racial dis-
crimination. At the other extreme are uses of race that impose mini-
mal harm on people of any race, for example, a request by the Census
Bureau that people indicate their race on a census form. There are
also uses of race that are in the middle. The use of race in districting,
for example, is a distinct kind of race-conscious government action
whose validity must be assessed on the basis of its own characteristics;
it falls somewhere in between these two extremes.
If it is to play a role in helping to answer the equal protection
question, strict scrutiny must be flexible enough to recognize that dif-
ferent uses of race pose different risks and impose different harms.
To determine what risks and harms are present requires a careful ex-
amination of the factual circumstances and social contexts in which
the use of race by government has taken place.
1. Describing This Approach: A Taxonomy of
Race-Conscious Government Action
The Court's cases can be understood to describe a taxonomy of
race-conscious government action that contains four discrete catego-
ries. Applying the principle described above, the characteristics of
each type of race-conscious action call for a unique degree ofjustifica-
tion. Indeed, although the Court has never expressly acknowledged
these different categories, its equal protection cases from a wide range
of areas, from well known affirmative action opinions to obscure deci-
sions involving desegregation, can best be understood to describe just
such an approach.
a. Category One: Classifications That Disadvantage Members of Historically
Disfavored Racial Minority Groups
The most common way in which racial classifications have been
used in American history has been to deny rights or benefits to mem-
62 For simplicity, I will generally use examples in which there are only two relevant
racial groups, a white majority and an historically disadvantaged African American mi-
nority. I will not refer either to the complexities that arise when a polity contains
members of more than one historically disadvantaged racial minority group or to those
that arise when individuals identify themselves with more than one racial or ethnic
group. Nor in general will I address the complex issue of categories that may be con-
sidered more or less analogous to race, such as sex or sexual orientation.
These categories fall along a continuum, and could analytically, although not
usefully, be further subdivided.
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bers of historically disfavored racial minority groups, archetypally Af-
rican Americans. Racial classifications that disadvantage African
Americans present all the risks and costs I have described above. With
regard to this first category of race-based classification, Professor Gun-
ther's famous 1972 description of strict scrutiny remains true today.
Scrutiny of such classifications has been "'strict' in theory and fatal in
fact."" No such classification has been upheld since Brown v. Board of
Education'' was decided in 1954.
This category includes not only those classifications that deny
something concrete or tangible to African Americans, but also those
classifications that separate black people from white, even if they ap-
pear to treat the members of each group equally. This latter point is
the teaching of Brown. Although the point has been clouded by those
who argue that Brown issued a constitutional command that govern-
ment must act in a colorblind fashion,6 the holding of Brown was not
that the classification and separation of the races in public schools was
ab initio an impermissible violation of the rights of all citizens because
it classified individuals on the basis of race. Rather, Brown held that
the black children's individual rights were violated by segregating
them on the basis of race because of the harm segregation imposed
upon them. 7
In its formulation, the Brown Court said of the black schoolchil-
dren: "To separate them from others of similar age and qualifications
solely because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their
status in the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a
way unlikely ever to be undone.""s The Court might have emphasized
the objective harm wrought by the pervasive system of official apart-
heid as well as the subjective feelings of the black students. But the
historic step in Brown was the examination of the use of race in its so-
cial context and the recognition that, in the context of public educa-
tion, "stigmatic" harm to blacks inheres in the governmental separa-
tion of people on the basis of race, notwithstanding the provision of
formal equality.69 It was the harm to members of the disadvantaged
, Gunther, supra note 3, at 8.
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
See, e.g., City of Richmond v.J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 521 (1989) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (quoting Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissent-
ing)).
Brown, 347 U.S. at 494-95.
Id. at 494.
See id. at 495 ("I ile hold that the plaintiffs and others similarly situated for whom
the actions have been brought are, by reason of the segregation complained of, de-
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group that brought segregation, even if formally equal, within the re-
medial ambit of the Equal Protection Clause.
Conservative scholars in the years following Brown criticized the
decision on the ground that separate-but-equal segregation could not
truly be said to disadvantage blacks on the basis of their race. 7  The
best defense of Brown, one that remains persuasive today, was put for-
ward by Professor Black, who defended the decision in Brown as an
appropriate response to a denial of equality on the basis of race:
[S]egregation was imposed on one race by the other race; consent was
not invited or required.... This fact ... confirms the picture which a
casual or deep observer is likely to form... not of mutual separation of
whites and Negroes, but of one in-group enjoying full normal communal
life and one out-group that is banned from this life and forced into an
inferior one of its own....
Segregation is historically and contemporaneously associated in a
functioning complex with practices which are indisputably and grossly
discriminatory.... Here we have two things. First, a certain group of
people is "segregated." Secondly, at about the same time, the very same
group of people, down to the last man and woman, is barred, or sought
to be barred, from the common political life of the community-from all
political power....
... Our question is whether discrimination inheres in that segrega-
tion which is imposed by law in the twentieth century in certain specific
states in the American Union. And that question has meaning and can
find an answer only on the ground of history and of common knowledge
about the facts of life in the times and places aforesaid.
I conclude.., that the Court had the soundest reasons for judging
that segregation violates the fourteenth amendment. These reasons
make up the simple syllogism with which I began: The fourteenth
amendment commands equality, and segregation as we know it is ine-
quality.
prived of the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment."
(emphasis added)).
0 More specifically, Professor Wechsler wrote that the only basis upon which the
decision could be sustained was that segregation denied black schoolchildren the right
to associate with white schoolchildren. He concluded, however, that there was no neu-
tral basis for preferring the claim of blacks to a right to associate over the claim of
whites to a right to choose not to. Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Consti-
tutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1, 32-34 (1959).
71 Charles L. Black, Jr., The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L.J. 421,
425-28 (1960).
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This understanding of the decisions outlawing segregation has not
been superseded by a view that they outlaw all race-conscious govern-
ment action." Indeed, in a significant portion of its 1992 opinion in
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, the Supreme
Court again expressed the view that the Brown decision was based on
the fact that racial segregation "treats the black race as inferior."
73
The Court in Casey concluded that the decision in Brown to overrule
Plessy v. Ferguson"4 was justified precisely because of the Court's recog-
nition of the actual inequality inherent in segregation:
The Court in Brown addressed th[e] facts [concerning the nature of
segregation] by observing that whatever may have been the understand-
ing in Plessy's time of the power of segregation to stigmatize those who
were segregated with a "badge of inferiority," it was clear by 1954 that le-
gally sanctioned segregation had just such an effect, to the point that ra-
cially separate public educational facilities were deemed inherently une-
qual .... While we think P/essy was wrong the day it was decided, we must
also recognize that the Plessy Court's explanation for its decision was so
clearly at odds with the facts apparent to the Court in 1954 that the deci-
sion to reexamine Plessy was on this ground alone not only justified but
required. 75
Brown rests upon the imposition of disadvantage based on mem-
bership in the disfavored racial minority group, not on any broader
principle forbidding all race-conscious government action. 76 The use
of race to segregate, then, is invalid under equal protection principles
precisely because it imposes a disadvantage on African Americans on
the basis of their race.77
There is, however, a compelling argument that when government provides sen-
ices and facilities, white and black people alike have a substantive due process right
that the services not be provided in a segregated manner. Cf Bolling v. Sharpe, 347
U.S. 497, 499-500 (1954) (holding that the operation of segregated schools in the Dis-
trict of Columbia violates Due Process). This would have afforded an alternative basis
for the decision in Brown.
7.i 505 U.S. 833, 862 (1992).
74 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
Casey, 505 U.S. at 863 (citation omitted).
Likewise, it is the continued social meaning of segregation, and not, as Justice
Thomas would have it, "the idea that any school that is black is inferior, and that blacks
cannot succeed without the benefit of the company of whites," that justifies the con-
tinued court-ordered desegregation of public schools. Missouri v.Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70,
119 (1995) (Thomas,J, concurring).
77 Those few other judicially invalidated racial classifications that may appear at
first blush to treat the members of both races equally in reality also imposed a detri-
ment upon blacks. In Lovingv. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), the anti-miscegenation law
prevented blacks from marrying people they could have married if they were white,
and whites from marrying people they could have married if they were black. The
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One can create bizarre hypotheticals in which we can imagine a
race-based classification in this first category that might be upheld.
But it would have to serve goals of the very highest order (that is the
meaning of "compelling" state interest in this context) and it would
only be permissible if the cost of any alternative would itself compro-
mise a goal of similar importance (that is a concept that is captured in
part by the idea of "narrow tailoring"). For example, Justice Stevens
has suggested that race could be used in choosing an undercover po-
lice officer to infiltrate a criminal group all of whose members were of
the same race.78 In such a circumstance, the only race-neutral alterna-
tives would be not to enforce the law against the group or to risk the
life of an officer.79 Nonetheless, racial classifications in this first cate-
gory are impermissible unless they serve the most important purpose,
and if race-neutral alternatives exist, they must be used unless the
costs would be very grave indeed.
b. Category Two: Racial Classifications That Benefit Members of
Historically Disfavored Groups
A second category of racial classifications includes those that
benefit members of historically disfavored groups, particularly African
Americans. These are race-conscious plans of affirmative action.
These classifications take different forms and work in different ways,
but normally they are brought before courts because they favor blacks
(or members of other historically disadvantaged groups) in the distri-
bution of some scarce resource. This imposes a concomitant disad-
statute thus imposed detrimental inequality upon members of both races. Different
individual members of each group were disadvantaged on the basis of their race. Such
"evenhanded" discrimination is, of course, discrimination nonetheless. In Anderson v.
Martin, 375 U.S. 399 (1964), a Louisiana statute required that the race of each candi-
date for election be placed next to his name on each ballot. Portions of Anderson sug-
gest that the Court understood the statute, "in the light of 'private attitudes and pres-
sures' towards Negroes at the time of its enactment," to have amounted to harmful
discrimination against black candidates. Id. at 403 (citation omitted); see LAURENCE H.
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw, § 16-16, at 1481 n.9 (2d ed. 1988) (discussing
Anderson).
78 SeeWygant vJackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 314 (1986) (Stevens,J., dissent-
ing).
In recent years, it has been suggested that it would be permissible to use race to
determine which police officers to send to particular neighborhoods to enforce the
law. In many contexts, such a use of race would likely be held impermissible, amount-
ing to nothing more than government bowing to the privately held prejudices of the
citizenry. See Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984) (holding that the potential
prejudice towards a child living with a stepparent of a different race is not a permissi-
ble consideration for the removal of the child from its natural mother because the law
cannot be used to give effect to private prejudices).
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xantage upon members of the white majority (or other historically ad-
vantaged group).
Although the Supreme Court has recently ruled in Adarand Con-
structors, Inc. v. Pen80 that these classifications, whether employed by
the states or the federal government, are all to be subjected to for-
mally strict scrutiny, it has also strongly suggested that such race-
conscious action can in some circumstances be justified. The Adarand
plurality wrote:
[ ,e wish to dispel the notion that strict scrutiny is "strict in theory, but
fatal in fact." The unhappy persistence of both the practice and the lin-
gering effects of racial discrimination against minority groups in this
country is an unfortunate reality, and government is not disqualified
from acting in response to it. As recently as 1987, for example, everyJus-
tice of this Court agreed that the Alabama Department of Public Safety's
.pervasive, systematic, and obstinate discriminatory conduct" justified a
narrowly tailored race-based remedy. When race-based action is neces-
sary to further a compelling interest, such action is within constitutional
constraints if it satisfies the "narrow tailoring" test this Court has set out
in previous cases.81
The use of race in these circumstances presents good reason for
searching examination, but these uses of race do not present all the
risks inherent in racial classifications that burden historically disfa-
vored groups. As with all racial classifications, there are the dignitary
and divisive harms described above. These are substantial costs, and
their presence means race should not be used casually. There is some
risk, too, that an affirmative action plan might reflect nothing more
than racial politics. There is also the risk of stereotype, although in
this circumstance the risk is a paternalistic stereotype that help is
- 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
Al Id. at 237 (plurality opinion of O'Connor, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and
Kennedy & Thomas, J.) (citations omitted). Although neither the Court nor Justice
Scalia, who concurred in part and concurred in the judgment, indicated precisely what
portions ofJustice O'Connor's opinion he did not join, this portion is almost certainly
inconsistent with his views. Each of the four dissenting Justices took at least as broad a
view of the permissibility of race-conscious action to benefit members of historically
disadvantaged minority groups as did the plurality. See id. at 243 (Stevens, J., joined by
Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (distinguishing invidious discrimination from remedial race-
based preferences); id. at 265-66 (Souter, J., joined by Ginsburg & Breyer, jJ., dissent-
ing) (agreeing with justice Stevens's conclusion that stare decisis compelled applica-
tion of Fullilove v. Kutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980), under which a minority business en-
terprise set-aside was upheld); id. at 271 (Ginsburg, J.,joined by Breyer, J., dissenting)
(maintaining that the Court should defer to Congressional legislation enacted to over-
come historic racial subjugation). The 1987 case mentioned in the quotation is United
States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149 (1987).
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needed where it is not, rather than a stereotype of unfitness.
These risks can be addressed by a careful examination, first by the
adopting authority and subsequently by any reviewing court, of the ac-
tual situation of the members of each group in the context in which
race has been used, to ensure that the benefit conferred addresses
some genuine difference in the real-world situation of the group be-
ing given aid and that the benefits of any such program outweigh any
costs imposed on members of the historically disadvantaged group.
But there is far less risk in this category, especially when the
authorities adopting the plan are not themselves members of the his-
torically disadvantaged group,2 that such classifications are being used
solely to impose upon either group a demeaning and dehumanizing
badge of inferiority by implying that one group is unfit to partake of a
benefit given to others.5 Indeed, the quality of affirmative action dif-
fers substantially from that of traditional racial discrimination because
those who are disadvantaged by affirmative action have suffered no
history of official or private discrimination that, in its social context,
has been used to deny the human dignity, indeed the very humanity,
of all the individuals in the group.
This suggests both that there are lower (although significant)
costs associated with the use of race in the second category, and that
there is a greater possibility that such race-conscious actions are, in
fact, justifiable. Undoubtedly, it is true that there is some incidental
82 See ELY, supra note 17, at 170 ("There is no danger that the coalition that makes
up the white majority in our society is going to deny to whites generally their right to
equal concern and respect.").
I intentionally avoid the "discrete and insular minority" formulation initially ar-
ticulated in Carolene Products as a basis for distinguishing affirmative action from invidi-
ous discrimination. It seems to me inadequate to say that the problem of racial dis-
crimination by government is solely one of a failure of certain groups to be
represented in the political process. As described above, see supra text accompanying
notes 42-44, I do not believe that once an historically disadvantaged minority group
such as African Americans is no longer "discrete and insular," discrimination against
members of that group should be any more permissible. Nor, in light of the deeply
rooted history of prejudicial attitudes toward African Americans, do I think that black
participation in the political process is likely to eradicate all official acts of racial dis-
crimination. I do think that members of the historically dominant racial group, whites,
are unlikely to act to harm members of their own group because of racial hatred of
whites, or a view that whites are inherently inferior to blacks. By contrast, psychologi-
cal and sociological studies tend to suggest that members of historically disfavored
groups may in fact internalize and act upon negative views of their own group. See Cas-
taneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 503 (1977) (Marshall,J, concurring) ("Social scientists
agree that members of minority groups frequently respond to discrimination and
prejudice by attempting to disassociate themselves from the group, even to the point of
adopting the majority's negative attitudes towards the minority.").
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cost to affirmative action plans in that they reinforce (or perhaps even
create) an impression of disability on the part of the group that the
legislature seeks to help. Affirmative action can foster a sense that,
without help, its beneficiaries are unable to compete. It can also rein-
force preexisting divisions, creating resentment on both sides. But,
unlike the exclusion of, or reservation of special roles for, people on
the basis of their race, a decision by members of the traditionally
dominant group to invite members of the traditionally disfavored
group to participate with them in some desirable activity cannot, on
balance, send a dehumanizing message about the members of the tra-
ditionally disfavored group. And, as the plurality observed in Adarand,
a history of separation of, and discrimination against, African Ameri-
cans has left a world in which, at least for now, race-conscious actions
that benefit them may indeed serve some significant governmental
purposes.
Consistent with this, although race-conscious government actions
of this type have triggered genuinely searching judicial review, the Su-
preme Court has not always found racial classifications in this second
category impermissible. Of course, for many years, a debate among
the members of the Court raged in its affirmative action cases about
the appropriate level of judicial scrutiny. But if Adarand truly signals
the end of the era in which the level of scrutiny almost invariably pre-
dicts each case's outcome-and when coupled with the Court's deci-
sion in Romer v. Evans,84 in which it invalidated a classification based
on sexual orientation while applying what it described as "rational ba-
sis" scrutiny, there is at least some evidence of a trend in that direc-
tion-it may be appropriate to say, as the Adarand plurality did, that
the scrutiny applied to these classifications, however it is described,
has in practice not been the fatal scrutiny applied to race-based classi-
fications that materially disadvantage or forcibly separate the mem-
bers of an historically disadvantaged minority group.
Indeed, every member of the Court to address the issue, except
Justice Scalia, has agreed that in certain circumstances even state gov-
ernments, which do not have the special responsibility to enforce
through appropriate legislation the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment,85 are permitted to provide some people who
are not themselves the immediate victims of discrimination with a
privilege on the basis of membership in an historically disadvantaged
" 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
Cf U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5 ("The Congress shall have power to enforce, by
appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.").
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racial minority group, despite the concomitant disadvantage imposed
on other individuals on the basis of their membership in the white
majority. 6 The Court has held in majority or controlling opinions
that there are two interests that suffice to justify the use of race-based
affirmative action: the interest in diversity and the interest in remedy-
ing "past and present" discrimination.
First, applying the "strict scrutiny" formulation, the controlling
opinion in what at least for now remains the Supreme Court's leading
affirmative action case, Regents of the University of California v. Bakke,
approved of the use of race by a state government for the purpose of
achieving racial diversity.87 Second, the Court in Local 28, Sheet Metal
Compare, e.g., Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 286 (1986)
(O'Connor,J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) ("The Court is in
agreement that, whatever the formulation employed, remedying past or present racial
discrimination by a state actor is a sufficiently weighty state interest to warrant the re-
medial use of a carefully constructed affirmative action program."), with City of Rich-
mond v.J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 526 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring) ("[A] State
may 'undo the effects of past discrimination' in the sense of giving the identified victim
of state discrimination that which it wrongfully denied him .... That is worlds apart
from the system here, in which those to be disadvantaged are identified solely by
race."). Justice Thomas has not commented upon this question since his elevation to
the Supreme Court, although he joined the language in Adarand that is quoted supra
at text accompanying note 81.
87 438 U.S. 265, 314 (Powell, J.) (concluding that the "interest of [student] diver-
sity is compelling in the context of a university's admissions program"). In Bakke a
fractured Court struck down the affirmative action plan adopted by the Medical School
of the University of California at Davis, which set aside a certain number of positions in
each incoming class for members of historically disadvantaged racial minority groups.
Justice Powell held it invalid on constitutional grounds. See id. at 315-20 (Powell, J.).
Four other members of the Court held it invalid under a federal statute. See id. at 408-
21 (Stevens, J.,joined by Burger, C.J., and Stewart & Rehnquist, JJ., concurring in the
judgment in part and dissenting in part) (holding that Section 601 of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 prohibits the use of race as a "basis of excluding anyone from participation
in a federally funded program").
The Court, however, also reversed the judgment of the court below that race could
not be taken into account at all by the University of California at Davis in its admissions
plan. The Court concluded that affirmative action plans that take race into account as
"one element" to be weighed in the admissions process do pass constitutional muster.
Id. at 318 (Powell,J.); id. at 320 (opinion of the Court by Powell,J., joined by Brennan,
White, Marshall, & Blackmun, JJ.) (approving a "properly devised admissions program
involving the competitive consideration of race and ethnic origin").
Although only Justice Powell applied "strict" scrutiny, his conclusion that the inter-
est in diversity is sufficiently "compelling" to justify the use of race in medical school
admissions does amount to a holding of the Court. "When a fragmented Court de-
cides a case and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five Jus-
tices, 'the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by those Members
who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds.'" Marks v. United States,
430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976)
(Stewart, Powell, & Stevens,,U.)). The interest in diversity recognized byJustice Powell
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Workers' International Association v. EEOC, purporting again to apply
strict scrutiny, upheld the conscious use of race by a court in creating
a racial quota for membership and advancement in a union as a rem-
edy for the union's past discrimination." The same result was reached
in the controlling opinion in United States v. Paradise, in which a court
order imposing race-based numerical goals for hiring by the Alabama
State Police as a remedy for past and present discrimination was chal-
lenged.79 The Court has also twice upheld race-conscious actions by
the federal government that provided a benefit to the members of his-
torically disadvantaged minority groups, first in Fullilove v. Klutznick,90
where the justification was remedying past discrimination, and again
(applying formally "intermediate" scrutiny) in Metro Broadcasting, Inc.
v. FCC,9' where the justification was the attainment of diversity.
Although the Court has thus at various times labeled "compelling"
the interests it believes are sufficient to permit a state to take race-
conscious action, these interests could not justify a use of race that
provided something unequal and inferior to an historically disadvan-
taged racial group. For example, a mandatory blacks-only public
school, imposing a Category One racial discrimination of the type de-
scribed above, could not be justified under the Equal Protection
Clause on the ground that it "remedied past discrimination" by instill-
ing pride and values in black students in order to permit them to
overcome the racism of the society of which they, like all schoolchil-
in Bakke has not always been recognized in subsequent opinions in the Court's affirma-
tive action cases. Compare Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 612 (1990)
(O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("Modern equal protection doctrine has recognized only
one [compelling] interest: remedying the effects of racial discrimination."), with
Wygant v.Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 286 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring in
part and concurring in thejudgment) ("[A]lithough its precise contours are uncertain,
a state interest in the promotion of racial diversity has been found sufficiently 'compel-
ling,' at least in the context of higher education, to support the use of racial considera-
tions in furthering that interest."). The status of Justice Powell's opinion has become
controversial. See, e.g., Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 944-45 (5th Cir. 1996) ("[T]he
Bakke Court did not express a majority view and is questionable as binding prece-
dent.").
86 478 U.S. 421 (1986). The strength of this interest is less controversial. See, e.g.,
Shaw v. Hunt (Shaw R), 517 U.S. 899, 909 (1996) ("A State's interest in remedying the
effects of past or present racial discrimination may in the proper case justify a govern-
ment's use of racial distinctions."); United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 196 (1987)
(O'Connor, J., dissenting) (stating that there is "a compelling interest in remedying
past and present discrimination").
480 U.S. 149 (1987).
448 U.S. 448 (1980).
91 497 U.S. 547 (1990), overruled in part by Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515
U.S. 200 (1995).
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dren, are being trained to be full members.92 In light of the cost of
segregation, such a purpose would not be found adequately "compel-
ling."
Nor in its past approval of race-conscious government action in
this second category has the Court applied the same requirement of
"narrow tailoring" that we saw in Category One. In that context, the
"narrow tailoring" requirement is "used to require consideration of
whether lawful alternative and less restrictive means could have been
used."93 Yet, even in those cases in which the Court has indicated race-
based government action of this second kind may be permissible, the
conscious use of race has not always been the least restrictive means of
achieving the government's asserted goal.
For example, the goal of attaining a diverse student body, ap-
proved as a "compelling" interest by the controlling opinion in Bakke,
could have been achieved without race-conscious government action
by selecting the student body at random. Of course, insisting on such
an approach would have required the University of California to
choose between, on the one hand, a diverse student body and, on the
other hand, one that was tailored to ensure the inclusion, and an ap-
propriate mix, of those nonracial qualities and qualifications that have
traditionally been valued in the creation of a student community. The
holding in Bakke means that in terms of narrow tailoring, the Court
genuinely requires only that the use of race for purposes of affirmative
action be the least restrictive means of achieving the government's
goal without compromising other important governmental objectives.
92 On the other hand, if a separate educational facility were made available exclu-
sively for voluntary attendance by members of a racial minority-for example, if a
community opened a public school in which only black students might voluntarily en-
roll-the government's use of race might fall into this second category. Several such
experimental schools have been suggested in recent years as a way to provide better
educational opportunity and a nurturing, discrimination-free environment for black
students, particularly African American males. See generally MichaelJohn Weber, Note,
Immersed in an Educational Crisis: Alternative Programs for African-American Males, 45
STAN. L. REV. 1099, 1100 & nn.5-10 (1993).
The exclusion of white students would not render such a school unconstitutional
ab initio, and the voluntary nature of the school might well neutralize the stigma of
exclusion that rendered the school in Brown unequal. If the school could be justified
by a strong interest, the achievement of which required drawing a racial line, such as
the situation of black students in light of discrimination in the community, it might be
held permissible. Evaluation of any such experimental school, however, would require
an intensive, case-specific inquiry, and the risk that the formally voluntary school might
come to be viewed as a de facto black school and the other schools as de facto white
might well suffice to invalidate it.
Wygant v.Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 280 n.6 (1986) (plurality opinion).
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Neither the plurality opinion in City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.,
which requires that state-enacted affirmative action plans be subjected
to formally strict scrutiny, nor the plurality opinion in Adarand pur-
ports to disturb the conclusions reached in the Court's prior cases
that race-based affirmative action sometimes may pass constitutional
muster under that test. Indeed, the plurality opinion in Adarand states
that "[t] he point of strict scrutiny is to 'differentiate between' permis-
sible and impermissible governmental uses of race."9 4 This point was
made again by its author, Justice O'Connor, in her concurring opin-
ion in Missouri v.Jenkins, which was handed down on the same day: "It
is only by applying strict scrutiny that we can distinguish between un-
constitutional discrimination and narrowly tailored remedial pro-
grams that legislatures may enact to further the compelling govern-
mental interest in redressing the effects of past discrimination."95
As the cases demonstrate, because classifications in Category Two
raise fewer concerns than race-conscious action in Category One,
strict scrutiny takes a slightly different shape: the idea of "compelling"
state interests is somewhat relaxed. Interests that may justify the use
of race in Category Two would be too weak to be accepted injustifica-
ton of Category One racial classifications. Similarly, the narrow tai-
loring requirement is somewhat relaxed: the government need not
prove absolute necessity. Its use of race may be accepted even in the
presence of a race-neutral alternative if the use of that alternative
would require the sacrifice of some other important value. This
change in the nature of strict scrutiny is justified by the very nature of
the equal protection inquiry. Where the harms and risks associated
with the use of race are reduced, the strength of the required justifica-
tions and the degree of required necessity for the use of race should
be commensurately lower.
c. Category Three: Classificationsfor Purposes of Districting
i. A Third Category
Assessment of these first two categories would exhaust most schol-
arly discussion of race-based classifications." The use of race to draw
geographic districts, however, represents a distinct third category of
race-conscious government action that previously has not been de-
4 515 U.S. at 228 (quoting id. at 245 (StevensJ, dissenting)).
515 U.S. 70, 112 (1995) (O'ConnorJ., concurring).
See, e.g., STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 595-697 (3d ed. 1996).
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scribed as such in the literature. For the same reasons that affirmative
action is somewhat easier to justify than the traditional form of dis-
crimination against members of historically disfavored racial groups,
race-conscious districting that does not segregate the races should be
somewhat easier to justify than affirmative action.
Plans of districting are used to place every person in one or an-
other administrative unit within ajurisdiction. On whatever basis dis-
tricting plans are drawn, they do not deny anyone the good it is their
immediate purpose to distribute. A fairly simple case of districting,
for example, is the drawing of school attendance zones. (The analysis
of school attendance zones is easier than that of electoral districts, the
focus of much of the rest of this Article, because the quality of one's
placement in one or another district does not depend on the aggrega-
tion of one's actions with those of the others placed in the same dis-
trict.)
Notwithstanding the basis upon which they are drawn, school at-
tendance zones place every child in a school. One can imagine a
school district deciding to integrate its segregated public schools by
drawing attendance zones that take the race of individuals in the ju-
risdiction into account. (Race of course will never be the only factor;
to be workable, attendance zones will have to meet some minimum
requirements of compactness and contiguity.)
Although the use of race for this purpose will share with other
race-conscious actions many of the costs described above, it does not
exclude, so there is little risk that race-conscious districting that does
not segregate will send a message that members of one or the other
group are inferior and unfit to partake of some otherwise available
public good on the basis of their race. Nor, for the same reason,
could such districting reflect racial politics.
Moreover, when race is used for drawing school attendance zones
it does not supplant some substantive criteria for evaluating students
that could be called "merit-based" and that would otherwise be used
to distribute the good in question. Thus, unlike the affirmative action
plans deemed permissible by the Court in Bakke, not only will a plan
of school attendance zones drawn to take race into account never re-
sult in a person's exclusion from school altogether, it will not result in
the exclusion from a particular school, on the basis of race, of any
person who would otherwise have been entitled to admission to that
school on some arguably merit-based race-neutral criteria.
This is one of the essential objections to affirmative action put
forward by its opponents. For example, Martin Peretz has written that
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"[t]he regime of racial and ethnic set-asides in education and em-
ployment makes victims of others who, on simple standards of merit,
would have won the places reserved now by custom and law for mem-
bers of particular groups. " , The use of race in districting does not
deny anyone anything to which they would otherwise be entitled.
For this same reason, in a districting context, there is no risk, as
there is in the context of affirmative action, that a government body
taking account of race is acting on the basis of a belief that blacks are
less able than whites or inherently in need of assistance."s Nor can it
reasonably be thought that a deliberately integrative plan of school
attendance zones would send an incidental message that blacks are
inferior to whites or less able to compete. If race is considered in a
districting decision that integrates schools, it will supplant only some
other essentially administrative procedure for assigning students to
schools, not some arguably merit-based substantive criteria by which
students would otherwise have been assigned to schools.
The absence of these costs distinguishes the use of race to draw
school attendance zones from the uses of race in Category Two, race-
conscious affirmative action. In light of the equal protection question
that scrutiny of racial classifications is designed to help answer (a
question that requires weighing the benefits against the costs of each
use of race), the absence of these harms should mean that under a
properly calibrated form of strict scrutiny, the use of race in this type
of districting should be more easily justified, upon a lesser showing of
relative necessity, than should the use of race for purposes of affirma-
tive action.
This is not to say that the use of race in this third category is cost-
.1 Martin Peretz, A Class Thing, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Oct. 31, 1994, at 11, 12.
1K Justice Thomas has suggested that a desire for integration must be based on the
view that blacks can only be educated if they are placed in the classroom with whites.
See Missouri v.Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 118-19 (1995) (ThomasJ., concurring) ("In effect,
the court [below] found that racial imbalances... continued to inflict harm on black
students. This position appears to rest upon the idea that any school that is black is
inferior, and that blacks cannot succeed without the benefit of the company of
whites."). If that were, in fact, the basis for Brown's conclusion that segregation is
harmful to African American children, it would have to be overruled. But Brown does
not depend upon a view that black children can only learn if placed next to white chil-
dren. Rather, the best explanation for Brown is that, against the backdrop of the his-
tory and cultural meaning of race in the United States today, the separation of African
Americans from other citizens sends a stigmatizing message about the members of that
race. See supra text accompanying notes 68-77. As long as segregation retains the
harmful (and unlawful) character of sending a stigmatic message of inferiority to
members of the historically disadxantaged group, it cannot be that integration is harm-
ful in the same way.
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free. There undoubtedly are costs to the use of race to integrate
school districts, costs that warrant close examination. To begin with,
when race is used there is still the threat of stigmatizing a group by
placing people in separate attendance zones on the basis of race. The
precise way in which race-based lines are being used therefore must be
closely examined. If lines are drawn that segregate, a districting plan
that takes race into account will actually fall into the first category of
race-conscious action and would likely be unjustifiable.
There is also the risk that the decision to use race is based on an
inaccurate racial generalization. In the example where schools within
a district are being integrated, ensuring that the use of race in draw-
ing attendance zone lines was not based on stereotype would require a
fairly sensitive appraisal of the racial circumstance in the local com-
munity. In most social contexts in which the separation of the races
would be understood to indicate the inferiority of African Americans,
race will have sufficient independent meaning that a conclusion that
integration is a valuable good will be easily supported. But in a social
context in which race was truly meaningless-presumably one in
which members of different races mixed freely and, thus, in which a
school with a particular racial composition was not especially notewor-
thy-a decision to use a racial classification to insure integration of
the schools would be based on an inaccurate presumption about race
and its significance and not on the present reality of the situation of
the members of the racial minority.
There may also be tangible harms imposed by a race-conscious
districting plan that should be cognizable in court. For example, as a
result of integrating school attendance zones (and in light of patterns
of residential segregation), members of one or another race might
have to travel farther to get to school than they would have under a
scheme that did not take race into account. And, in a typical Ameri-
can jurisdiction, a decision to integrate formerly segregated schools
would likely require white students to attend worse schools than they
otherwise would have.9 It is true that no one is entitled to assignment
to any particular school and that these harms might therefore nor-
mally have been imposed by the line-drawing authority at its discre-
Black schoolchildren also might be subjected, for example, to the hateful stares
(and perhaps worse) of their new white classmates, something to which they would not
have been subjected had they not been placed in classrooms whose racial composition
was deliberately mixed. But these harms, the result of private prejudice, could not
form the basis for a governmental decision not to integrate schools. See Palmore v. Si-
dod, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984) ("Private biases may be outside the reach of the law, but
the law cannot, directly or indirectly, give them effect.").
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tion. But, as a general rule, simply because an individual may be de-
nied a benefit at the government's discretion does not mean that the
government may deny that benefit to an individual on the basis of
race. The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that even those deci-
sions to deny a good that may ordinarily be taken by the government
on any basis may not be made on the basis of race."°
Finally, as described above, the very use of race by government al-
ways carries a cost to dignity, and it always involves the risk that, to
some degree, it will reinforce and perpetuate ideas of difference that
are inherently divisive. For these reasons, every suggestion of racial
difference should be held impermissible if it does not meet a substan-
tial and genuine need.
These risks and costs require close examination and justification.
However, because a plan like the one described above does not deny
anyone on the basis of race a good or benefit to which he or she is en-
titled, the validity, under an appropriately framed judicial inquiry, of
any such plan that has an integrative effect and that is adopted in a
community in which race continues to have social significance should
be easier to establish than the validity of a race-based Category Two
plan of affirmative action.
To begin with, in the face of persistent racial separation in public
and private life, integrating the classroom itself is valuable for society.
There are powerful arguments that just as segregation is bad, so long
as race continues to have salience in our pluralist society, integration
itself is a positive good. Where race is taken into account for purposes
of drawing school attendance zones in order to integrate a public
school system, the interest in integration (or "diversity") is the same as
(or maybe, given the impressionability of young children, even
stronger than) it is in the context of college admissions. Yet, the costs
are fewer. In college admissions, the result at the margin may be the
rejection of a white candidate in favor of a member of a racial minor-
ity group. In drawing school attendance zones this will not be the
case. Indeed, the permissibility of the use of race in districting to in-
tegrate public schools follows afortiori from the reasoning in Bakke.
In addition, using race to integrate a school system may also be
justified by a second, remedial purpose. A segregated school, even
what we would describe as merely a de facto segregated school, may
well have a discriminatory effect upon African American children,
,, See, e.g., Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 89 (1986) (addressing governmental
use of peremptory challenges injury selection).
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sending a stigmatizing message of inferiority. Although the Supreme
Court has distinguished dejure and de facto segregation for constitu-
tional purposes, as Professor Bickel concluded, the stigmatic message
of segregated schools likely will not depend on the mechanism that
causes the racial separation.I°1 This stigmatic message is likely to be
reinforced when, as is frequently the case, the school in which African
American students find themselves is substantially worse in terms of
resources, teacher quality, student-teacher ratios, and the like than the
all-white school across town. Surely these students will not miss the
sting of the message this sends.
Indeed, in a circumstance in which because of residential segrega-
tion race-neutral attendance zones would produce segregated schools,
that school segregation may or may not be the product of intentional
discrimination. The patterns of residential segregation that cause de
facto segregation of course may themselves be the product of, among
other things, acts of private (and, indeed, frequently public) discrimi-
nation."' There is also the possibility of intentional discrimination on
the part of school officials who at one point in time adopted the very
school assignment plan that resulted in fact in segregated schools.
In light of the distinctive nature of districting, under a properly
conceived and consistently applied approach to strict scrutiny of racial
classifications, either the interest in diversity or the interest in prevent-
ing the discriminatory effect of the operation of a segregated school
system would likely suffice to justify the use of race in drawing school
attendance zones that insure public school integration.
Consistent with this view, in a little-remarked companion case to
101 Professor Bickel wrote:
If a Negro child perceives his separation as discriminatory and invidious, he
is not, in a society a hundred years removed from slavery, going to make fine
distinctions about the source of a particular separation. The Court [in Brown]
implied as much when it quoted with approval a statement by a lower-court
judge to the effect that the detrimental consequences of school segregation
were heightened-merely heightened-when segregation had the sanction of
law.
ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 119-20 (Yale
Univ. Press 1978) (originally published 1970).
102 See, for example, the statement of Senator Brooke in support of the passage of
the Federal Fair Housing Act, Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968: "Discrimina-
tion in the sale and rental of housing has been the root cause of the widespread pat-
terns of de facto segregation which characterize America's residential neighborhoods."
114 CONG. REc. 2524 (1968) (statement of Sen. Brooke). See also Freeman v. Pitts, 503
U.S. 467, 507 (1992) (Souter, J., concurring) (recognizing instances in which "demo-
graphic change toward segregated residential patterns is itself caused by past school
segregation and the patterns of thinking that segregation creates").
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Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education... that involved the
voluntary adoption of a race-conscious school attendance zone plan
by a county school board attempting to respond to conditions of seg-
regation, the Supreme Court upheld the school attendance zones at
issue. In McDaniel v. Barresi, the Court held that race-conscious dis-
tricting was an appropriate method for a school board to use voluntar-
ily in the disestablishment of a segregated school system even in the
absence of ajudicial finding of a constitutional violation.
0 4
It is true that, even in the absence of such a finding, a jurisdiction
that has previously maintained a de jure segregated school system has
an affirmative duty under the Constitution not merely to stop dis-
criminating, but to disestablish the dual school system,0 5 and that this
would itself ordinarily require that race be taken into account in draw-
ing school attendance zones. Indeed, the McDaniel Court said that
this was the purpose for which racial assignment was being used in
that particular case. 10" Nonetheless, the McDaniel Court described
such race-conscious assignment as an "exercise of [state school
authorities'] discretionary powers to assign students within their
school systems."""
Consistent with this, in another companion case to Swann, North
Carolina State Board of Education v. Swann, the Court explained that
"school authorities have wide discretion in formulating school policy,
and that as a matter of educational policy school authorities may well
conclude that some kind of racial balance in the schools is desirable
quite apart from any constitutional requirements."' 0 Indeed, to like effect
1"'A 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
",A 402 U.S. 39, 42 (1971); see also id. at 40 n.1 (stating, but not relying on the fact,
that the adoption of the plan at issue might have come in response to the urging of
federal officials).
Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 437-38 (1968).
'~ 402 U.S. at 40, 41 (describing the action of the County Board of Education as a
"voluntary program to desegregate its public schools," adopted as part of its "affirma-
tive duty to disestablish the dual school system").
1,7 Id. at 42.
y, 402 U.S. 43, 45 (1971) (emphasis added). North Carolina State Board of Education
came from a school system that had been adjudicated to have operated a de jure seg-
regated school system. The Court held that it was beyond the bounds of constitutional
permissibility for the state authorities' discretion to be exercised in a way that "in-
hibit[s] or obstruct[s] the operation of a unitary school system." Id. The Court struck
down a North Carolina law forbidding North Carolina school districts from assigning
students to any school "on account of race, creed, color or national origin, or for the
purpose of creating a balance or ratio of race, religion or national origins." N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 115-176.1 (Supp. 1969). The Court held that this violated the Constitution not
only because it might purport to obstruct remedies ordered by the district court, but
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is the language in Swann itself:
School authorities... might well conclude ... that in order to prepare
students to live in a pluralistic society each school should have a pre-
scribed ratio of Negro to white students reflecting the proportion for the
district as a whole. To do this as an educational policy is within the
broad discretionary powers of school authoities ....
The decision in McDanie4 and the language from North Carolina
Board of Education and Swan, is what one would expect under a
framework for examination of race-conscious government action like
that proposed by this Article. Although it is certainly arguable that
the board of education in McDaniel sought to achieve only the self-
evidently overriding purpose of fulfilling its constitutional obligation
to disestablish its dual school system, the language in Swann demon-
strates a willingness to accept a justification that would not, by itself,
have been held sufficient to justify affirmative action plans like those
approved in Bakke, plans that would ultimately have the effect at the
margin of denying some members of the white majority from places in
a university that they would otherwise obtain.10
Even more clearly, the decision in McDaniel also necessarily re-
also because it would prevent constitutionally compelled remedial action by the school
board:
IT~he statute exploits an apparently neutral form to control school assign-
ment plans by directing that they be "color blind": that requirement, against
the background of segregation, would render illusory the promise of Brown v.
Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). Just as the race of students must be
considered in determining whether a constitutional violation has occurred, so
also must race be considered in formulating a remedy. To forbid, at this
stage, all assignments made on the basis of race would deprive school authori-
ties of the one tool absolutely essential to fulfillment of their constitutional
obligation to eliminate existing dual school systems.
402 U.S. at 45-46.
109 402 U.S. 1, 16 (1971). The Court went on to say by comparison that, in the ab-
sence of a finding of a constitutional violation, a federal court would lack authority to
implement a similar policy. Id.
110 Indeed, Justice Douglas distinguished affirmative action from race-conscious
districting for purposes of integration on just this basis:
In Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1, 16, we stated
that as a matter of educational policy school authorities could, within their
broad discretion, specify that each school within its district have a prescribed
ratio of Negro to white students reflecting the proportion for the district as a
whole, in order to disestablish a dual school system. But there is a crucial dif-
ference between the policy suggested in Swann and that under consideration
here: the Swann policy would impinge on no person's constitutional rights,
because no one would be excluded from a public school and no one has a
right to attend a segregated public school.
DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 336 n.18 (1974) (DouglasJ, dissenting).
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flects a more forgiving requirement of narrow tailoring. This is pre-
cisely what one would predict in this context if the Court's scrutiny
were appropriately tailored to address the risks and harms attendant
upon government's use of race. As we have seen, when government
seeks to take actions on the basis of race that fall into Category One,
the category containing race-conscious government actions that harm
members of historically disadvantaged racial minority groups, gov-
ernment will essentially never be permitted to reject a race-neutral al-
ternative. In Category Two, and specifically as seen in the Bakke case,
race-neutral alternatives have not been required where using them
would obligate government to abandon other important goals.
Logically, where a use of race, because of context, raises even
fewer of the concerns associated with traditional, invidious racial dis-
crimination, the degree of necessity that would have to be shown to
justify it should be less. Assuming a sufficiently important interest, a
reviewing court evaluating a race-conscious action in this third cate-
gory, Category Three, should not require the use of race-neutral al-
ternatives where their use would compromise other substantial values,
even if those values are somewhat less significant than those that
would have been compromised by the use of race-neutral alternatives
in a case like Bakke.
The McDaniel decision undeniably reflects just such an approach
to the question of necessity. In any case in which race-conscious at-
tendance zones are justified by a desire to integrate a city or county's
schools-as was also true in the case of medical school admissions-a
race-neutral lottery system could be used to achieve the same goal.
Furthermore, the sacrifice required by use of a lottery in this context
would be less significant than the sacrifice that would be required by
adoption of such a system for university admissions. For unlike the
use of a lottery for admission to a college or medical school, such a
mechanism could be employed for public school assignments without
requiring abandonment of a system of merit-based admission to a
scarce number of places in a class. The state's interest in avoiding that
race-neutral alternative would seem to be less powerful than in Bakke.
Yet, the McDaniel Court did not require county school authorities to
use this race-neutral alternative.
Of course, there would be substantial costs to such a system: de-
pending upon how the system was designed, children from a single
neighborhood might not be able to attend the same school together,
the burdens of transportation could be enormous, and the system
might entail all manner of administrative difficulties. Still, avoidance
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of such costs would not permit a state to engage in any traditional
form of invidious discrimination.
To say that the outcome of McDaniel was consistent with a rational
approach to strict scrutiny of governmental uses of race, however, is
not to approve of the approach the Court's opinion took in reaching
its result. McDaniel was decided before Croson or Adarand. Indeed, it
was decided before Bakke. The Court did not use the language of
strict or heightened scrutiny. Nor did the Court pause long in its
unanimous two and one-half page opinion to assess the strength of
the government's interest or the necessity of the use of race to the
achievement of the government's purpose.'
Such a casual approach-perhaps explicable in McDaniel in part
by the background of resistance to Brown against which it was de-
cided-would only be appropriate if the racial classification were es-
sentially harmless. As described above, however, even the use of race
to integrate public schools carries with it some costs. In fact, even on
the more easily measured "tangible" level, the use of race approved in
McDaniel did impose some disadvantage on certain individuals on the
basis of their race. Among the plaintiffs in McDaniel were parents of
black schoolchildren who, under the County Board of Education's
race-based plan, were required to walk "about one and one-half miles"
to the school to which they had been assigned, whereas prior to the
adoption of the race-conscious plan "they had attended a school lo-
cated within two blocks of their homes.""2 Similarly, among the plain-
tiffs were the parents of white schoolchildren who were "'bussed' to
schools located much further from their residences than other schools
previously attended.""3 The imposition of these harms alone on the
basis of race would require an exacting framework for examining the
use of race in drawing school attendance lines-a more exacting
framework than the Court's opinion in McDaniel articulated.
ii. Examining the Hypothesis That the Narrow-Tailoring Inquiry
Varies with the HarmsJudicial Scrutiny Is Invoked to Address
At this point, it may be worthwhile to evaluate more broadly the
validity of my claim that the appropriate judicial scrutiny of a chal-
lenged governmental classification depends upon the risks and harms
111 See 402 U.S. at 40-42.
1 Barresi v. Browne, 175 S.E.2d 649, 651 (Ga. 1970), rev'd sub nom. McDaniel v.
Barresi, 402 U.S. 39 (1971).
113 Id.
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that inhere in the use of that classification in its particular context. In
particular, it may be valuable to evaluate my suggestion that in certain
circumstances it would be appropriate to employ a kind of close judi-
cial scrutiny more forgiving than that employed to assess race-
conscious affirmative action in Category Two. To do this by assessing
the strength of various purposes that might be held to justify particu-
lar uses of race would be a tricky business, since, even if it is widely
shared, the judgment of the weight or strength of a particular gov-
ernmental interest is ultimately and necessarily subjective. The nature
of the narrow-tailoring requirement, however, and in particular of the
aspect that asks about the necessity for the use of a particular classifi-
cation, is far easier to evaluate. It is to this aspect ofjudicial scrutiny,
therefore, that I turn.
I have suggested that there is a continuum of necessity along
which each of the categories of race-conscious action described so far
falls. Classifications that disadvantage an historically disadvantaged
group will be permitted only where absolutely necessary to serve a suf-
ficiently important purpose; classifications that disadvantage the ma-
jority, such as affirmative action, will be permitted where the use of
any race-neutral alternative to achieve the government's purpose
would require the sacrifice of other important values; classifications
that disadvantage neither group, but that merely place people in (in-
tegrated) districts will be permitted where the use of any race-neutral
alternative would entail significant costs.
It may be possible to see more clearly the way that a rational sys-
tem of judicial review would calibrate the requirement of relative ne-
cessity to the context in which the classification at issue has been used,
and in particular to the harm the classification may engender in that
context, by examining an example from outside the world of race. It
is an example that we encounter unthinkingly every day, one that
would seem to raise profound equal protection questions except for
circumstances that limit the extent to which the traditional concerns
described above are implicated: segregation on the basis of sex in the
provision of public restroom facilities.
Many distinctions on the basis of gender are and ought to be
anathema to the Equal Protection Clause. Indeed, the Supreme
Court has recently suggested that gender discrimination might be a
candidate for the "most stringent judicial scrutiny" that is currently
applied to classifications based on race.' 4 The Court has called for
4 See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 532 n.6 (1996) (noting that "thus far"
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"careful[] inspect [ion]""" of gender classifications: "[T]he proffered
justification [must be] 'exceedingly persuasive.' .. . The State must
show 'at least that the [challenged] classification serves "important
governmental objectives and that the discriminatory means employed"
are "substantially related to the achievement of those objectives."""
Whether segregation on the basis of sex in higher education
might be permissible in some circumstances under this standard re-
mains an open and difficult question. 1 7 Because the social meaning
of separation of the sexes is not always one of subjugation,"' however,
there may be less reason for concern about segregation by gender in
certain circumstances outside the educational context. If the frame-
work I have described accurately reflects a rational approach to scru-
tinizing governmental classifications, one would expect that in such
circumstances gender-neutral alternatives would not be as stringently
required by the Equal Protection Clause even as race-neutral alterna-
tives would be in the second category of race-conscious action de-
scribed above. That is, there may be circumstances in which segrega-
tion on the basis of gender will be deemed permissible despite the
availability of gender-neutral alternatives that might with little cost
achieve the government's goal.
Imagine a court is being asked to review the widespread system of
publicly maintained separate-but-equal men's and women's bath-
rooms. The interests served by the provision in public buildings of
separate bathrooms presumably include respecting the privacy of in-
dividuals who wish not to use a bathroom in the presence of someone
of the opposite sex, and perhaps the provision of facilities that meet
the different physiological needs and characteristics of the two sexes.
When bathrooms are built in public buildings, ordinarily for use by
more than one person at a time, they are designated for one or the
other sex.
that type of scrutiny has been "reserved... for classifications based on race or national
origin"). The Court in Virginia asserted, apparently to draw a parallel between scrutiny
of race-based and gender-based classifications, that strict scrutiny of racial classifica-
tions (like the "skeptical scrutiny" of gender classifications it employed in that case)
did not "inevitably" lead to a finding of unconstitutionality. See id.
11 Id. at 532.
16 Id. at 533 (quoting Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982)
(quoting Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 466 U.S. 142, 150 (1980))).
11 See id. at 534 n.7 (reserving the question).
118 Cf Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with
Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 351 (1987) (suggesting that separation only
"obtains its shameful meaning from the historical and cultural context in which it is
used").
[Vol. 149: 1
20001 A COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH TO STRICT SCRUTINY 49
But segregation on the basis of gender is not necessary to achieve
the interests described. Those goals could be achieved in a gender-
neutral fashion by the installation of individual bathrooms, open to
anyone, one person at a time. Indeed, this is the system most of us use
in our homes and that is used in some public settings-for example,
on airplanes.
If faced with a challenge to the system of officially sanctioned
separate-but-equal men's and women's bathrooms, however, a court
would probably not require the government to go to the expense of
equipping its buildings with a multitude of individual bathrooms,
each of which would then be freely available to members of either sex.
Rather, the government would probably be permitted to continue to
build bathrooms that allow several people to use them at once, and to
classify who may use each bathroom on the basis of sex.
The government's only interest (aside from traditional ways of
thinking) in organizing the bathrooms in its buildings in this way
rather than using gender-neutral alternatives is its interest in saving
money. In essence, we could say that, in light of the sensibilities of
most people in our culture, the use of this gender classification is a
necessary means for achieving the goal of obtaining economies of
scale in plumbing installation. In light of the fact that the harm im-
posed on women by single-sex bathrooms is widely thought to ap-
proach zero-the risk of stigma to women from separate sex bath-
rooms is at most considered slight when compared, for example, to
the risk of stigma from the maintenance of single race bathrooms -
and despite application of formally searching judicial scrutiny, it is a
safe bet that almost no court would require government to employ the
gender-neutral alternative. If it were judged, however, that the social
meaning of single-sex bathrooms was to connote the inferiority of
women, more concerns would be raised and the result would likely be
different."'
11-, See id. at 351-52 ("Our society does not ordinarily interpret sex-segregated toilet
facilities as designating the inferiority of women. By contrast, the black who is asked to
use a different public bathroom from that of a white companion of the same gender is
stigmatized."); see also Richard A. Wasserstrom, Racism, Sexism and Preferential Treatment:
An Approach to the Topics, 24 UCLA L. REv. 581, 592-94 (1977) (observing that sex-
segregated toilet facilities, unlike those segregated by race, imply "no notion of the
possibility of contamination; or even directly of inferiority and superiority").
1" Indeed, if the desire that many people have not to share a bathroom with a per-
son of the opposite sex were itself judged to be nothing more than a reflection of
stereotypical thinking, the government might not be able to respond to a ruling strik-
ing down its separate-but-equal system by building single-person (even gender-
nonspecific) bathrooms. It might be required instead to desegregate all preexisting
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d. Category Four: Uses of Race Unrelated to the Distribution of Benefits or
Burdens
Finally, to complete the picture, I must briefly mention the cate-
gory of race-conscious government action that imposes the least
cost-that which is not used to distribute goods at all. Perhaps the
only use of race in this category, Category Four, is the collection of ra-
cial information for statistical purposes. An example would be a re-
quirement that a person identify himself by race on a census form.
This is race-conscious government action. The government requires
people who are black to write "black" on the form, and people who
are white to write "white"-or, more typically today, to check one or
another box indicating race. 2 '
This presents some of the risks described above, but will have sub-
stantially fewer costs even than the use of race in drawing a district
line. It will draw attention to race, and will therefore have some inci-
dental divisive cost. It may cause some people a dignitary harm by
suggesting to people who would like to think otherwise that their race
is in some way relevant to some aspect of public life. Yet, in the act of
requiring this information, no benefit or burden is distributed on a
racial basis. Many of the risks and harms that may be caused by the
use of race thus are absent here.
What costs there are require justification. If racial data is col-
lected withoutjustification, it may suggest that race is relevant where it
is not. On the other hand, the costs attendant upon such collection
are relatively low. Consequently, the justification required need not
be so powerful. The benefit gained from the collection of racial data
for almost any purpose for which it is actually relevant would likely
outweigh the costs.
men-only and women-only bathrooms. Cf Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984) (rul-
ing that the federal Constitution prohibits state actors from giving effect to private dis-
crimination); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (requiring government to
integrate its formerly segregated public schools). But cf Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S.
217 (1970) (allowing government to close formerly race-segregated swimming pools
rather than integrate them). Interestingly, the government would appear to have no
interest in designating single-person bathrooms as men- or women-only, aside from
traditional ways of thinking and, perhaps, related stereotypical views of women's need
for ?rotection from bathrooms men have been using.
Of course, at present there is an ongoing debate about the racial and ethnic
categories that should be used for data collection purposes on the census form, and
about the usefulness and vitality of traditional racial categories. See generally, e.g., Ken-
neth L. Karst, Myths of Identity: Individual and Group Portraits of Race and Sexual Orienta-
tion, 43 UCLA L. REV. 263 (1995). As I have in general throughout this Article, how-
ever, I will continue for simplicity of analysis to utilize the example in which there are
only two racial groups in the relevantjurisdiction, "black" and "white."
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This case does not come up much, but in Tancil v. Woolls the Su-
preme Court did summarily affirm the decision of a district court up-
holding the portion of Virginia's divorce statute that required the in-
clusion in any divorce decree of the race of the parties, but striking
down those state provisions that called for the maintenance of sepa-
rate white and black voting and property tax records."' The district
court concluded that such racial notation could be upheld if "the
purpose is legitimate, the reason justifiable." l2 It upheld the race-
conscious collection of information, concluding that "[v]ital statistics,
obviously, are aided by denotation in the divorce decrees of the race
of the parties.""' It struck down the maintenance of separate tax and
real estate records, concluding that it served "no other purpose than
to classily and distinguish official records on the basis of race or
color. ' ' 7 The collection of racial data has more recently been upheld
against constitutional challenge in the lower courts.
12 6
The district court in Tancil probably should have required articu-
lation of a specific purpose beyond the maintenance of "vital statistics"
that required the collection of racial data. It is likely true, however,
that in light of the history of discrimination and its aftermath in this
country, the costs entailed by governmental collection of racial data
like that at issue in that case are justified by the need to measure the
persistence of racial disparities in a number of social contexts. Per-
haps somewhat counterintuitively, the collection of racial data may be
necessary in other settings to ensure that no discrimination is taking
place. For example, in order to ensure that peremptory challenges
are not used in a racially discriminatory fashion, courts now ask citi-
zens called for jury service to indicate their race.12 By contrast, be-
cause it always does entail some costs, the purposeless, thoughtless, or
casual use of race by government, or the use of race only for its own
sake, should never be held permissible, even in this final category.
U2 Tancil v. Woolls, 379 U.S. 19 (1964) (per curiam), af'gHamm v. Virginia State
Bd. of Elections, 230 F. Supp. 156 (E.D. Va. 1964).
1i_ Hamrn, 230 F. Supp. at 158.
124 Id.
1 Id.
, See, e.g., Caulfield v. Bd. of Educ., 583 F.2d 605, 611-12 (2d Cir. 1978) ("[T]he
Constitution itself does not condemn the collection of [racial] data."); United States v.
New Hampshire, 539 F.2d 277, 281 (1st Cir. 1976) (allowing collection of racial data as
"a reasonable and proper means of assuring equality in employment").
10 See, e.g., United States v. Ovalle, 136 F.3d 1092, 1096-97 (6th Cir. 1998) (describ-
ing jury questionnaires that require potential jurors to indicate their race and that in-
form them that the information "is required solely to avoid discrimination injury se-
lection").
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2. Conclusion
All of this is not to say that the outcome of judicial evaluation of
any one of these types of uses of race is foreordained. The assessment
of the significance of the harms wrought even by the least harmful use
of race is a matter of judgment upon which reasonable people cer-
tainly can, and do, differ, as are the strength of the government's in-
terests and the importance of any competing values that might be sac-
rificed if the government were forced to use a race-neutral alternative.
Thus, if one concluded, as Justice Scalia has, that the costs of the clas-
sification of individuals on the basis of race in perpetuating the idea
of difference is so great that it can virtually never be overcome, one
might also conclude that virtually no use of race by government can
ever be justified.
1
21
The point, however, is that different uses of race do present dif-
ferent risks and harms. If strict scrutiny is not calibrated to those risks
and harms, it will be loosed from its moorings. A rigid cookie-cutter
version of strict scrutiny may result in the invalidation of race-
conscious government action even where invalidation is not justified
by reference to the principles that warrant the very imposition of strict
scrutiny in the first instance. Consistent with this, the Court's cases
outside the race-conscious districting context describe an approach
that varies depending upon the context in which race is used-an ap-
proach tailored to the costs associated with each use.
There may be an infinite number of circumstances in which gov-
ernment may seek to take race-conscious action. In light of the rea-
sons why race-conscious government action is normally impermissible,
a court trying to determine whether a particular governmental action
that takes race into account is justified must examine both the way in
which the government seeks to use race and the circumstances in
which it seeks to act. An error in approach would divorce strict scru-
tiny from the underlying purposes of the Equal Protection Clause and
could, not coincidentally, inappropriately hobble government in its
128 SeeAdarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 239 (1995) (Scalia, J., con-
curring) ("To pursue the concept of racial entitlement-even for the most benign and
admirable of purposes--is to reinforce and preserve for future mischief the way of
thinking that produced race slavery, race privilege and race hatred."); City of Rich-
mond v.J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 520 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring) ("The diffi-
culty of overcoming the effects of past discrimination is as nothing compared with the
difficulty of eradicating from our society the source of those effects, which is the ten-
dency-fatal to a Nation such as ours-to classify and judge men and women on the
basis of their country of origin or the color of their skin. A solution to the first prob-
lem that aggravates the second is no solution at all.").
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ability to address discrimination.
1I. VOTE DILUTION, RACE-CONSCIOUS DISTRICrING, AND
THE SHAWV. RENO CAUSE OF ACTION
In the remainder of this Article, I will apply the framework I have
described to one of the most complicated equal protection problems:
the problem of race-conscious electoral districting. Since Croson and,
indeed, since Adarand, this is the area in which the Supreme Court
has had the most experience applying strict scrutiny to racial classifi-
cations, and it is one in which the Court has had an extraordinary
amount of difficulty. Since Shaw Iwas decided in 1993, the Supreme
Court has applied "strict scrutiny" to plans of electoral districting that
have been drawn on the basis of race. In a series of subsequent cases,
Miller v. Johnson,'2 Shaw v. Hunt (Shaw I1),' and Bush v. Vera,'31 the
Court has struggled to make clear what it meant in Shaw I, and there
have been fits and starts as the Court has tried to explain what triggers
strict scrutiny when electoral district lines are drawn, what that scru-
tiny entails, and when race may be used by government in drawing
electoral district lines to prevent discrimination.
Although the Court majority continues to suggest that Shaw strict
scrutiny-like the strict scrutiny called for by Croson and Adarand-will
not always be fatal, since Shaw the Court has in fact invalidated every
district line drawn on the basis of race that it has considered in a fully
briefed and argued case. " At the same time, the Supreme Court has
also reaffirmed that the creation of black-majority districts is some-
times actually required to comply with the command of equality con-
tained in section 2 of the V.RA. 3 3 Indeed, in a controlling opinion in
Bush v. Vera,"" Justice O'Connor purported to explain that Shaw does
not mean that the use of race in response to the command of section
2 of the V.R.A. is prohibited. Compliance with that law, she con-
cluded, is a "compelling state interest" and race-conscious districts
that are narrowly tailored to the goal of such compliance therefore
515 U.S. 900 (1993).
":' 517 U.S. 899 (1996).
j, 517 U.S. 952 (1996).
'~ See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
SeeJohnson v. DeGrandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1020 (1994) (acknowledging that "soci-
ety's racial and ethnic cleavages sometimes necessitate majority-minority districts to
ensure equal political and electoral opportunity" guaranteed by section 2 of the
V.R.A.).
1-1 517 U.S. 952 (1996).
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will not be invalidated. 5 This conclusion, however, appears to be
more theoretical than real. Because under Justice O'Connor's analy-
sis the very features that appear to trigger Shaw scrutiny will also de-
feat the claim of narrow tailoring, in Bush itself (in which a state drew
race-conscious districts in an attempt to comply with section 2) the
districting plan was struck down under Shaw.
The states thus find themselves in a box. They appear, under fed-
eral antidiscrimination law, to be both required to use and prohibited
from using race as they draw their electoral district lines. When con-
fronted with this reality, the Court has not engaged in the analytical
rethinking that would be required to make the law more coherent.
Rather, apparently intent on holding the line on Shaw, but unwilling
explicitly to strike down the V.R.A., the Court has repeatedly loosened
the states' bind by weakening the command of the Act,13 most re-
cently last Term in Reno v. Bossier Parish School Board (Bossier Parish
I/),131 in order to avoid the conclusion that compliance with the anti-
discrimination command of the statute would require the very use of
race in electoral districting that Shaw strict scrutiny seems poised to
condemn. The consequence of this has been to render V.R.A. analysis
less coherent and its command of equal opportunity in voting less ef-
fective.
Those members of the Court who disagree with Shaw have sug-
gested only rational basis scrutiny for districting plans that classify ac-
cording to race, unless and until they actually dilute the voting
strength of one or another racial group. The framework for assessing
the use of race in drawing electoral districts first set out in Shaw I and
135 Id. at 992 (O'ConnorJ., concurring).
136 See Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd. (Bossier Parish fl), 120 S. Ct. 866, 869 (2000)
(holding, remarkably, that the prohibition in section 5 of the V.RA. of any change in
state law with respect to voting that has "the purpose... of denying or abridging the
right to vote on account of race or color," actually permits government action that in-
tentionally discriminates against African Americans, so long as the intended discrimi-
natory effect is no worse than what was in place before the change in the law (citations
omitted)); Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 979-81 (1996) (concluding that section 2 of the
V.R-.A cannot require creation of a noncompact majority-minority district and that a
district that deviates from traditional districting principles cannot be "narrowly tai-
lored" to preventing a violation of section 2 of the V.R.A.); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S.
900, 924-27 (1995) (concluding that the failure to draw a proportionate number of
black-majority districts could not support a finding of discriminatory purpose under
section 5 of the V.RA, and suggesting that any reading of the V.RA that requires
race-conscious government action "brings the Act... into tension with the Fourteenth
Amendment").
137 120 S. Ct. 866 (2000).
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applied by the Supreme Court in its succeeding decisions in Miller,'
Bush,'" and Shaw f, 140 thus has proven incoherent and unworkable,
yet no realistic alternative that maintains the system of geographically
based districting has been put forward.
The need for a solution to this problem is urgent. The Court is
poised again to consider the nature of Shaw scrutiny, having recently
granted review in Hunt v. Cromartie (Cromartie I1),4 in which it will, for
a third time, evaluate the districts drawn in North Carolina to comply
with the V.R.A. Without some rethinking, the vitality of Shaw may well
result in the evisceration of that landmark statute.
Evaluating the use of race in electoral districting requires some
background, which will be provided in this Part. In Part U.A I will de-
scribe in some detail the law of voting rights in order to explain how
race may be used in drawing electoral district lines in order to combat
discrimination. In Part ll.B I will turn to the actual evaluation of the
resulting race-conscious districts, examining the approach put forward
in Shaw and its follow-on cases, and the alternative suggested by the
dissenters in those cases. In the next Part, Part III, I will apply to the
case of race-conscious districting the method I have described in
Part I.
A. The Use of Race-Conscious Districts to Address Minority Vote
Dilution Under the Voting Rights Act of 1965
In the case of drawing electoral districts, race has sometimes been
used to comply with the antidiscrimination command set out in the
V.R.A." ' Voting rights law in the United States is concerned primarily
with prohibiting discrimination in voting. The right to be free from
discrimination in voting has several distinct aspects. Many are formal
and quite obvious: the right to vote includes the right to be free to
register to vote, the right to cast ballots, and the right to have those
ballots counted. Some aspects of the right to vote are more subtle.
The right to vote also includes the right to have an equally weighted
vote, that is a vote that plays a role in the selection of candidates equal
to that of any other. Protection of this right is guaranteed in the
Im 515 U.S. 900 (1995).
1p, 517 U.S. 952 (1996).
W 517 U.S. 899 (1996).
141 120 S. Ct. 2715 (2000).
142 Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (1965) (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973, 1973a-1973p (1994)).
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United States by the "one person-one vote" principle, which requires
all the members of most representative bodies to be chosen from dis-
tricts whose populations are equal.' This principle ensures that each
voter will have an equal say in the election of a polity's representatives.
The right to vote also has long been held to include the right not
to have one's vote "diluted" on an impermissible basis such as race.44
Racial vote dilution can occur only in the presence of racial polariza-
tion among voters. It is the result of the interaction between the votes
cast by individuals in the voting booth, and the mechanism adopted
by the government for aggregating those votes. In its simplest form,
where a substantial percentage of voters of one race refuse to vote for
a candidate supported by people of a different race, and where a state
employs a mechanism to aggregate votes that ensures that such voters
form a majority of the electorate in a particular election, a racial mi-
nority group may find itself persistently outvoted. Despite the removal
of formal obstacles to registration and the casting of ballots, members
of a racial minority group may find their votes "submerged" in a sea of
hostile votes, and their voting strength "diluted."
Where there is racially polarized voting, the most usual mecha-
nism for addressing the problem of vote dilution has been to draw
some electoral districts that contain a particular racial mix, ensuring
that the votes of members of the racial minority group can, at least in
theory, actually contribute to the election of a candidate. To under-
stand the way in which race-conscious districting may be used to pre-
vent minority vote dilution, it may be helpful to examine briefly the
history of the V.R.A. and the dilutive practices that were sometimes
adopted in response to it.
1. The History of Racial Discrimination in Voting
The right to vote is the sine qua non of citizenship in a representa-
tive democracy. But beginning in colonial times, and for almost the
first one hundred years of this Nation's independence, African
143 See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 568 (1964) (requiring apportionment based
on population in state legislative districts); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1964)
(applying the "one person-one vote" rule to congressional districts). In some special
contexts, such as those applicable to elections for water or irrigation districts, the "one
person-one vote" rule does not apply. See, e.g., Ball v.James, 451 U.S. 355, 368 (1981);
Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist., 410 U.S. 719, 729-30 (1973).
Nor does it apply in the U.S. Senate, where less populous states are entitled to the
same two Senators as more populous ones. See U.S. CONST. amend. XVII.
144 See, e.g., White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 765 (1973).
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Americans were excluded from suffrage. Immediately before the Civil
War, even free blacks were denied the right to vote in the United
States except in most of New England and, if they met a property re-
quirement inapplicable to whites, in New York. 145 Voting discrimina-
146
don has not been limited in the United States to any one region,
and the history of voting discrimination has not been a pretty one.
The institutionalized denial of the right to vote in the southern
states followed the abolition of slavery. During Reconstruction, there
was high black voter turnout throughout the South, and, at least in
the first years of Reconstruction, the election of many black officials at
every level of government. 14'7 But with the end of Reconstruction and
the withdrawal of federal troops in 1877, blacks in the South were sys-
tematically deprived, first of an effective right to vote, then of the right
to vote at all.
During the first decades after the end of Reconstruction, there
was widespread coercion and intimidation of black voters throughout
the South, but blacks did continue to vote.148  As an initial matter,
however, the votes of blacks were systematically rendered ineffective.
There were racial gerrymanders which diluted black voting strength.
In Mississippi, for example, black voters were "packed" into a "shoe-
string"-shaped district, which left five other districts with white majori-
ties. Alabama carefully "cracked," or fragmented, its black voters, dis-
tributing them among six districts in which their votes would be
submerged among those of white majorities. 4, Southern jurisdictions
14, See Chandler Davidson, The Vioting Rights Act: A Brief History, in CONTROVERSIES
IN MINORITY VOTING 7, 7 & n.2 (Bernard Grofman & Chandler Davidson eds., 1992).
Blacks were denied the right to vote in Connecticut, and were required in New York to
possess property worth $250 before they could vote. The right of free blacks to vote
had, apparently, been more widespread in the United States at the time of the adop-
tion of the Constitution. Id.
14" In the four years after the Civil War, whites denied black voters equal suffrage in
eight of eleven referenda held in northern states on the issue. Id. at 8.
.47 The turnout of eligible black male voters in presidential and gubernatorial elec-
tions during Reconstruction has been estimated to be as high as two-thirds. See David-
son, supra note 145, at 10. One commentator has estimated that in 1872, 324 black
state legislators and Congressmen were elected from the 11 states that had been mem-
bers of the Confederacy. J. Morgan Kousser, The Voting Rights Act and the Two Recon-
structions, in CONTROVERSIES IN MINORITY VOTING, supra note 145, at 135, 139-40. It
must be recognized, however, that these officeholders were subject to an "overall pat-
tern of white [Republican] political control." ERIc FONER, RECONSTRUCTION 355
(1988).
11 See C. VANIN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JI, CROw 53-54 (3d ed.
1974).
14., SeeFONER, supra note 147, at 590.
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with white majorities also adopted at-large voting mechanisms to sub-
merge black votes that could have formed a majority in some smaller
districts. 150 Powers formerly held by black-dominated local govern-
ments were transferred to white-controlled legislatures,' and elective
offices were replaced by appointive ones.'52 Finally, under Democratic
control of the electoral process, election fraud became an "art
form."
153
By the late 1890s and early 1900s, despite the command of the Fif-
teenth Amendment that "[t] he right of citizens of the United States to
vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any
State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude,""4
legal disenfranchisement of blacks through state constitutional
amendment became the norm throughout the South, at about the
same time as the adoption of the largest number of laws mandating
segregation in most facets of life.'55 In most southem states, blacks
were denied the vote by facially neutral qualifications for voting which
either disproportionately excluded blacks from suffrage, or were ap-
plied in such a way as to have that effect. These included literacy tests
or property requirements for voting coupled with either "grandfather
clauses," clauses permitting registration to people who could "under-
stand" certain material, or "good character clauses," by which whites
otherwise unable to meet the literacy or property requirements might
be permitted to vote. 6 In addition, all the southern states adopted
poll taxes, some of which were cumulative, which also included com-
150 See Kousser, supra note 147, at 144.
1 See FONER, supra note 147, at 591.
152 See Kousser, supra note 147, at 144.
13 Id. at 143; see also FONER, supra note 147, at 590.
154 U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1. The Fifteenth Amendment, passed in 1870, by its
terms outlaws discrimination in voting. Section 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment pro-
vides that "[t]he Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legis-
lation." Id. at § 2. The Fifteenth Amendment was not the first Civil War Amendment
to address voting rights. Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment, adopted in 1868
(section 1 of which overruled Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856), by
conferring federal and state citizenship upon black Americans), also attempted to co-
erce the southern states into not denying or abridging the right of blacks to vote by
reducing each state's representation in Congress by a proportion equal to the percent-
age of "the male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age" affected by
any such denial or abridgement. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2. Despite post-
Reconstruction denial of the right to vote, this provision was never utilized.
155 See generally WOODWARD, supra note 148, at 83-85, 97-102 (discussing the prolif-
eration of laws relating to segregation).
1'6 Id. at 84.
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plex procedures for compliance."' The disproportionate effect of
these laws was enhanced by their arbitrary application to exclude
blacks. As historian C. Vann Woodward has written: "[t]he effective-
ness of disfranchisement is suggested by a comparison of the number
of registered Negro voters in Louisiana in 1896, when there were
130,334 and in 1904 [after the adoption of literacy, property and poll
tax qualifications], when there were 1,342. "15 The southern states
also adopted whites-only Democratic primaries, which excluded blacks
from participation in what was normally the only significant stage of
the electoral process. 59
To the extent that these mechanisms were struck down as uncon-
stitutional-Oklahoma's grandfather clause was held invalid in Guinn
v. United States in 1915,'60 and the white primary was invalidated in sev-
eral cases spanning from 1944 to 1953,'61 but the poll tax was not
struck down until 1966 when the Supreme Court announced the deci-
sion in Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections"-new variants emerged to
replace them. Whatever mechanisms were in place for qualifying vot-
ers, they were applied so as to prevent blacks from voting, regardless
of the formal level of discretion given to local election officials.'6 3
2. Adoption of the Voting Rights Act and the
Recurrence of Dilutive Practices
Attempts to register black voters in the South in the early 1960s
met with a violent response. In early 1965, the Southern Christian
Leadership Conference, under the leadership of Martin Luther King,
Jr., began a campaign for voting rights in Selma, Alabama. On March
7, 1965, state and local police in Selma beat and tear-gassed peaceful
civil rights demonstrators attempting to march from Selma to Mont-
157 Id.
15 Id. at 85.
15 Id.
1" 238 U.S. 347 (1915).
161 See Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944) (finding Texas's all-white primary
system unconstitutional); see also Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953) (invalidating ex-
clusion of blacks from the almost always dispositive pre-primary election of the "Jaybird
Democratic Association"). Progress toward judicial protection from voting discrimina-
tion was by no means smooth. Smith in fact overruled Grovey v. Townsend, 295 U.S. 45
(1935), in which the Court had, just nine years before, upheld Texas's whites-only
primary against a constitutional challenge.
162 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
16 See, e.g., South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 312-14 (1966) (describing
the way in which voter registration laws were applied before adoption of the V.R.A. to
prevent blacks from voting).
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gomery, the state capital. The Selma crisis, which included the mur-
ders of three civil rights workers, enraged people in the rest of the na-
tion. Eight days later, President Johnson introduced the V.R.A. in an
address before Congress. On August 3, 1965, the V.R.A. passed the
House by a vote of 328 to 74. The next day, it passed the Senate by a
vote of 79 to 18, and two days later, the President signed this long-
overdue response to discrimination in voting into law.
The V.R.A. had a substantial impact in providing a sharp increase
in minority voter registration and access to the voting booth. 4 It has
had a tremendous impact in opening the doors of America's elected
offices to representatives supported by members of the African
American community. Although the V.R.A. does not presume that
people should vote for representatives of their own ethnic group, this
often happens, especially when members of an ethnic group are first
able to exercise political power. The dramatic increase in the number
of black elected officials since 1965 is the clearest reflection of the in-
creased participation in voting by African Americans wrought by the
passage of the Act. In 1965 there were approximately 500 black
elected officials nationwide; by 1990, there were over 7200.16
Nonetheless, in the presence of polarized voting along racial lines,
members of racial minority groups have remained vulnerable to ac-
tions that render their newly protected voting strength ineffective,
particularly through plans of electoral districting. As formal barriers
to black participation in elections fell following the passage of the
V.R.A., some state and local governments responded by attempting to
blunt the force of newly protected black votes. They took varied ap-
proaches similar to those taken by the southern states in the years fol-
lowing Reconstruction. The devices used to weaken the impact of in-
creased political participation by African Americans included, for
example, replacing elective offices with appointive ones"' and annex-
164 See Issacharoff, supra note 44, at 1838 n.25 (discussing the impact of the V.R.A.
and the Freedom Rides on voter registration). The provisions of the Act have not
been completely effective. Race-neutral restrictions on the time and place of voter reg-
istration that survived passage of the V.R.A. have had a disparate impact on black voter
registration. See id. These obstacles to voter registration may in part be overcome by
the National Voter Registration Act of 1993, the so-called "motor voter" law. Under
this statute, states must permit individuals to register to vote for elections for federal
office "by application made simultaneously with an application for a motor vehicle
driver's license." 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg-2 (1994).
165 FRANKR. PARKER, BLACKVOTES COUNT 1 (1990).
166 See Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 550-51 (1969) (describing a
1966 Mississippi law changing several county offices to appointive offices).
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ing land on which additional white voters resided. 67
The responses to increased black voter registration also included
the adoption of systems of election that limited black voting strength.
The size, shape, and number of electoral districts were sometimes al-
tered. Where once there had been electoral districts, state and local
governments adopted systems of at-large voting. Black voters with
common interests who might have banded together to elect a repre-
sentative from one or another district found their votes submerged
among those of a hostile, white majority that could control the out-
come of the at-large election for each seat. In addition, there were
gerrymanders of the more familiar kind: electoral district lines were
simply redrawn so as to weaken black voting power. Sometimes dis-
trict lines were drawn to disperse black voters in small numbers
among many districts, in which they would form an ineffectual minor-
ity (a process called "cracking" in the vernacular of voting rights). 6 9
At other times black voters were "packed" into districts in which they
constituted an excessive majority, rendering many of their votes in
that district superfluous while removing their influence from sur-
rounding districts.7 Runoff requirements were adopted that had the
effect of insuring that even a black candidate who won a plurality of
votes could not gain elective office in the face of unified white opposi-
tion.17 1 Provisions to prevent "single-shot" voting were also imposed.
1 2
16 See City of Richmond v. United States, 422 U.S. 358 (1975) (upholding an an-
nexation reducing the relative strength of the minority race, where the postannexation
system fairly recognized the minority's political potential). For a detailed description
of some of the techniques used to blunt African American voting power, see generally
PARKER, supra note 165.
16 Following passage of the V.R.A., "[a]lmost every [southern state] legislature,
from Texas to Virginia, employed multimember districts in both houses (although
Georgia and Texas have no multimember senate districts) which consequently re-
mained virtually all white despite dramatic increases in black voting strength." Frank
R. Parker, Racial Gerrymandering and Legislative Reapportionmen in MINORriY VOTE
DILUTION 85, 88 (Chandler Davidson ed., 1984) (citation omitted).
169 Id. at 89-92. For example, the black population of the Mississippi Delta lived
within a single congressional district between 1882 and 1966. Although the contours
of the district were not always the same, the district containing the Delta was sixty-six
percent black in 1960 (when it was the Third District), and fifty-nine percent black be-
tween 1962 and 1966 (when it was the Second District). After passage of the V.R.A.,
the Delta's black population was split among four different congressional districts,
each of which was majority white in voting age population. Id. at 89.
17 See id. at 96-99.
1 Runoff requirements ultimately prevent the white vote from being split among
two or more candidates. In the circumstances of most racially polarized communities,
a runoff requirement "creates a de facto white primary." Pamela S. Karlan, Maps and
Misreadings: The Role of Geographical Compactness in Racial Vote Dilution Litigation, 24
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In the parlance of voting rights law, these mechanisms all "dilute"
minority voting strength. They do not deny the right to vote by for-
mally preventing members of the minority group from casting ballots;
where members of the minority group are like-minded about the can-
didate they support, these mechanisms operate to deny their votes ef-
fect by preventing them from being aggregated in such a way as to
successfully lead to the election of the minority-preferred candidate.
1'7 3
The precise scope of the invasion wrought by dilutive electoral sys-
tems is hard to describe. It is an extraordinarily difficult task to say
what the benchmark "fair" aggregative mechanism would be against
which a challenged electoral system ought to be measured. 74 There
are an infinite number of possible configurations. And ordinarily,
one has no right to be placed in a district in which like-minded voters
form a majority.
But the intentional aggregation of voters on the basis of race in a
way that is likely to result in the votes of members of one race being
meaningless is undoubtedly a form of invidious race discrimination.
As long as black voters continue to have cohesive communities of in-
terest, the harm done to them by these discriminatory mechanisms is
no less real than denial of the franchise itself. To begin with, even the
HARv. C.R-C.L. L. REV. 173, 187 n.54 (1989). The favored candidate among the white
voters will come in at least second, even if black support amounting to a plurality of
the votes cast is uniformly behind another candidate. The white voters' candidate will
then be assured of election in the runoff on the basis of white support.
1 Single-shot voting involves voting for only a single candidate when one is enti-
fled to vote for several members of an electoral slate to fill several seats in a single elec-
tion. Anti-single-shot provisions include "full slate" rules-direct prohibitions on sin-
gle-shot voting-which require voters in multimember districts to vote for as many
candidates as there are positions to fill as a prerequisite to having their ballots
counted. Under such provisions, if there is a single minority-preferred candidate, a
minority voter cannot simply vote for him or her (that is, the voter cannot practice sin-
gle-shot voting). Instead, each minority voter is bound also to vote for other candi-
dates, actually helping them to outpoll the minority-preferred candidate. "Numbered
post" systems, in which candidates in a multimember district declare their candidacy
for a particular seat (or "numbered post"), have a similar effect because a supporter of
one candidate can gain no advantage by denying his or her vote to a candidate for a
different numbered post. See id. at 187 n.53. A regime of staggered terms for repre-
sentatives from multimember districts works the same way. See id.
17' In this regard, Professor Karlan has usefully distinguished between the right to
vote as a right to "participation," a right not formally denied by the dilutive mecha-
nisms I have described, and the right to vote as a right to "aggregation," which is nec-
essary for "[t]he primary function of voting." See generally Pamela S. Karlan, The Rights
to Vote: Some Pessimism About Formalism, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1705, 1709-20 (1993) (outlining
a taxonomy of the "rights to vote").
174 See id. at 1714-15 (discussing discarded baseline notions of what a fair aggrega-
tion would produce).
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sense of what Professor Karlan has called "civic inclusion," 75 engen-
dered by formal participation in the franchise, is diminished: there
are symbolic harms in having the ability to cast only a meaningless
vote. There is denial of the right to participate fairly in the demo-
cratic process by which government officials are chosen. And there is
the additional concrete harm of having one disfavored ethnic com-
munity's voice simply not present in the legislative bodies that pass
laws affecting the members of that community. Finally, where black
votes are diluted, elected officials tend to be unresponsive to the
needs of the African American community.! This is especially true at
the local level and where the black community is residentially segre-
gated.'77 The concrete result of vote dilution will frequently be dis-
crimination in provision of government services and distribution of
public resources.
Evidence of discriminatory minority vote dilution is familiar in re-
cent American history. The most obvious example has been the fail-
ure in some jurisdictions to elect black officeholders despite the pres-
ence of a substantial African American population. Although the
debate about race-conscious electoral districting frequently turns to
the question of the election of African Americans to office, clear
analysis requires us to remember that it is the right of the voters to
elect the candidate of their choice that is significant, not the election
of a person of a particular race. Indeed, the idea that certain seats in
a legislature must be reserved for members of a particular race would
turn on its head the American notion of equality, which has as its goal
the erasure, rather than the preservation, of distinctions based on
race.
Nevertheless, because one could expect the election of members
of each race in rough proportionality to their representation in the
population were race irrelevant to election, the failure of states with
substantial African American populations ever to elect a member of
the black community to Congress is powerful evidence both of racial
polarization in voting and of an electoral system that consistently op-
erates to limit black voters' chances of garnering representation.
175 Id. at 1710.
1-16 See Andrew P. Miller & Mark A. Packman, Amended Section 2 of the Voting Rights
Act: lWhtat is the Intent of the Results Test?, 36 EIORY L.J. 1, 21 (1987) (isolating respon-
siveness to racial minorities as the most important factor in voting dilution cases de-
cided before section 2 of the Act was amended).
177 See, e.g., Perkins v. City of West Helena, 675 F.2d 201, 210-11 (8th Cir. 1982)
(describing unresponsiveness in the provision of municipal services in a city with a di-
lutive at-large electoral system).
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Thus, to give but one example, although South Carolina's popula-
don is 29.8% black,78 not a single black person was elected to Con-
gress from any Congressional District within the state for almost 100
years, between 1896 and 1992. 9 This is strong evidence of minority
vote dilution.
The dilution of minority voting strength is not confined to any
one region. There is evidence of minority vote dilution in the north-
ern as well as the southern United States."' Nor are dilutive practicesa thing of the past.'8'
3. Understanding the Law's Focus on Mechanisms
for Aggregating Votes
To see when and why race-conscious districting might be an ap-
propriate response to the problem of minority vote dilution, it is nec-
essary to have both a comprehensible definition of discriminatory mi-
nority vote dilution and an understanding of the limitations on law's
ability to address it. The former has been clouded by recent decisions
of the Supreme Court, and the latter has been missing altogether
from both the case law and the literature on voting rights.
178 BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 1990 CENSUS OF
POPULATION, SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS: SOUTH CAROLINA 10 (1993).
179 See MICHAEL BARONE & GRANT UJIFASA, THE ALMANAC OF AMERICAN POLITICS
2000, at 1454 (Eleanor Evans ed., 1999) (describing the election in 1992 of the first
African American representative from South Carolina since 1897).
180 For just one example, see United Jewish Organization of l'97liamsburgh, Inc. v.
Carey, 430 U.S. 144 (1977), in which the United States Attorney General interposed an
objection under the V.R.A. to New York's state legislative apportionment plan, and re-
quired district lines to be redrawn, on the ground that the original plan had the pur-
pose or effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on the basis of race.
181 For example, in 1987 the County Commission of Etowah County, Alabama,
which is responsible primarily for upkeep of county roads, responded to the election
from a newly drawn, black-majority district of the first black County Commissioner in
its history by altering the rules of the Commission to prevent the newly elected Com-
missioner from exercising power. See Presley v. Etowah County Comm'n, 502 U.S. 491,
521 (1992) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("The two resolutions adopted by the Etowah
County Commission on August 25, 1987, less than nine months after the county's first
black Commissioner took office, were an obvious response to the redistricting of the
county that produced a majority black district from which a black Commissioner ras
elected."). Until that time, road funds had been divided among districts within the
county, and decisions about spending within each district had been within the power
of the individual Commissioner from that district. Id. at 495-98 (opinion of the
Court). Under the new rules, the Commission required a majority vote before funds
could be spent anywhere in the county. Id. at 497. The Supreme Court held that the
bait-and-switch perpetrated on black voters by Etowah County was not tied closely
enough to voting to have been prohibited by the V.R.A. Id. at 506.
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To begin with, the operation of a dilutive plan of electoral district-
ing is not complex. Electoral districting plans by themselves merely
place the land on which individuals live in one or another district.
The capacity of a districting plan to render less effective the voting
strength of one or another group depends on the interaction of that
plan with the acts of the individual voters it places in each district, that
is, with the way they cast their ballots. The effect of every electoral sys-
tem thus depends on both the behavior of the voters in the voting
booth and the mechanism chosen to aggregate their votes.
Ideally, voting strength would be measured against a hypothetical
world in which race was irrelevant to the votes cast. In such a case,
there would be no "dilution" of any group's voting strength, not be-
cause districting would be done in a way that would give each group
full ("undiluted") strength, but because the very concept of dilution
would be inapplicable. Where race does not correlate with votes,
every districting plan would have an essentially random impact upon
some voters of each race. Because they would not have cohesive in-
terests as a group, voters of one race could not be denied effective vot-
ing strength by any districting plan.
Although one could attempt to replicate through law a world
without voter discrimination, any such attempt would run into grave
constitutional-and, indeed, practical-difficulty. Antidiscrimination
laws do sometimes try to provide a remedy that would return the
complainant to where he or she would have been but for an act of dis-
crimination, but to combat voting discrimination in this way would
require invalidating the outcomes of elections that are decided on the
basis of individual votes cast on a discriminatory basis.
In some circumstances, that might not be an obstacle to the in-
validation of certain electoral outcomes. Although the act of voting
has been understood in American law as a private act, there is cer-
tainly a sense in which the casting of ballots could be viewed as state
action with respect to which the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Pro-
tection Clause would apply. Laws that are adopted by ballot initiative,
for example, are not immune from invalidation on constitutional
grounds, even when discriminatory intent is a part of the constitu-
tional equation.
l See Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 647 n.30 (1982) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (ar-
guin that casting of ballots is not state action).
See, e.g., Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 484 (1982) (con-
cluding in the course of striking down a ballot initiative that "purposeful discrimina-
tion is the condition that offends the Constitution" (internal quotation marks and cita-
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On the other hand, inquiry into the selection of representatives by
popular vote raises some at least apparently different constitutional
concerns. It is true that, in a nation in which the people are sover-
eign, voting could be described as the ultimate legislative act. At the
moment of the election, there is no line between the governed and
the governing. The voters hold governmental power. (Indeed, when
votes are cast on ballot initiatives, as they are in some states, the elec-
tion is in every sense a "legislative" act.)
Even when viewed as an action by a private party, the casting of a
ballot in an election for office has some characteristics of state action:
its purpose is the selection of representatives in a governmental body,
and it is given effect by governmental machinery. These factors
played a significant role in the Supreme Court's conclusion that the
act of a private party exercising a peremptory challenge in a civil case,
a similar type of private act, rose to the level of state action.'84 One
can at least imagine a legal regime in which individual votes found af-
ter investigation to have been cast on a discriminatory basis, like per-
emptory challenges brought on the basis of race, would be held inva-
lid.'
85
The law, however, could not work in this way without doing vio-
lence to other constitutional values. The very secrecy of the ballot, al-
though a part of the American system of voting only since the late
nineteenth century, is itself of constitutional dimension. Although
the Constitution nowhere mentions the secret ballot, and the Su-
preme Court has not addressed the question, several lower courts
have found the right to cast one's ballot in secret to be a fundamental
one protected by the Constitution. The ballot undoubtedly also has
at least some expressive component that is protected by the First
Amendment.
87
ions omitted)).
184 See Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 626, 622 (1991) (describ-
ing selection of jurors by private parties as "determining representation on a govern-
mental body" with the "overt, significant assistance of state officials").
185 Of course, unlike peremptory challenges, the power to vote is not ordinarily
understood to have been "conferred" on the people by the government. The power to
vote precedes government itself.
See, e.g., Anderson v. Mills, 664 F.2d 600, 608 (6th Cir. 1981) (asserting that se-
cret ballots safeguard the purity of the election process); cf. Roger, 458 U.S. at 647 n.30
(1982) (StevensJ., dissenting) (suggesting that secrecy of the ballot is constitutionally
protected).
187 But see Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 438 (1992) (rejecting a First Amend-
ment challenge to a Hawaii law prohibiting write-in ballots in part because attributing
a "generalized expressive function" to elections "would undermine the ability of States
to operate elections fairly and efficiently").
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Permitting government agents, including judges, to assess the ba-
sis on which individual votes have been cast would violate these consti-
tutional principles. Indeed, even the suggestion of governmental re-
view of an individual's vote could chill its conscientious exercise and
destroy the vitality of democracy.
In addition, the invalidation of racially tinged election results
could well give judges authority beyond their ability. Where a ballot
initiative is struck down, the consequence is merely invalidation of a
law. Were the election of an individual held to be tainted with racial
animus, the consequence-whether through invalidation of the
tainted votes or of the outcome of the election itself-could ultimately
be the installation in office of the other candidate. Merely holding a
new election might not be an effective remedy because voter discrimi-
nation might well persist. Yet to permit a court to order a losing can-
didate into office on the basis of necessarily speculative judgments of
what the election result would have looked like had one factor (race)
been removed from the voters' hearts and minds would likely go well
beyond the scope of judicial-indeed, perhaps, of human-compe-
tence.
4. The Legal Prohibition of Minority Vote Dilution and the
Definition of Undiluted Minority Voting Strength
The voting booth, in fact, has not been where the law has ad-
dressed the problem of racial vote dilution. Neither Congress nor the
courts has given even the explanation that I have suggested above for
the decision not to invalidate votes cast on a discriminatory basis. In-
deed, I know of no explicit analysis in either legislative history, judicial
opinion, or scholarly commentary of the reasons for the choice of ap-
proach that Congress and the courts have taken. Nonetheless, the law
has uniformly addressed vote dilution not by scrutiny into individuals'
voting behavior, but by examining the use of vote-aggregating mecha-
nisms that blunt the effectiveness of minority votes.
Significantly, this means that antidiscrimination law, at least as it
currently stands, does not directly address racially polarized voting,
the sine qua non of vote dilution. Rather, where there is racially cohe-
sive bloc voting, the law takes it as a given. The law addresses only the
"dilution" of one racial group's voting strength through the use of
particular tools of vote aggregation.
To determine whether a plan of electoral districting dilutes mi-
nority voting strength, one must have a definition of "undiluted" mi-
nority voting strength against which to measure it. Likewise, the way
68 UNIVERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA LAWREVEW
in which race may be required to combat discrimination under the
V.R.A. depends on that very definition. The definition of undiluted
minority voting strength is thus the critical question in voting dis-
crimination law.
Sections 2188 and 5"" of the V.R.A. both address the problem of
minority vote dilution through imposing requirements upon the
mechanisms used to aggregate votes. The 1965 Act was a novel and
far-reaching piece of legislation. At the time of its adoption, section 2
prohibited discrimination in voting in language mirroring that of the
Fifteenth Amendment to the Constitution. As originally enacted, sec-
tion 2 of the V.R.A. provided: "No voting qualification or prerequisite
to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure shall be imposed or ap-
plied by any State or political subdivision to deny or abridge the right
of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or
color."' 9°
Section 5 has always been more complicated. Several of the Act's
provisions, including section 5, apply only to certain jurisdictions
around the country that have exhibited indicia of racial discrimina-
tion with respect to voting. Specifically, coverage under these provi-
sions was limited at the time of the bill's adoption to those jurisdic-
tions found by the Attorney General of the United States both to have
utilized as of November 1964 certain tests or devices for voter registra-
tion (for example, literacy tests) and to have had below-average levels
of voter registration or participation. These circumstances together
typically reflect discrimination in voting on the basis of race. 9 Sec-
tion 4 of the Act temporarily suspended the use of those tests and de-
vices by covered jurisdictions."' And, under several of the Act's provi-
188 Section 2 is codified as amended at42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1994).
Section 5 is codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1994).
Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, § 2, 79 Stat. 437,437.
Section 5 applied on its effective date to states or their subdivisions found to
have required on November 1, 1964, "that a person as a prerequisite for voting or reg-
istration for voting (1) demonstrate the ability to read, write, understand, or interpret
any matter, (2) demonstrate any educational achievement or his knowledge of any par-
ticular subject, (3) possess good moral character, or (4) prove his qualifications by the
voucher of registered voters or members of any other class," and in which less than fifty
percent of the population either was registered to vote on November 1, 1964, or voted
in the presidential election of November 1964. Id. §§ 4-5, 79 Stat. at 438-39 (codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973b(b), (c), 1973c (1994)). The Supreme Court held
the coverage formula of the Act constitutional in South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S.
301 (1966).
192 See Voting Rights Act § 4, 79 Stat. at 438-39 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1973b
(1994)).
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sions, the Attorney General was permitted to appoint federal voting
examiners to be sent to covered jurisdictions to ensure that those
qualified to register to vote could do so.'
Under section 5 of the V.RA., a covered jurisdiction may not en-
force any change in a "voting qualification or prerequisite to voting,
or standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting,"191 before it
seeks and receives federal judicial or administrative "preclearance."
The Act defines voting to "include all action necessary to make a vote
effective in any primary, special, or general election."9" Under the
Act, a covered jurisdiction can seek judicial preclearance of a change
by bringing a declaratory judgment action in the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia. In such a suit, the submitting ju-
risdiction bears the burden of showing that the proposed change
"does not have the purpose and will not have the effect of denying or
abridging the right to vote on account of race or color" or, under a
1975 amendment, membership in a language minority group. 96
If a covered jurisdiction does not want to go to court, it can sub-
mit a proposed change to the Attorney General of the United States
for administrative preclearance. Because of its speed, this is ordinarily
the procedure chosen by jurisdictions subject to section 5 of the Act.
The statute does not establish standards to govern the administra-
tive preclearance determination, but the Attorney General has prom-
ulgated regulations governing the procedure by which it is made.
These require her to make the same determination as the District
Court would make in an action brought under the Act, and (as the
Act does with respect to judicial preclearance) place the burden of
proving the absence of a discriminatory purpose or effect upon the
submitting jurisdiction.97 If the Attorney General does not interpose
19 4 See id. §§ 6(b), 7,9, 13(a), 79 Stat. at 439-42, 444-45.
42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1994).
Voting Rights Act § 14(c) (1) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 19731 (1994)). This sub-
section of the Act reads in full:
The terms "vote" or "voting" shall include all action necessary to make a vote
effective in any primary, special, or general election, including, but not lim-
ited to, registration, listing pursuant to this Act, or other action required by
law prerequisite to voting, casting a ballot, and having such ballot counted
properly and included in the appropriate totals of votes cast with respect to
candidates for public or party office and propositions for which votes are re-
ceived in an election.
".,6 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1994). The provision relating to language minority groups
was added by Pub. L. No. 94-73, 89 Stat. 400, 401 (1975).
] ,7 Procedures for the Administration of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965,
as Amended, 28 C.F.R. § 51.52(a) (1999).
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an objection to a submitted change within sixty days, that change may
take effect. When the Attorney General decides to interpose an objec-
tion to a change, the regulations require her to state the reasons for
her decision, 98 and an objection letter accompanies a denial of ad-
ministrative preclearance. However, neither section 5 of the Act nor
any regulation promulgated by the Attorney General purport to pro-
vide any mechanism for the Attorney General to require a state to
adopt any particular alternative to a scheme to which she interposes
an objection. The Attorney General's power amounts only to a veto
over any adopted change. If the Attorney General does deny adminis-
trative preclearance to a change in state or local law, the aggrieved
state or political subdivision may, nonetheless, commence an action
for judicial preclearance in the District Court for the District of Co-
lumbia, and the court must give the change de novo consideration.
"A
Section 5, like the other portions of the Act applicable only to cer-
tain jurisdictions, has always been temporary, but the preclearance
provisions of section 5 have repeatedly been renewed-most recently
as they were about to expire in 1982, when they were extended for
twenty-five years.20 The coverage formula has also twice been revised
and section 5 now applies not only to those jurisdictions that exhib-
ited indicia of racial discrimination in voting in 1964, but also to those
exhibiting such indicia in 1968 or 1972.Y01
Section 5 was the first provision of the V.RA. to be held to play a
role in combating vote dilution. The V.RA. "was aimed at the subtle,
as well as the obvious, state regulations which have the effect of deny-
ing citizens their right to vote because of their race."212 Consequently,
as long ago as 1969, in its decision in Allen v. State Board of Elections, the
Supreme Court, relying on the statutory definition of "voting" to in-
clude "'all action necessary to make a vote effective,'" construed laws
that submerged black votes or replaced elective with appointive offices
198 Id. at § 51.44(a).
199 Morris v. Gressette, 432 U.S. 491,505 n.21 (1977).
200 See 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(a)(8) (1994).
201 The coverage formula was amended in 1970 to permit extension of coverage to
additional jurisdictions on the basis of findings with respect to voting procedures in
effect on November 1, 1968, and voter registration and participation that month, and
again in 1975 to permit a similar extension based on findings regarding voting in No-
vember 1972. 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(b) (1994). The statute has also always contained so-
called "bailout" provisions that permit covered states or their subdivisions to be freed
in certain circumstances from the requirements of compliance with those portions of
the Act that apply only to coveredjurisdictions. 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(a) (1) (1994).
202 Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544,565 (1969).
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as "voting qualification [s] or prerequisite [s] to voting, or standard [s],
practice[s] or procedure[s] with respect to voting," subject to review
under section 5 of the Act by the district court (or the Attorney Gen-
eral) in order to determine whether they had the purpose or effect of
denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color.
0 3
Section 5 of the V.RA., then, reached not only government actions
that had the purpose or effect of discriminating on the basis of race in
voter registration and the casting of ballots, but also, as the Allen
Court made clear, electoral mechanisms that had the purpose or ef-
fect of "diluti[ng] voting power" on the basis of race.0 4 For many
years after the Court's decision in Allen, however, the precise nature of
undiluted minority voting strength remained unarticulated by the
courts, making it impossible to determine precisely the nature of what
203might be protected by a prohibition of vote dilution.
In Beer v. United States, in 1976, the Court construed the "effect"
prong of the judicial preclearance provisions of section 5 to require
the submitting jurisdiction to demonstrate only that a change in vot-
ing practices or procedures will not "lead to a retrogression in the po-
sition of racial minorities with respect to their effective exercise of the
electoral franchise. '2Ob In requiring the district court to determine
whether a new plan gives greater or lesser effect to minority voting
strength, Beer-like Allen-implicitly acknowledged that it would be
possible to ascertain when a group had undiluted voting strength-or
in Bees terms, the fully "effective exercise of the electoral fran-
"" See id. at 566 (quoting 79 Stat. 445, 42 U.S.C. § 19731(c) (1) (Supp. 11964)). In
terms of rendering black votes ineffective, Allen itself addressed the replacement of
single-member districts in Mississippi with an at-large election. 393 U.S. at 550, 569.
The holding of Allen was first applied by the Supreme Court to address the shapes of
electoral districts in 1973-after Congress's post-Allen re-enactment of section 5 of the
V.R.A.-in Georgia v. United States, 411 U.S. 526 (1973).
" Allen, 393 U.S. at 569.
="o' Although the Court at first analogized the protection afforded under the
V.RA's command of nondilution to the protection against "dilution" of a vote's value
imposed by the one person-one vote rule of Reynolds v. Sims, in fact they are not the
same. See Allen, 393 U.S. at 569 (citing Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964)).
Racial vote dilution takes place in a context in which, because districts are equipopu-
lous, the weight of each vote, in the sense in which it is guaranteed by the one person-
one vote rule, is the same.
k 3 425 U.S. 130, 141 (1976). Again, the district court and the Attorney General
are empowered to deny preclearance if a change has the purpose or will have the ef-
fect of denying or abridging the right to vote on the basis of race, color, or member-
ship in a language minority group. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1994) (outlining the statu-"
tory standard applicable to the district court); Procedures for the Administration of
Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as Amended, 28 C.F.R. § 51.52(a) (1999)
(codifying adoption of the same standard for preclearance by the Attorney General).
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But Beer also blunted the need to explicate the nature of this undi-
luted voting strength, and limited the power of the Attorney General
to weed out vote dilution through the "effect" prong of her preclear-
ance power by holding, in essence, that even some dilutive plans will
pass muster under the section 5 preclearance provisions because they
are no more dilutive than what came before. Under Beer, the only dis-
criminatory effect that can form the basis for a denial of preclearance
is "retrogression."2 8 And, despite the continuing use of the "retro-
gression" test, the Court has never in its section 5 jurisprudence come
to grips with what might be meant by fully effective voting power.'°
Section 5 of the V.RA., however, is not the only federal statutory
prohibition on diluting voting strength on the basis of race. The sec-
ond provision of federal law to address voting mechanisms that have a
dilutive effect is section 2 of the V.R.A., which was amended to do so
in 1982.
The test contained in the amended section 2 actually grew out of
the Court's Equal Protection jurisprudence. In 1966, a month after
211the V.R.A. was upheld in South Carolina v. Katzenbach, the Supreme
Court in Burns v. Richardson first said (albeit in dictum) that one could
state a vote dilution claim-which it described as a claim that "the vot-
ing strength of racial or political elements of the population" had
been "minimize[d] or cancel[ed] out"--directly under the Equal Pro-
tection Clause.211 Seven years later, the Court in White v. Regester struck
207 425 U.S. at 141.
208 Id.
209 See, e.g., Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Dist. (Bossier Parish Rl), 120 S. Ct. 866, 873
(2000) (holding that the "purpose" prong of section 5 of the V.RA. prohibited only
acts undertaken with a purpose to "retrogress"); Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd. (Bossier
Parish 1), 520 U.S. 471, 478, 480 (1997) (distinguishing the section 5 retrogression test,
which the Court claimed requires only a comparison of a "new voting plan with [the]
existing plan," from the test for "dilution" under section 2, which "implies... the exis-
tence of an 'undiluted' practice against which the fact of dilution may be measured").
210 383 U.S. 301 (1966).
21 384 U.S. 73, 88 (1966). The Court said that where the requirements of Reynolds
v. Sims are met, apportionment schemes including multimember districts would consti-
tute an invidious discrimination only if it could be shown that "designedly or other-
wise, a multi-member constituency apportionment scheme, under the circumstances of
a particular case, would operate to minimize or cancel out the voting strength of racial
or political elements of the voting population." Id. (quoting Fortson v. Dropsy, 379
U.S. 433, 439 (1965)) (footnote omitted). Thus, the Court said that legislative judg-
ments reflected in the apportionment scheme before it "were subject to constitutional
challenge only upon a demonstration that the... apportionment, although made on a
proper population basis, was designed to or would operate to minimize or cancel out
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down for the first time a state's districting scheme under the Constitu-
tion on the basis that it had just such a dilutive effect.
21
1
In W11hite the Court held that unconstitutional vote dilution could
be found only on the basis of an in-depth examination of the "totality
of the circumstances." It held that not every racial or political group
had a right to representation in the state legislature, but that members
of racial groups have a right not to be "invidiously excluded... from
effective participation in political life."214 Although the unanimous
opinion for the Court in White did not purport to describe any rigid
test for dilution, it upheld the district court's "intensely local"215 ap-
praisal of a number of factors: the history of racial discrimination and
discrimination in voting in the jurisdiction at issue, the cultural and
economic situation of the group within the jurisdiction, the previous
success of members of racial minority groups in gaining election, the
presence or absence of support for candidates for office across racial
lines, the responsiveness of elected and other political officials to the
shared needs and interests of the minority community, and the racial
campaign tactics of candidates for office."'5
the Noting strength of racial or political elements of the voting population." Id. at 89.
The possible viability of such a claim had been raised, but left open, two years earlier
in Foiton.
212 412 U.S. 755 (1973) (invalidating multimember districts in two Texas counties
as having unconstitutionally diluted the votes of blacks and Mexican Americans). The
Court previously rejected such a challenge in Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124 (1971).
These lawsuits were both aimed at multimember districts, districts populous enough to
support the number of representatives who were to represent them without running
afoul of the one person-one vote requirements set out in Baker v. Carr and Reynolds v.
Sims.
41 11Wite, 412 U.S. at 769.
•414 Id. The court also stated:
[NW]e have entertained claims that multimember districts are being used in-
vidiously to cancel out or minimize the voting strength of racial groups. To
sustain such claims, it is not enough that the racial group allegedly discrimi-
nated against has not had legislative seats in proportion to its voting potential.
The plaintiffs' burden is to produce evidence to support findings that the po-
litical processes leading to nomination and election were not equally open to
participation by the group in question-that its members had less opportunity
than did other residents in the district to participate in the political processes
and to elect legislators of their choice.
Id. at 766 (citing Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 149-150 (1971)).
2b Id. at 769.
2l . Id. at 766-69. In White, the Court invalidated the multimember district in
Texas's Dallas and Bexar Counties because of their impact on black and Mexican-
American voters, respectively. The Court described the district court's findings with
respect to the latter as "a blend of history and an intensely local appraisal of the design
and impact of the Bexar County multimember district in the light of past and present
reality, political and otherwise." Id. at 769-70.
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While White opened the door to redress for unlawfully discrimina-
tory minority vote dilution, this multifactor test did little to clarify the
nature of undiluted voting strength, or, consequently, the nature of
the legal entitlement against vote dilution on the basis of race.1 7
The evolution of the constitutional law of vote dilution came to an
abrupt halt in 1980. In that year, the Supreme Court held in City of
Mobile v. Bolden that the Constitution prohibited only those electoral
mechanisms adopted with an intention to discriminate on the basis of218
race. This imposed a virtually insurmountable burden on minority
voters pressing a claim of unconstitutional vote dilution.
Congress, however, responded almost immediately and in 1982
amended section 2 of the V.RA. to make clear that any electoral
The framework set out in White was refined by the lower courts. Particularly influ-
ential was the Fifth Circuit's opinion in Zimmer v. McKeithen, which stated:
The Supreme Court has identified a panoply of factors, any number of
which may contribute to the existence of dilution. Clearly, it is not enough to
prove a mere disparity between the number of minority residents and the
number of minority representatives. Where it is apparent that a minority is af-
forded the opportunity to participate in the slating of candidates to represent
its area, that the representatives slated and elected provide representation re-
sponsive to minority's needs, and that the use of a multi-member districting
scheme is rooted in a strong state policy divorced from the maintenance of
racial discrimination, Whitcomb v. Chavis would require a holding of no dilu-
tion. Whitcomb would not be controlling, however, where the state policy fa-
voring multi-member or at-large districting schemes is rooted in racial dis-
crimination. Conversely, where a minority can demonstrate a lack of access to
the process of slating candidates, the unresponsiveness of legislators to their
particularized interests, a tenuous state policy underlying the preference for
multi-member or at-large districting, or that the existence of past discrimina-
tion in general precludes the effective participation in the election system, a
strong case is made. Such proof is enhanced by a showing of the existence of
large districts, majority vote requirements, anti-single shot voting provisions
and the lack of provision for at-large candidates running from particular geo-
graphical subdistricts. The fact of dilution is established upon proof of the ex-
istence of an aggregate of these factors. The Supreme Court's recent pro-
nouncement in White v. Regester demonstrates, however, that all these factors
need not be proved in order to obtain relief.
485 F.2d 1297, 1305 (5th Cir. 1973) (en banc), affd sub nom. East Carroll Parish Sch.
Bd. v. Marshall, 424 U.S. 639 (1976) (per curiam) (footnotes and citations omitted).
217 See, e.g., Issacharoff, supra note 44, at 1841-45 (describing the way in which Wite
failed to articulate the nature of the "minority vote dilution" the Court sought to rem-
edy).
446 U.S. 55, 66-70 (1980) (plurality opinion). Justice White's separate opinion
in City of Mobile essentially argues only that purposeful discrimination could be inferred
from the effect of the districting scheme at issue in the case before the Court. See 446
U.S. at 101-03 (White, J., dissenting). In Rogers v. Lodge 458 U.S. 613, 619 (1982),
however, the Court described Justice White's opinion in City of Mobile as having pro-
vided a fifth vote for the proposition that purposeful discrimination is a prerequisite to
a finding of vote dilution under the Equal Protection Clause.
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mechanism with a dilutive effect is unlawful.
Section 2 (a) of the V.RA., as amended in 1982, now provides that:
(a) No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard,
practice, or procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or politi-
cal subdivision in a manner which results in a denial or abridgement of the
right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or
color, or [membership in a language minority group], as provided in
subsection (b) of this 
section.
219
Section 2(b) explains the statutory standard for vote dilution:
(b) A violation of subsection (a) of this section is established if, based
on the totality of circumstances, it is shown that the political processes
leading to nomination or election in the State or political subdivision are
not equally open to participation by members of a class of citizens pro-
tected by subsection (a) of this section in that its members have less op-
portunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the po-
litical process and to elect representatives of their choice. The extent to
which members of a protected class have been elected to office in the
State or political subdivision is one circumstance which may be consid-
ered: Provided, That nothing in this section establishes a right to have
members of a protected class elected in numbers equal to their propor-
tion in the population.22°
These amendments were approved by an 85-8 vote in a Republi-
can-controlled Senate, and were signed into law by President
21Reagan.
In outlawing a discriminatory effect, section 2 is similar in opera-
tion to section 4 of the original V.R.A., which suspended use in cov-
ered jurisdictions of literacy and other tests which had had a racially
disparate impact, and to section 5 of the V.R.A., which prohibits
changes to voting laws in covered jurisdictions unless the adopting
state or its political subdivision can prove that the changes have no
discriminatory effect. Congress's power to outlaw voting practices on
the basis of their discriminatory effect alone was upheld in City of Rome
v. United States - and South Carolina v. Katzenbach.213
The 1982 amendments led finally to a judicial decision from
which one can deduce the nature of undiluted minority voting
strength and the corollary nature of a vote dilution claim. This came
in the Supreme Court's first opinion construing the prohibition on
21' 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a) (1994) (emphasis added).
24" 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (1994).
2A 128 CONG. REc. 14,304-37 (1982).
" 446 U.S. 156, 173-78 (1980).
zz2 383 U.S. 301, 334, 337 (1966).
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vote dilution contained in the amended section 2, Thornburg v. Gin-
/ .224
gles.24
Gingles articulates a clear, relatively straightforward measure for
the essential elements of a minority vote dilution claim. In that case, a
group of black voters alleged that their placement in multimember
districts rather than single-member districts denied them the ability to
elect the candidates of their choice. While not abandoning the ex-
amination of the "totality of the circumstances" prescribed by the stat-
ute,2u the Court held that there are three preconditions to showing
that a multimember district dilutes votes in that way.
First, the minority group must be "politically cohesive."22 Other-
wise, there are no "distinctive minority group interests" that can be
thwarted by a particular plan of electoral districting.227
Second, the white majority must "[vote] sufficiently as a bloc to
enable it-in the absence of special circumstances, such as the minor-
ity candidate running unopposed-usually to defeat the minority's
preferred candidate." 228 Although the point appears to have been lost
in some subsequent decisions, the Court made clear that varying de-
grees of white bloc voting could result in varying degrees of vote dilu-
tion: "[A] white bloc vote that normally will defeat the combined
strength of minority support plus white 'crossover' votes rises to the
level of legally significant white bloc voting."
229
Finally, as a measure of the possibility of minority success absent
such "racially polarized bloc voting," the Court required a showing
that the minority group "is sufficiently large and geographically com-
pact to constitute a majority in a single-member district."2"
Although subsequent cases have given great weight to this last fac-
tor,22' the requirement of compactness has not been satisfactorily ex-
plained. Section 2, of course, does not speak of compactness. And
the Constitution has long been held not to require that electoral dis-
224 478 U.S. 30 (1986).
25 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (1994); seeJohnson v. DeGrandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1018 (1994)
(citing 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b)) (reaffirming that a violation of section 2 must be deter-
mined "based on the totality of the circumstances").
26 Gingles, 478 U.S. at 51.
227 Id.
228 Id. (citation omitted).
229 Id. at 56.
230 Id. at 50.
231 See, e.g., Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 978 (1996) (plurality opinion), discussed
infta notes 355-72 and accompanying text.
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tricts be drawn compactly.
2
This Gingles precondition therefore appears to mean only that the
minority group cannot be so dispersed throughout the population as
to make it impossible to draw a district in which they form a major-
ity.1i- ' As some of the Court's more recent cases demonstrate, advances
in computer technology since Gingles have reduced the practical diffi-
culty of drawing such districts. The Court also explained that the re-
quirement that the minority group be able to form a "majority" was
based on the fact that the plaintiffs in Gingles had alleged impairment
of their "ability to elect the representatives of their choice."2  It ex-
pressly stated that the test it articulated was not meant to govern a case
in which a claim was made that a minority group's "ability to influence
235elections" was impaired.
Gingles made clear that the touchstone for finding the dilution of
minority voting strength is a showing of racially polarized bloc voting,
and that the degree of that dilution depends on the degree of racial
polarization. The measurement of such racial polarization will not
always be easy. The results of any single election will be insufficient to
determine whether such polarization exists, and election data may
have to be analyzed in light of other circumstances, such as racial ap-
peals in political campaigns and the responsiveness of elected officials
to the needs of the minority community, in order to determine its
meaning. Nonetheless, meeting the Gingles preconditions is "essen-
tial" in order to establish a vote dilution claim under section 2.236
In circumstances where vote dilution is possible, then, it is prohib-
ited by section 2 of the V.R.A. In the presence of racial polarization
among voters-a cohesion of interests among the members of a racial
minority group in electing particular candidates and a persistent un-
willingness among a substantial part of the majority group to vote for
"1- See, e.g., Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 752 n.18 (1973) ("But compactness
or attractiveness has never been held to constitute an independent federal constitu-
tional requirement for state legislative districts.").
-33 For example, in his influential piece on the meaning of amended section 2,
Howard Shapiro spoke of "the minimal level of geographic compactness necessary for
the effective operation of political districts." Howard Shapiro, Note, Geometry and Geog-
raphy: Racial Gerrymandering and the Voting Rights Act, 94YALE L.J. 189, 202 (1984).
24 478 U.S. at 46 n.12.
Id.
2 ,,See id. at 48-49 n.15 (noting that "[u]nder [the] 'functional' view of the political
process mandated by § 2," other factors "are supportive of, but not essential to, a minor-
ity voter's claim." (emphasis in original)); Growe v. Emison, 507 U.S. 25, 39-40 (1993)
("[T]o establish a vote-dilution claim... a plaintiff must prove [the] three [Gingles]
threshold conditions.").
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those candidates-section 2 of the V.R.A. requires state and local gov-
ernments to adopt mechanisms for holding elections that will not
have a dilutive effect on minority votes.
5. Drawing Race-Conscious Districts to Comply with the Act
In order to prevent the dilution of minority votes, compliance
with the V.R.A., as construed in Gingles (and subsequent cases follow-
ing it23 ), requires jurisdictions that use geographically based electoral
districts and in which there is racially polarized bloc voting to draw
district lines in a race-conscious fashion.ss As the Court recognized in
Johnson v. DeGrandy, "the lesson of Gingles is that society's racial and
ethnic cleavages sometimes necessitate majority-minority districts to
ensure equal political and electoral opportunity."211 In limited cir-
cumstances, then, compliance with the V.R.A. requires the use of race
in the drawing of electoral district lines.
The precise way in which race must be used to comply with sec-
tion 2 of the Act, however, has been widely misunderstood. To begin
with, section 2 of the V.RA., as construed in Gingles, does not require
the creation of a proportional number of majority-minority districts.
Nor does section 2 require the creation of the maximum number of
majority-minority districts. 4 It is usually mathematically possible to
draw even more than a proportional number of majority-minority dis-
tricts.24' For example, in a ten-district polity, members of a racial mi-
nority group comprising 21% of the population could, at least in the-
ory, be divided so as to make up a 50.5% majority in 40% of the
districts (four of the ten). This would never be required by section 2,
and would probably unlawfully dilute white voting strength.
In any event, the statute is not designed to require proportional
237 See Voinovich v. Quilter, 507 U.S. 146 (1993), and Johnson v. DeGrandy, 512 U.S.
997 (1994), both discussed infra notes 252-55 and accompanying text.
238 Indeed, there is a strong argument that the Constitution itself demands such
race-conscious action where the alternative is to give effect to discrimination in voting.
See Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984) (holding that the federal Constitution pro-
hibits state actors from giving effect to private discrimination); see also David A. Strauss,
The Myth of Colorblindness, 1986 S. Cr. REV. 99, 105 (concluding that Palmore stands for
the proposition that race-conscious government action is sometimes constitutionally
required).
239 512 U.S. at 1020.
240 See Ginges, 478 U.S. at 89 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (noting that section 2
does not require the "maximiz[ation of] feasible minority electoral success").
241 See Johnson, 512 U.S. at 1015-16 (explaining the mathematical possibility of dis-
proportionate minority control of electoral districts).
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representation of ethnic groups. Rather, it is designed to require that
racial minority groups are afforded "undiluted" or fully effective vot-
ing strength. 4' This point has led to a great deal of confusion.
Under Gingles, polarization of voting is a necessary precondition
for unlawful vote dilution. As the Court's focus on "the combined
strength of minority support plus white 'crossover' votes" makes clear,
the extent of unlawful vote dilution may vary with the degree of racial
polarization./ Consequently, the extent to which race would have to
be used in drawing district lines to prevent dilution will also vary with
the degree of racial polarization.
Concrete examples may be helpful. At one extreme, given a high
degree of cohesion among black voters, if racially polarized voting is
absolute-if no white voters will cross over and vote for a candidate
supported by black voters-only a districting plan that creates black-
majority districts in proportion to the percentage of blacks in the
population will give full effect to black voting strength.24 This is not
because creation of a proportional number of black-majority electoral
districts is required by the statute, but because drawing such districts is
in those circumstances the only way to prevent the dilution of black
i42 Because legally cognizable voter polarization can only be found where the ma-
jority group -votes sufficiently as a bloc to enable it... usually to defeat the minority's
preferred candidate," Gingles, 478 U.S. at 51, section 2 addresses only the structural
inability to build coalitions across racial lines. The fully effective voting strength guar-
anteed by the statute thus should not necessarily translate into continual success at the
polls. In the absence of a refusal of white voters to cross over, even cohesive minority
voters who are unable in one or another election to succeed in electing a like-minded
individual do not necessarily suffer vote dilution as a racial group. The relevant ques-
tion-both in determining whether there is sufficient racial polarization to warrant
race-conscious districting and in determining whether any districting plan is dilutive-
is not success or failure in any single election, but refusal of voters to form coalitions
across racial lines.
243 Gingles, 478 U.S. at 56.
44 The precise percentage of minority voters necessary to create an effective ma-
jority-minority district will depend on the circumstances. If the degree of cohesion
among black voters is less than complete, as it usually will be in reality, effective minor-
ity voting strength would require a more substantial black majority. Some courts im-
posing remedial districting plans after finding a violation of section 2 have ordered the
creation of districts with minority populations over sixty percent in order to compen-
sate for lower turnout among minority group members. See, e.g., Prosser v. Elections
Bd., 743 F. Supp. 859, 869 (W.D. Wsc. 1992) (per curiam). This presents some diffi-
cult issues. As a general matter, such supermajorities would seem to be unjustifiable
unless the low turnout is itself traceable (as it often will be) to past discrimination in
voting. In this regard, examination of the greatest minority voter turnout in any previ-
ous election may be a helpful benchmark in assessing the potential minority voter
turnout that may be assumed by the districting authority.
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241
voting strength.
An intermediate example might be ajurisdiction in which there is
a highly cohesive community of black voters and in which there is sub-
stantial, but less than absolute, bloc voting by white voters. Minority
voters in such a circumstance could achieve fully effective voting
strength under a districting plan which creates a number of districts in
which members of that group form some substantial minority. More
precisely, any district in which as an empirical matter enough white
voters might be willing to cross over and vote for a candidate sup-
ported by most of the black voters that, together, black and white
crossover voters would make up a majority, would provide those black
voters an opportunity, equal with that of other members of the elec-
torate, to elect representatives of their choice. For example, if in such
a circumstance the potential white crossover vote amounted to 15% of
the electorate, a districting plan which created approximately 35%-
minority districts would give full effect to black voting strength.146 In
such an intermediate case, drawing black-majority districts in propor-
tion to black population, instead of the black "influence districts" just
described, would actually "pack" black voters, giving black voters a
small number of "safer" seats, but diluting overall black voting
strength. In the face of a white population willing to cross over and
form coalitions with black voters, the placement of larger numbers of
black voters in a district than are necessary to offset any white voting
bloc that is unwilling to form coalitions with black voters could in fact
amount to "a 'contrivance to segregate' the group, thereby frustrating
its potentially successful efforts at coalition building across racial
lines."2 '
Finally, if there is enough potential crossover voting by whites that
the candidate supported by a cohesive black minority will not usually
be defeated by the votes of the white-majority bloc, compliance with
section 2 will not ordinarily require electoral districts to be drawn to
concentrate black voters to any degree. Indeed, it will prohibit the
concentration of too many minority voters in a single district as "pack-
245 Again, a proportional number of black-majority districts will not amount to maxi-
mizing the number of black-majority districts. See supra text accompanying notes
240-41. A disproportionately large number of black-majority districts would itself di-
lute white voting strength.
246 This example is based roughly on the allegations in Voinovich v. Quilter dis-
cussed infra notes 252-54 and accompanying text. Again, this assumes a completely
cohesive black community.
247 See United Jewish Org. of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Cary, 430 U.S. 144, 172-73
(1977) (Brennan, J., concurring in part) (citation omitted).
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ing."
Similarly, in a situation in which the black community shares no
community of interests, compliance with section 2 will neither require
nor prohibit race-conscious districting because in the absence of a co-
hesion of minority interests, no districting plan can dilute minority
voting strength.4 8 Lack of minority political cohesion necessarily de-
feats a claim of minority vote dilution.
Another widespread misconception about section 2 is that it guar-
antees the right to elect candidates of a particular race, and that its
purpose is to "integrate legislatures."249 But the V.R.A. is not con-
cerned with the race of the candidates per se. The V.R.A. guarantees
minority-group voters the right to participate equally in the election of
the candidates of their choice, regardless of those candidates' race.
The purpose of the V.RIA. is to ensure that the voices of citizens of all
races are heard in the nation's legislatures.
Clearly the effect of the creation of nondilutive districts in jurisdic-
tions in which voting is polarized along racial lines has in fact been to
integrate many legislative bodies to a previously unknown degree. At
times, it appears that the single interest that minority-group voters
may share most fervently is the desire to elect someone of their own
race. Certainly Congress was aware in 1982 of the sad fact that race
is still so salient in American life that people of both races continue to
feel that only one of their own can properly represent them. The
amended statute thus makes clear that the race of candidates can be
considered in measuring the presence of unlawful voting discrimina-
tion under the Act.' 5 But discrimination in voting under the Act is
not measured solely by the success of candidates of a particular race.
Two section 2 cases decided in the 1990s have reaffirmed the
definition of vote dilution first articulated in Gingles with its focus on
the presence and degree of racial polarization. In Voinovich v. Quilter,
the Court heard a claim by black voters that the creation of a number
of black-majority districts proportionate to the percentage of blacks in
the population actually diluted black voting strength because of the
1AS Race-conscious districting in such a situation, however, because completely un-
justified, would properly be held to violate the Constitution.
249 See LNI GUINIER, THE TYRANNY OF THE MAJORrIY 41-42 (1994).
250 See Issacharoff, supra note 44, at 1855-56.
25 See 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (1994) ("The extent to which members of a protected
class have been elected to office in the State or political subdivision is one circum-
stance which may be considered: Provided, That nothing in this section establishes a
right to have members of a protected class elected in numbers equal to their propor-
tion in the population.").
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possibility of crossover votes from white voters. The plaintiffs ar-
gued that in Ohio, white voters who made up fifteen percent of the
electorate were willing to cross over and vote in coalitional fashion
with black voters, even when those voters supported a black candidate.
Thus, the plaintiffs argued, the creation of black-majority districts,
rather than districts in which black voters made up approximately
thirty-five percent of the population, denied blacks the opportunity to
form coalitions with this "crossover" segment of the white population.
The plan at issue, they argued, had the effect of "packing" black voters
into black-majority districts when a districting plan could have been
drawn that contained a larger number of districts whose populations
were thirty-five percent black, and in which black voters could effec-
tively influence the outcome of the election.
The Bush Administration's Department of Justice suggested that
an "influence district" claim of vote dilution could not be brought
under section 2 by members of a minority group who had the poten-
tial, in combination with a substantial number of crossover voters, to
elect a candidate of their choice.2 As part of its argument that sec-
tion 2 protected only those members of racial minority groups who
could not elect a candidate without the creation of a majority-minority
district, the government urged that each of the three factors described
in Gingles, including the requirement of sufficient minority population
to make up a majority in a single-member district, was necessary to
make out a section 2 claim in all circumstances. This would have ren-
dered claims of vote dilution such as the plaintiffs' outside the protec-
tion of section 2 of the Act.
The Court rejected this. Although the Court only assumed that
an "influence" claim could be brought under the Act, it stated:
Of course, the Gingles factors cannot be applied mechanically and
without regard for the nature of the claim. For example, the first Gingles
precondition, the requirement that the group be sufficiently large to
constitute a majority in a single district, would have to be modified or
eliminated when analyzing the influence-dilution claim we assume argu-
endo to be actionable today. The complaint in such a case is not that
black voters have been deprived of the ability to constitute a majority, but
of the possibility of being a sufficiently large minority to elect their candi-
22 507 U.S. 146 (1993).
253 See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellants at 16 &
n.9, Voinovich v. Quilter, 507 U.S. 146 (1993) (No. 91-1618) (arguing that the major-
ity-minority districts could not violate section 2 because section 2 did not require the
creation of influence districts).
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date of choice with the assistance of cross-over votes from the white ma-
jority.254
Also, in Johnson v. DeGrandy, although the Court purported again
not to decide whether black voters could bring a claim under section
2 that they had been denied an influence district, it made clear that
creation of a number of majority-minority districts in proportion to
the minority percentage of the overall population might nonetheless
dilute minority voting strength because "there are communities in
which minority citizens are able to form coalitions with voters from
other racial and ethnic groups, having no need to be a majority within
a single district in order to elect candidates of their choice. " ' 5 The
Court there rejected an argument that creation of a proportional
number of majority-minority districts should provide states' districting
plans a conclusively safe harbor from section 2 challenges.
6. The Limits of the Law: Race-Conscious Districting
as a Second-Best Solution
So the law may require race-conscious districting to prevent vote
dilution. As we have seen in Part I, this use of race will carry some
substantial costs, but before turning to the question of the proper ap-
proach to assessing the constitutionality of race-conscious districting,
it is worth focussing briefly on some of the costs of the failure (really
the inability) of the law to address directly the discriminatory action of
voters in voting along racial lines.
The persistence of racial polarization makes districting itself a no-
win proposition from the standpoint of racial equality. Indeed, there
is no method for aggregating votes that will not have some deleterious
consequence for members of the minority group. If race is not taken
into account, the votes of members of the minority group will be, by
definition, submerged. Yet if race is used to create black-majority dis-
tricts, there will inevitably be some costs to black voters in terms of re-
duced influence in the surrounding black-minority districts.
To begin with, the essential fact that must be understood when
evaluating race-conscious district lines drawn to prevent vote dilution
caused by racially polarized voting is that a refusal to draw race-
conscious district lines will not do anything to alter the existence of
white-preferred and black-preferred candidates or of white-majority or
black-majority districts. In the face of racial polarization, a refusal to
24 Voinovich, 507 U.S. at 158.
2'; 512 U.S. 997, 1020 (1994).
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draw race-conscious district lines is not "neutral": it will simply result
in the creation of majority-majority districts and the election of all or
almost all the candidates preferred by the majority group. This would
be so even if district lines were drawn at random-the average district
would have a racial composition roughly reflecting that of the polity,
that is, a white majority.
Thus, in the face of a racially polarized electorate, neither the
drawing of electoral district lines without reference to race nor the
drawing of them in race-conscious fashion leads to a "neutral" out-
come. In the face of the most extreme example of racial polarization,
lines drawn without reference to race will submerge black votes and
lead to the election of virtually all the white-preferred candidates;
lines drawn on racial grounds to comply with the V.R.A. would lead to
a proportionate number of successful white-preferred and black-
preferred candidates. The view that drawing lines without reference
to race is neutral, and that drawing electoral district lines on racial
grounds provides minority voters with something they are not entitled
to, is probably based on nothing more than the fact that we are accus-
tomed, in the face of racial polarization, to the election of the white-
preferred candidate.
Further, even if race is taken into account, minority voters will pay
for their increased voting strength in a smaller number of districts
with the loss of some lesser influence in a larger number of districts.2 '5
Even in a racially polarized jurisdiction whose districts are drawn in-
tentionally to dilute black voting strength, black voters, whose candi-
date is never elected and to whom elected officials (relying on the
predictable racial patterns in voting) may be extremely unresponsive,
may make some difference in determining precisely who is elected
simply by turning out and voting.
To take the extreme example, imagine ajurisdiction in which vot-
ing is completely racially polarized, and in which the African Ameri-
can population is overwhelmingly Democratic. Imagine further that
every district has a white majority and that in virtually every election,
26 This fact has led Justice Thomas to argue that "any reapportionment plan" can
be invalidated under the Court's vote dilution jurisprudence, "either because it did not
include enough majority-minority districts or because it did (and thereby diluted the
minority vote in the remaining districts)." Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd. (Bossier Par-
ish 1), 520 U.S. 471, 491 (1997) (Thomas, J., concurring). Because the Court in Gingles
provided a definition of "dilution" under section 2 and a roadmap for assessing the
minority group's "undiluted" voting strength, this argument is not correct. It is, how-
ever, true that in the face of racially polarized voting no districting plan will be ideal
for the representation of members of the minority group.
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the black-supported candidate (say someone who is black) loses to a
white-supported candidate (say someone who is white) in the Demo-
cratic primary. The general election is then between two white-
supported candidates. Depending on numbers, the Democrat may
only be capable of election with black support.
If he needs black support for election, the Democrat must at a
minimum not act in a way that completely discourages all black voter
turnout. This may require him to do nothing: simply preventing the
Republican's election may encourage sufficient black turnout to en-
sure the Democrat's election. Or it may prevent the Democrat from
acting in some ways that are antithetical to the black community's
core interests. This effect will be limited, perhaps by the candidate's
own views, and certainly by the risk of losing the support of white vot-
ers who voted for him in the primary.
Black voting strength in such a circumstance will still be diluted-
intentionally in the example I have given. The price of nondilutive
districting (with dilution defined as it is in Gingles) would be the loss
of this limited-but often in the real world significant-black influ-
ence over a larger number of seats. The increase of black population
in one or two districts will require the decrease of that population in
the surrounding districts.
The power of law to address social problems is limited, and be-
cause, in this case, law does not address the discriminatory act in the
voting booth, the result of antidiscrimination law here is not a replica-
tion of a world without voting discrimination, but a second-best solu-
tion. Given racial polarization in voting, section 2's prohibition on
vote dilution means that no group is denied its voice in electoral poli-
tics. But it does not eliminate the costs imposed by discriminatory be-
havior in the voting booth. The law does not, at least in an immediate
way, prevent ballots from being cast on racial lines. It only blunts the
effects of the individual voters' impulse to discriminate. 7 But so long
as racial polarization persists, some deleterious racial effects are inevi-
table.
In the context of electoral districting, as long as votes are still cast
in a racially polarized way, and as long as one racial group forms a mi-
nority, the most the law can do is make a choice for what it determines
is the least among evils. As long as discrimination persists, the possi-
bility of a tradeoff between fully effective votes in a smaller number of
• 7 See Rubin, supra note 52, at 590-91 (making this same argument about the op-
eration of laws against discrimination generally).
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districts and some influence, however slight, in a larger number of dis-
tricts will be inescapable. In terms of drawing electoral district lines,
the only options are to alter the lines to prevent dilution or to leave
the members of the racial minority group to be persistently defeated.
The second-best nature of nondilutive districting suggests, of
course, that society's ultimate goal must be the eradication of racial
polarization in voting, and that race-conscious districting must at most
be a temporary way-station along that road. The problem of racial
group representation will only disappear when race no longer corre-
lates with patterns of voting. This correlation, however, reflects
broader racial attitudes in society, attitudes that law alone cannot
eradicate.
As an empirical matter, as with other antidiscrimination laws, the
V.R.A. may, through its choice that a prohibition on minority vote di-
lution as defined in Gingles is the lesser of the two evils, help to break
down patterns of discrimination. In the initial elections from districts
that have been drawn to take race into account in order to comply
with the command of section 2 of the V.R., blacks tend to be chosen
in votes that, unsurprisingly in light of the racial polarization that jus-
tifies the district lines in the first place, go along racial lines. In at
least some subsequent elections, however, black incumbents have
been able to attract white voters who previously had not voted for a
black candidate. For example, Mike Espy was elected from a black-
majority district in 1986 as the first black congressman from Missis-
sippi since Reconstruction, with only twelve percent of the white
vote.2" Two years later, he was re-elected with forty percent of the
white vote.259 This can presumably be attributed in large part to the
effect on white voters of having seen that a black representative can be
260as effective as a white one. This pattern has been repeated in the re-
election of black incumbents even when their districts have been re-
drawn in light of Shaw to eliminate the black majorities that originally
elected them.261
258 See Issacharoff, supra note 44, at 1854-55 & n.105.
259 Tom Kenworthy, Pathfinder Turns Up a Landslide, WASH. POST, Nov. 11, 1988,
atA9.
260 See id. (quoting Espy as saying, "You have to get in to serve so they recognize
that with a black congressman the sun will come up tomorrow just like it did yester-
day... I've always said there was a Catch-22. You have to get in there to produce and
in order to produce you have to get in.").
26 See, e.g., Catalina Camia, Re-elected Blacks Defy the Pundits, DALLAS MORNING
Nmws, Nov. 17, 1996, at 1A, 20A (describing, inter alia, the 1996 re-election of African
American Congresswoman Cynthia McKinney from a sixty-five percent white district in
[Vol. 149: 1
20001 A COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH TO STRICT SCRUTINY 87
Indeed, Abigail Thernstrom, a commentator who has criticized
much of the race-conscious districting undertaken pursuant to the
1982 amendments to section 2 of the V.R.A., has observed that "where
whites-and often blacks-regard skin color as a qualification for of-
fice (in part because no experience suggests otherwise), the election
of blacks helps to break both white and black patterns of behavior."262
Similarly, if the trajectory of politics among African Americans follows
the pattern of other ethnic groups for whom obstacles to participation
in electoral politics have been removed, the initial election of black
candidates in racially polarized areas may be a step along the way to a
time when the African Americans who live there no longer feel they
must elect one of their own to be truly represented.
If racial polarization is broken down by the use of nondilutive dis-
tricts, the percentage of minority voters needed in each district to en-
sure fully effective voting strength will diminish over time. In situa-
tions where the initial election and service of a black representative
alters the willingness of white voters to cross over and vote for a black-
supported candidate, there has been a reduction in the degree of ra-
cial polarization. Consequently, the number of black voters necessary
in each district to combat the remaining racial polarization will be re-
duced.
In such a circumstance the previously drawn district line will no
longer be necessary to prevent vote dilution, because vote dilution can
be prevented by a district with a smaller percentage of black voters. A
new district line that reflects the reduction in polarization will have to
be drawn. Indeed, the effect of retaining so large a black population
in a district in which polarization has begun to break down would be
the same as if black voters had been "packed" into the district in the
first place. This phenomenon may have been reflected, for example,
in some of the results in the 1994 congressional mid-term elections,
the second elections under the districts drawn after the 1990 census,
in which black-majority districts sent black (Democratic) incumbents
263
back to Congress, usually with well over sixty percent of the vote.
Georgia).
ABIGAIL THER.NSTROM, WHOSE VOTES COUNT? 239 (1987).
, See, e.g., BARONE & UJIFASA, supra note 179, at 25-26 (noting that in Alabama's
Seventh Congressional District, the incumbent, African American Democratic Con-
gressman Earl Hilliard, won in 1994 with seventy-seven percent of the vote, up from
the seventy percent he obtained when he was initially elected in 1992). Of course, a
court analyzing the outcome of an election in a district whose racial composition had
been intentionally fixed in order to comply with the V.RA. would have to take account
of the quality of the opposing candidate. Part of the reason black incumbents in black-
majority districts received supermajorities in the 1994 election may have been that the
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The V.R.A. requires that states prevent dilution of minority votes.
Under Gingles, this means that the state must utilize a system in which
minority voters have an opportunity to elect the candidate of their
choice despite polarized opposition from some or most of the white
majority. It does not mean that minority voters must be given or
maintained in "safe" districts if that opposition softens. The creation
of such safe seats may unjustifiably drain black voters from surround-
ing districts, diminishing their influence on a statewide level.
Unlike the mechanisms used in some countries to protect ethnic
minorities' rights to representation, the type of districting that may be
required by section 2 of the V.R.A. does not treat racial interest
groups as permanent.26 In determining what is required by section 2
of the V.R.A., ajurisdiction or a reviewing court thus must pay careful
attention to the actual degree of potential crossover voting revealed by
previous election results. Failure to do so may result in a small num-
ber of districts that have unnecessarily large black populations, unjus-
tifiably reducing the influence of black voters in surrounding districts.
Of course, whether racial polarization is broken down by district-
ing that complies with section 2 of the Act is an empirical question
that will be answered over time. Nothing in the drawing of nondilu-
tive districts ensures this result. There is the possibility in a racially
polarized jurisdiction that a person elected from a black-majority dis-
trict will be as unresponsive to the needs of his white constituents as
the persons elected from white-majority districts have sometimes been
to their African American ones. But every district must have either a
black or a white majority. In a racially polarized jurisdiction, the re-
sult of either choice may be to provide some voters in each district
with an unresponsive elected official. In the face of racial polariza-
tion, it is not inherently better to have all or virtually all white-majority
districts, rather than some percentage of black-majority ones. And,
since the traditional system of dilutive majority-majority districts has
done little to break down patterns of racial polarization in voting,
there is little reason to think that drawing nondilutive districts will
somehow be less effective at doing so.
most viable potential Republican candidates concluded that their chances of success
were small enough that they chose not to run.
26 The opposite can be seen, for example, in systems like Lebanon's, where the
top government offices are permanently divided among the nation's religious factions,
with the Presidency belonging to a Mennonite Christian, the office of Prime Minister
to a Sunni Muslim, and the Speakership of the Parliament to a Shiite Muslim. See
Wadie Said, The Palestinians in Lebanon: The Rights of the Victims of the Palestinian-Israeli
Peace Process, 30 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 315, 320 (1999) (describing this power-
sharing agreement).
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B. The Supreme Court's Evaluation of Race-Conscious Districting
With a clear understanding of the way in which race-conscious dis-
tricting may be employed to combat vote dilution, we can turn now to
the approach to race-conscious districting described by the Supreme
Court in its Shaw line of decisions and the contesting approach of-
fered by the dissenters in Shaw land its progeny.
In Shaw v. Reno the Supreme Court held that, in at least some cir-
cumstances, electoral districts drawn on the basis of race must be sub-
jected to strict scrutiny.2 6 In a series of follow-on cases, the Shaw ma-
jority has struggled to explain what triggers strict scrutiny of race-
conscious electoral districts and whether those districts can ever sur-
vive that strict scrutiny.2°
At best, the Shaw majority has articulated a scheme that operates
in a binary fashion, one that evaluates attempts to address discrimina-
tion in voting too harshly in most circumstances by imposing a form of
strict scrutiny that amounts to a rule of automatic invalidation, and
that may (it at least suggests) evaluate such attempts too leniently in
others, by using an utterly deferential rational basis test despite the
costs associated with the use of race in this context
At worst, the Court majority has laid, perhaps without even realiz-
ing it, the groundwork for the imposition of a uniform policy that will
lead to the invalidation of all race-conscious districts, regardless of the
circumstances leading to their adoption, and regardless of whether
they present the risks and costs that appear to animate the Court's
concern about race-conscious districts in the first place. In order to
prevent the collision of this new requirement of equal protection with
that of the civil rights statute that addresses discrmination in this area,
the Court has begun to weaken the requirements of the V.R.A., so that
it will not be construed to require what Shaw, so far implicitly, seems
to prohibit.
By contrast, the approach put forward by the dissenting opinions
in Shaw I and its progeny fails to recognize some of the harms that
may be wrought by the use of race in districting, even where it is em-
ployed to combat discrimination. At least as articulated thus far, the
approach advocates a deferential rational basis scrutiny in the absence
of a showing of racial vote dilution.26' This approach ignores some of
the real risks that accompany any governmental use of race. It is not
- 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
See infra text accompanying notes 268-372.
See infra text accompanying notes 377-89.
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appropriately tailored to ensure that race-conscious districts do, in-
deed, serve purposes that transcend the harm they may cause.
As I will describe, however, Shaw I and the decisions that have fol-
lowed it, particularly Miller v. Johnson and Bush v. Vera, have left the
doctrine in this area confused and incoherent. In particular, the
Court has been unable adequately to articulate the significance to its
analysis of the bizarre shapes of the majority-minority electoral dis-
tricts it has evaluated in these cases. As a consequence, the cause of
action articulated in Shaw and its progeny is ripe for reconceptualiza-
ion in a way that would render it both consistent with principles of
equality, and responsive to the concerns that seem to animate the
Court's decisions in this area.
1. The Shaw Approach
The drawing of electoral districts, like the drawing of school at-
tendance zones, has the characteristics of geographical districting de-
scribed in Part I. However it is achieved, it places each person (or,
more precisely, each address at which a person may live) within one or
another district. However a district is drawn, each person will find
himself or herself assigned to a district. Each eligible voter will be
able to cast a ballot for a representative. After the election, every resi-
dent of the district will be represented by the winning candidate.
The nature of assignment to districts does not require that the dis-
tricts be constructed on the basis of any substantive criteria. There is
no natural or neutral pattern of drawing district lines. Because of the
one person-one vote requirement that districts be equipopulous,ss
268 See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 568 (1964) (holding that under the Equal
Protection Clause seats in both houses of a bicameral state legislature must be appor-
tioned on a population basis); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 18 (1964) (holding the
same for congressional districts in order for each individual's vote to have equal worth
under Article I, section 2 of the Constitution). With respect to congressional districts,
even de minimis population deviations are not permissible without justification if they
are avoidable. See, e.g., Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 730, 734 (1983) ("[The] 'as
nearly as practicable' standard requires that the State make a good-faith effort to
achieve precise mathematical equality. Unless population variances among congres-
sional districts are shown to have resulted despite such effort, the state must justify
each variance, no matter how small." (citations omitted)). By contrast, state legislative
districts with small population deviations "in the vicinity of 10 percent" have been held
presumptively valid. SAMUEL IssAcHARoFF ET AL., THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY: LEGAL
STRUCrURE OF THE POLITICAL PROCESS 145 (1998); see also Gaffney v. Cummings, 412
U.S. 735, 748-49 (1973) (discussing "insignificant population variations"); Mahan v.
Howell, 410 U.S. 315, 320-25 (1973) (acknowledging that the "more stringent stan-
dards" applicable to congressional districting are not applicable to state legislative dis-
tricting). The Court in Mahan upheld a 16.4% population deviation, noting, however,
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when one superimposes a districting plan upon a political jurisdiction,
it is generally impossible to avoid splitting some communities or po-
litical subdivisions. There are also a multiplicity of different ways to
combine subdivisions and communities even when they are not split.
No person has an entitlement to placement within any particular
district. Nor does any person have an entitlement to be placed in a
district with other like-minded individuals or in a districting plan that
aggregates like-minded individuals overall in any particular way.
Consequently, the harm wrought by adoption of a plan of elec-
toral districting that takes race into account will be less than the harm
that may be caused by government uses of race that may determine,
for example, who is given a particular job or a place in a college or
graduate school class. Although the precise mechanisms by which
electoral districts operate differ somewhat from the mechanisms by
which school attendance zones operate, and while, as a consequence,
districting plans may impose unique harms on persons placed in one
or another district, race-conscious electoral districting thus falls
roughly into Category Three, the third category of race-conscious ac-
tion described in Part I.269
Nonetheless, in the series of decisions that began with Shaw I and
continued through Miller v. Johnson, 7" Bush v. Vera, 7' and Shaw v. Hunt
(Shaw I1),2 2 the Supreme Court has subjected to strict scrutiny and in-
validated every districting plan to come before it in a fully briefed and
argued case in which race was used in drawing district lines, and its
controlling opinions indicate that it will continue to do so-at least
when the resulting districts are bizarrely shaped and fail to employ
what the court has called "traditional districting principles."73 The
Court has failed to examine the particular harms caused by the gov-
ernment's use of race in each of the cases before it to determine what
"strict" scrutiny should allow. Nor has its approach been able ade-
quately to account for the possible need for race-conscious govern-
ment action to address voting discrimination in the form of racially
polarized bloc voting.
Invalidation of these race-conscious districts has put states in a
bind. They are required by the principles of equal opportunity con-
that it "may well approach tolerable limits." Id. at 329.
20 See supra text accompanying notes 96-113.
k7, 515 U.S. 900 (1995).
271 517 U.S. 952 (1996).
27: 517 U.S. 899 (1996).
273 Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. at 994 (O'ConnorJ., concurring).
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tamined in the V.R.A. to draw such districts, yet they may be prohibited
by the Equal Protection Clause as construed in Shaw Ifrom doing just
that. Confronted with this result of the interplay between Shaw I and
the antidiscrimination command of the V.R.A., the Court has begun
to relax the antidiscrimination requirement of the Act. Indeed, in its
latest decision on voting rights, the Court held in Reno v. Bossier Parish
School Board (Bossier Parish fl) that neither the Attorney General nor
the District Court for the District of Columbia may deny preclearance
under section 5 of the Act to a change adopted with an intent to dis-
criminate, but no intent to "retrogress."274 That is, the Court has is-
sued the remarkable holding that preclearance under the Voting
Rights Act must be granted to laws that are adopted with discrimina-
tory intent, so long as the intent behind them was to leave the mem-
bers of the racial minority group against whom they are aimed in no
worse a position than they were under the previous law! The result
will be that such districting plans will be permitted to stand-so no
race-conscious alternative plans will have to be drawn to replace them.
The animating force behind the Court's trend toward weakening
the V.R.A. seems to be rigid opposition to race-conscious districts. But
the Equal Protection Clause fails to serve its fundamental purpose
when what is required under the principle of equality is prohibited by
the Constitution. The very nature of the strict scrutiny inquiry under
Shaw I must be tailored to meet the Court's legitimate concerns if an
undifferentiated constitutional approach to the use of race by gov-
ernment is not to hobble both the state and federal governments as
they attempt to redress problems of persistent discrimination.
a. Shaw I, Miller, and Bush
The most important cases in the Shaw line-Shaw I, which arose in
North Carolina, Miller, which arose in Georgia, and Bush, which arose
in Texas-all grew out of the 1990 decennial congressional reappor-
tionment. The results of the 1990 census revealed that, as a result of
population increases, North Carolina and Georgia were each entitled
to one additional congressional seat, and Texas was entitled to three.
Statewide, 20% of North Carolina's voting age population and
22% of its total population are black.275 Nonetheless, at the time the
274 120 S. Ct. 866, 878 (2000).
275 See Shaw v. Reno (Shaw 1), 509 U.S. 630, 634 (1993) (describing the voting age
population); BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, 1990 CENSUS OF
POPULATION,, GENERAL POPULATION CHARACTERISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES 522
(1990) (breaking down population by race).
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districting plan at issue in Shaw was drawn, no North Carolina con-
gressional district had sent an African American to Congress since the
end of Reconstruction.
Georgia's population is 27% black.277 The State sent to Washing-
ton its first black congressman in 101 years in 1972 when Andrew
Young was elected from a 40% black district in Atlanta, the Fifth Con-
gressional District. After Young's retirement, a white Democrat, Wy-
che Fowler, was elected from the Fifth District in a racially polarized
election.' 7" The district was redrawn to include a black majority fol-
lowing the 1981 reapportionment after the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia refused to preclear, under section 5
of the V.R.A., an initial plan that did not create such a district, finding
that that plan served a discriminatory purpose.279 Fowler was re-
elected in 1982 and 1984 when he faced no opposition from "the first
rank of black politicians in Atlanta."2 11 When Fowler retired in 1986,
John Lewis, a black politician, replaced him. At the time the district-
ing plan at issue in Millerwas drawn, Lewis represented the only black-
majority district in Georgia and was the state's only black representa-
tive.
In both Shaw and Miller, the State adopted a redistricting plan that
created one more black-majority district than had previously existed.
North Carolina-now entitled to twelve congressional districts-cre-
ated its first black-majority district, and Georgia-now entitled to
eleven districts-added a second. Under the original North Carolina
plan, black voters thus formed a majority of the voting age population
in only 8.33% of the congressional districts. Under the original Geor-
gia plan, black voters formed a majority of the voting age population
in 18.18% of the congressional districts.
Both plans were submitted to the Attorney General of the United
States for preclearance under section 5 of the Act.'8 As described
27o See Shaw , 509 U.S. at 659 (White, J., dissenting).
07 See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, supra note 275, at 519 (breaking down population
by race).
'" See POLITICS IN AMERICA 375 (Alan Ehrenhalt ed., 1985).
See Busbee v. Smith, 549 F. Supp. 494 (D.D.C. 1982) (noting that the state was
unable to demonstrate that the proposal wras not discriminatory in either purpose or
effect).
2- POLITICS IN AMERICA, supra note 278, at 375.
2,1 The entire state of Georgia is covered by section 5 of the V.R.A., see Abrams v.
Johnson, 521 U.S. 74, 79-80 (1997), as are forty of North Carolina's one hundred
counties, see Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 634 (1993). Although only fort)' of North
Carolina's one hundred counties are thus subject to the statute's preclearance re-
quirements, none of the parties to the lawsuit in Shaw contended that the statewide
94 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LA W REVIEW
above, each state had the burden of demonstrating before the Attor-
ney General that the proposed change "does not have the purpose
and will not have the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote
on account of race, color" or membership in a language minority
group. 11 Under Beds non-retrogression standard, given the degree of
racial polarization in the two states, the Attorney General could not
have concluded that these plans had the "effect" of discriminating on
the basis of race within the meaning of section 5. They did not have a
retrogressive effect, even though, in the presence of racial polariza-
tion, they would have had a discriminatory, "dilutive" effect under sec-
tion 2 of the V.R.A.
Nonetheless, since the case arose before the Court's decision in
Bossier Parish IT, the Attorney General remained free to conclude
that the purpose behind their adoption was discriminatory even if it was
not a purpose to worsen the position of African Americans, but only to
leave a pre-existing discriminatory effect in place. And, in each case,
exercising his power under section 5 of the V.R.A., the Attorney Gen-
eral interposed an objection to the plan on the ground that it had the
purpose of discriminating against black voters by minimizing black
voting strength.
In the letter conveying the denial of preclearance to North Caro-
lina's plan, John Dunne, the Assistant Attorney General for Civil
Rights in the Bush Administration's Justice Department, wrote that a
second majority-black district could have been drawn "in the south-
central to southeastern part of the state."2 4 In his letter concerning
plan was not subject to those requirements. See 509 U.S. at 634.
282 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1994); see supra text accompanying notes 196-97; see also Beer
v. United States, 425 U.S. 130 (1976).
283 As described above, in Reno v. Bossier Parish School District (Bossier Parish 11), 120
S. Ct. 866 (2000), a closely divided Court concluded that a discriminatory purpose
could not give rise to a violation of section 5 of the V.R.A. unless it was a purpose actu-
ally to retrogress-that is, to worsen the position of minority voters.284 In his objection letter Dunne wrote that:
[T]he proposed... district boundary lines in the south-central to southeast-
ern part of the state appear to minimize minority voting strength given the
significant minority population in this area of the state. In general, it appears
that the state chose not to give effect to black and Native American voting
strength in this area....
We also note that the state was well aware of the significant interest on the
part of the minority community in creating a second majority-minority con-
gressional district.... For the south-central to southeast area, there were sev-
eral plans drawn providing for a second majority-minority congressional dis-
trict, including at least one alternative presented to the legislature.... These
alternatives, and other variations identified in our analysis, appear to provide
the minority community with an opportunity to elect a second member of
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the Georgia reapportionment, he wrote that the proposed plan did
not recognize concentrations of minority voters in the southwest area
of the state. " 5
Under the statute, a state aggrieved by a failure of the Attorney
General to preclear a submitted change still may bring an action in
the district court for judicial preclearance. Neither state took this
course. Rather, the legislature in each state responded by adopting a
new plan. North Carolina created a second black-majority district.
Georgia adopted a second plan that included two black-majority dis-
tricts, but again, the Attorney General denied preclearance on the
ground that the state had not proven the absence of a discriminatory
effect. Georgia then adopted a third districting plan, the one at issue
in Miller, which contained a third black-majority district.
In the second majority-minority district created by the new North
Carolina plan (the Twelfth District), African Americans made up
53.34% of the voting age population and 54.71% of the population
overall."" The Twelfth District was not in the southeastern part of the
state to which the Assistant Attorney General had referred in his ob-
jection letter. Rather, it described "a thin band, sometimes no wider
than Interstate Highway 85, some 160 miles long, snaking diagonally
across piedmont North Carolina from Durham to Gastonia. 2 87 This
configuration lacked compactness and split other pre-existing political
units-precincts, counties, and towns-among two, or even three,
congress of their choice to office, but, despite this fact, such configuration for
a second majority-minority congressional district was dismissed for what ap-
pear[] to be pretextual reasons. Indeed, some commentators have alleged
that the state's decision to place the concentrations of minority voters in the
southern part of the state into white majority districts attempts to ensure the
election of white incumbents while minimizing minority electoral strength.
Such submergence will have the expected result of "minimiz[ing] or can-
cel[ing] out the voting strength of [black and Native American minority vot-
ers]." Although invited to do so, the state has yet to provide convincing evi-
dence to the contrary.
Letter from John R. Dunne, Assistant Attorney General, Civil Rights Division, to Tiare
B. Smiley, Special Deputy Attorney General (Dec. 18, 1991), reprinted in State Appel-
lees' Brief at 16a-17a, Shaw v. Barr, 808 F. Supp. 461 (E.D.N.C. 1992) (No. 92-357)
[hereinafter State Appellees' Brief] (citation omitted).
4 SeeJohnson v. Miller, 864 F. Supp. 1354, 1364 (S.D. Ga. 1994) ("Mr. Dunne also
observed that, while the submitted plan properly utilized black voting potential in At-
lanta and east-central Georgia, it did not 'recognize' concentrations of minorities in
the south-west region of the state.").
i! See Shaw, 509 U.S. at 671 n.7 (White, J., dissenting) (describing the total popula-
tion); State Appellees' Brief, supra note 284, at 24a (describing the voting age popula-
tion).
v7 Shawv. Barr, 808 F. Supp. 461,464 (E.D.N.C. 1992).
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congressional districts. Nonetheless, when the North Carolina Gen-
eral Assembly submitted the new plan to Attorney General Barr, he
interposed no objection to it, but, rather, chose to preclear it. Under
the new plan, North Carolina in 1992 sent its first two black represen-
tatives to Congress since the election of 1898.
The third black-majority district contained in Georgia's new plan
was the Second District. This new plan altered the second Georgia
plan by adding a black population center in Macon, originally in-
cluded in the planned black-majority Eleventh District, to the Second
District, giving it a black majority. The Eleventh District was then ex-
tended eastward to Savannah to include an African American popula-
tion center there. Consequently, it retained its majority-black charac-
ter. The shape of the resulting Eleventh District was not especially
bizarre by mathematical standards,28 although it included some bi-
zarre tentacle-like appendages (obviously created with the aid of a
computer) to include certain black populations in the District. Under
this third plan, Georgia's Second, Fifth, and Eleventh Districts had
voting age populations that were 52.33% black, 57.47% black, and
60.36% black, respectively.289 This plan, too, was precleared by the At-
torney General. Under it, two additional black representatives from
Georgia were elected to Congress in 1992.
The districts at issue in Bush had a less tortured genesis:
In response [to the 1990 census], and with a view to complying with the
Voting Rights Act of 1965 as amended, the Texas Legislature promul-
gated a redistricting plan that, among other things, created District 30, a
new majority-African-American district in Dallas County; created District
29, a new majority-Hispanic district in and around Houston in Harris
County; and reconfigured District 18, which is adjacent to District 29, to
make it a majority-African-American district. The Department ofJustice
precleared that plan under VRA §5 in 1991, and it was used in the 1992
congressional elections.
290
A study by Professors Pildes and Niemi concluded that the three
districts at issue in Bush were among the twenty-eight least compact
291and regular congressional districts in the nation.
288 See Richard H. Pildes & Richard G. Niemi, Expressive Harms, "Bizarre Districts,"
and Voting Rights: EvaluatingElection-District Appearances After Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH. L.
REV. 483, 565-66 & tbl. 3 (1993) (identifying the most bizarrely shaped congressional
districts employed in the 1992 election).
289 SeeJohnson v. Miller, 864 F. Supp. at 1366 n.12. The total populations of these
districts were 56.63% black, 62.27% black, and 64.07% black, respectively. See id.
2 Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 957 (1996) (plurality opinion) (citations omitted).
291 See Pildes & Niemi, supra note 288, at 565-66 & tbl. 3.
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i. Shaw I
The first of these cases to come before the Court was of course
Shaw L The V.R-A. specifies that the Attorney General's decision to
preclear a change shall not "bar a subsequent action to enjoin [its]
enforcement.",2"  No minority voter in North Carolina, however,
sought to challenge the State's plan. Suit was brought, rather, by five
white voters from Durham County, which was divided between the
white-majority Second District and the newly created black-majority
Twelfth District. Under the plan, two of the plaintiffs were to vote in
the Twelfth District and three in the Second.2
The complaint named among the defendants various North Caro-
2914lina state officials and the State Board of Elections, and alleged a
laundry list of constitutional infirmities in the adoption of the new
plan. The complaint alleged that the creation of two districts, "each
of which was designed and intended to contain a majority of black
persons and black voters[,] ... violated important rights possessed by
the plaintiffs as citizens, residents and registered voters in the State of
North Carolina." 95 With respect to their claim under the Equal Pro-
tection Clause, the plaintiffs alleged that "[a]ny action by officers of
the State of North Carolina which discriminates on the basis of race or
color.., denies the Plaintiffs and all other voters equal protection of
the laws."' - The complaint alleged that the plan created a "racially
discriminatory voting process, and that the creation of two congres-
sional districts in which "a majority of black voters was concentrated
arbitrarily... was a decision made with the purpose ... to create
Congressional Districts along racial lines and to assure that black
members of Congress would be elected from two Congressional Dis-
42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1994).
"' SeeShawv. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 637 (1993).
V Despite the fact that § 14(b) of the V.R.A. provides that the District Court for
the District of Columbia has exclusive jurisdiction to enjoin actions of federal officials
taken pursuant to the Act, see 42 U.S.C. § 19731(b), the plaintiff named as primary de-
fendants the Attorney General and the Assistant Attorney General for the Civil Rights
Division (the federal appellees). The Supreme Court ultimately held, however, that
the District Court's dismissal of the claims against these federal appellees was proper.
Shaw, 509 U.S. at 641 (1993).
2, Complaint and Motion for Preliminary Injunction and for Temporary Restrain-
ing Order at 17, Shaw v. Barr, 808 F. Supp. 461 (E.D.N.C. 1992) (No. 92-202-CIV-5-
BR) [hereinafter Complaint], reprinted in Jurisdictional Statement of Plaintiffs-
Appellants, Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, app. C at 81a (1993) (No. 92-357) [hereinafter
Jurisdictional Statement].
14-W Id. at 1 36, reprinted inJurisdictiona Statement, supra note 295, app. C at 93a.
zj7 Id.
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tricts in which a majority of black voters were intentionally and pur-
posefully concentrated." 8 Read liberally, the complaint, which did
not mention the plaintiffs' race, appears to incorporate, with respect
to the state defendants, an allegation that they "abridged the rights of
the plaintiffs and all other citizens and registered voters of North
Carolina whether black, white, native American, or others--to partici-
pate in a process for electing members of the House of Representa-
tives which is color-blind."
2 9
A divided threejudge district court dismissed for failure to state a
claim.30' The Supreme Court, however, noted probable jurisdiction,
and then, by a vote of 5-4, reversed.
After describing the facts, the Court, in an opinion written byJus-
tice O'Connor, recounted a brief history of discrimination against Af-
rican Americans with respect to voting in the United States. The
Court acknowledged that the interests of a cohesive bloc of minority
voters could be thwarted in ways more complex than simple denial of
equal access to the polls:
[T]his Court [has] recognized that "the right to vote can be affected
by a dilution of voting power as well as by an absolute prohibition on cast-
ing a ballot." Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 569 (1969) (em-
phasis added). Where members of a racial minority group vote as a co-
hesive unit, practices such as multimember or at-large electoral systems
can reduce or nullify minority voters' ability, as a group, "to elect the
candidate of their choice." Ibid. Accordingly, the Court [has] held that
such schemes violate the Fourteenth Amendment when they are
adopted with a discriminatory purpose and have the effect of diluting
minority voting strength. Se, e.g., Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 616-617
(1982); White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 765-766 (1973). Congress, too, re-
sponded to the problem of vote dilution. In 1982, it amended § 2 of the
Voting Rights Act to prohibit legislation that results in the dilution of a
minority group's voting strength, regardless of the legislature's intent.
42 U.S.C. § 1973.
301
Rather than focussing on whether the districting plan at issue was
responsive to precisely such a situation, however, the Court observed,
in apparent reference to the shape of the proposed districts, that "[i] t
298 Amendment to Complaint at I 36a, Shaw v. Barr, 808 F. Supp. 461 (E.D.N.C.
1992) (No. 92-202-CIV-5-BR), reprinted inJurisdictional Statement, supra note 295, app.
D at 102a.
299 Complaint, supra note 295, at 1 29, reprinted in Jurisdictional Statement, supra
note 295, app. C at 89a-90a.
O SeeShawv. Barr, 808 F. Supp. 461 (1992) (E.D.N.C. 1992), rev'd sub nom. Shaw v.
Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
301 509 U.S. at 64041.
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is unsettling how closely the North Carolina plan resembles the most
egregious racial gerrymanders of the past,""2 and permitted the plain-
tiffs to go forward on their claim that the plan at issue itself amounted
to an "unconstitutional racial gerrymande [r].""'
The Court held that the plaintiffs had stated a claim upon which
relief could be granted under the Equal Protection Clause, a claim
that the electoral districting plan was "so extremely irregular on its
face that it rationally can be viewed only as an effort to segregate the
races for purposes of voting, without regard for traditional districting
principles and without sufficiently compelling justification." °4 The
Court ruled that the districting plan could therefore be upheld only if
it could survive strict scrutiny 35 The Court reversed the judgment of
the district court and remanded for a determination whether the dis-
tricting plan was "narrowly tailored to further a compelling govern-
mental interest."3" Among the interests the lower court was instructed
to consider on remand was whether the districting scheme was justi-
fied by a compelling state interest in compliance with the federal vot-
ing rights statute."'
The Court made clear that the claim it recognized was not a claim
that white voting strength was diminished on the basis of race.
Rather, the Court purported to recognize "the analytically distinct
claim that a reapportionment plan rationally cannot be understood as
anything other than an effort to segregate citizens into separate voting
districts on the basis of race without sufficient justification.""' This
was the language the Court used, despite the fact that the North Caro-
lina districts were "among the most integrated districts in the coun-
try."
The Court-after describing North Carolina's redistricting legisla-
tion as "race-neutral on its face"31---did suggest (despite the state's in-
escapable concession that it had used race to draw the district lines)
1 q Id. at 641.
-110 Id.
" Id. at 642.
Id. at 643-44.
Id. at 658.
Id. at 653-57.
" Id. at 652.
Pamela S. Karlan, Our Separatism? Voting Rights as an American Nationalities Poliy,
1995 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 83, 94.
31" 509 U.S. at 643. The Court observed at one point "[a] reapportionment statute
typically does not classify persons at all; it classifies tracts of land, or addresses." Id. at
646.
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that the trigger for strict scrutiny in the case before it was not merely
the conscious use of race by government, but the presence of a district
whose appearance was "so bizarre on its face that it is 'unexplainable
on grounds other than race."' 31" Although the Court stated-without
distinguishing among them-that "[l]aws that explicitly distinguish
between individuals on racial grounds fall within the core"3 1 2 of the
prohibition of the Equal Protection Clause, and that "[a] ccordingly,
we have held that the Fourteenth Amendment requires state legisla-
tion that expressly distinguishes among citizens because of their race
to be narrowly tailored to further a compelling state interest,"3 3 the
Court purported to limit its holding to districting plans it described as
"bizarre," "highly irregular," or "irrational on [their] face," those
drawn without regard for "traditional districting principles such as
compactness, contiguity, and respect for political subdivisions."314 It
thereby reserved the question "whether 'the intentional creation of
majority-minority districts, without more' always gives rise to an equal
protection claim." 15
After its initial observation about the shape of the districts created
by the plan at issue, the Court concluded that "we believe that reap-
portionment is one area in which appearances do matter.",3 Without
exploring the possibility that black voters in North Carolina in fact had
cohesive interests which, without race-conscious districting, would find
no representation in light of antithetical bloc voting by white voters,
the Court stated that:
A reapportionment plan that includes in one district individuals who be-
long to the same race, but who are otherwise widely separated by geo-
graphical and political boundaries, and who may have little in common
with one another but the color of their skin, bears an uncomfortable re-
semblance to political apartheid. It reinforces the perception that
members of the same racial group-regardless of their age, education,
economic status, or the community in which they live-think alike, share
the same political interests, and will prefer the same candidates at the
polls. We have rejected such perceptions elsewhere as impermissible ra-
cial stereotypes.
31 Id. at 644 (quoting Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429
U.S. 252, 266 (1977)).
312 Id. at 642.
313 Id. at 643.
314 Id. at 647.
315 Id. at 649 (quoting id. at 668 (WhiteJ., dissenting)).
316 Id. at 647.
317 Id.
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The Court also concluded, without recognizing that in a racially
polarized jurisdiction every district will further the interests of one or
another group, that:
The message that such districting sends to elected representatives is
equally pernicious. When a district obviously is created solely to effectu-
ate the perceived common interests of one racial group, elected officials
are more likely to believe that their primary obligation is to represent
only the members of that group, rather than their constituency as a
whole. This is altogether antithetical to our system of representative
democracy.
318
ii. Miller v. Johnson
The Shaw opinion raised more questions about this new "analyti-
cally distinct" cause of action than it answered. In the Miller decision,
a divided Court attempted to explain further what it meant. That
opinion purported to deal with both the relevance of district shape to
a Shaw claim, as well as one of the binds in which districting authori-
ties might find themselves after Shaw--specifically, when they might
be required to use race in order to avoid retrogression under section
5 of the V.RA., but could be prohibited from doing so under a read-
ing of Shaw that applied to all acts of race-conscious districting. The
results, however, were far from satisfactory.
In Miller, as in Shaw, following the adoption and preclearance of
the Georgia plan, no black voter brought a vote dilution claim. In-
stead five white voters who lived in the new black-majority Eleventh
District brought suit under Shaw. A divided three-judge district court
struck the districting plan down.319 The Supreme Court, in an opinion
by Justice Kennedy, affirmed. 30
The Court purported to hold that a district need not, in fact, have
a bizarre shape in order to violate the Fourteenth Amendment under
Shaw:
Shape is relevant not because bizarreness is a necessary element of the
constitutional wrong, or a threshold requirement of proof, but because
it may be persuasive circumstantial evidence that race for its own sake,
and not other districting principles, was the legislature's dominant and
controlling rationale in drawing its district lines. The logical implica-
tion ... is that parties may rely on evidence other than bizarreness to es-
AM Id. at 648.
Johnson v. Miller, 864 F. Supp. 1354 (S.D. Ga. 1994) (per curiam).
Miller v.Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995).
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tablish race-based districting.
321
The gravamen of a Shaw claim, the Miller Court explained:
is that the State has used race as a basis for separating voters into dis-
tricts. Just as the State may not, absent extraordinary justification, segre-
gate citizens on the basis of race in its public parks, buses, golf courses,
beaches and schools, so did we recognize in Shaw that it may not sepa-
322
rate its citizens into different voting districts on the basis of race.
The Court purported to hold that the assignment of voters to elec-
toral districts on the basis of race-apparently regardless of the racial
composition of the resulting districts-was always to be subjected to
strict scrutiny.3u And the case of United States v. Hays, decided the
same day as Miller, makes clear that, wherever it is available, the gra-
vamen of the Shaw cause of action is the very classification by race, re-
gardless of the particular race of the putative plaintiff.3 4 In Hays, the
Court held that an individual does not have standing to challenge a
districting plan simply because he or she lives in a state with districts
that have been drawn on racial grounds. It further held, however,
that "[a] ny citizen able to demonstrate that he or she, personally" has
been classified according to race, that is, that he or she "resides in a
racially gerrymandered district," does have standing to challenge the
districting plan under Shaw.3u
Despite saying that district shape is not an essential part of a Shaw
claim, in language that clouded its holding on the significance of bi-
zarre shape, the Court in Millerwent on to say that, because the inevi-
table awareness of race on the part of districting authorities would
render proof of racial "motivat[ion]" difficult,126 to succeed in a Shaw
claim a plaintiff would have to show "that race was the predominant
factor motivating the legislature's decision to place a significant num-
ber of voters within or without a particular district. To make this
showing, a plaintiff must prove that the legislature subordinated tradi-
tional race-neutral districting principles... to racial considera-
,,327tions.
Again without addressing the possibility that districts might be
321 Id. at 913.
322 Id. at 911 (citations omitted).
323 See id. at 915 (stating that "assignment of voters on the basis of race" must be
subjected to "our strictest scrutiny").
24 515 U.S. 737, 744 (1995).
3. Id. at 74445.
326 Miller, 515 U.S. at 916.
327 I (emphasis added).
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drawn on racial grounds in a legitimate effort to prevent minority vote
dilution, that is, that taking race into account for this reason might be
necessary because otherwise the voices of members of the minority ra-
cial group would in fact be submerged in light of the racial polariza-
tion of voters within a particularjurisdiction, the Courtjustified its po-
sition that all race-conscious districting was subject to strict scrutiny by
saying that:
When the State assigns voters on the basis of race, it engages in the of-
fensive and demeaning assumption that voters of a particular race, be-
cause of their race, "think alike, share the same political interests, and
will prefer the same candidates at the polls." Race-based assignments
"embody stereotypes that treat individuals as the product of their race,
evaluating their thoughts and efforts-their very worth as citizens-ac-
cording to a criterion barred to the Government by history and the Con-
stitution."
2
The Court did state that "[a] State is free to recognize communi-
ties that have a particular racial makeup, provided its action is di-
rected toward some common thread of relevant interests," but it ig-
nored the possibility that members of one racial group might share
political interests in the way they do in jurisdictions where there is ra-
cially polarized bloc voting.!2 9 Quoting the district court, the Court
stated that "[t] he evidence was compelling 'that there are no tangible
"communities of interest" spanning the hundreds of miles of the Elev-
enth District.'" ' o But the passage in the district court opinion cited by
the Court spoke only of "compelling evidence of economic condi-
tions, educational backgrounds, media concentrations, commuting
habits, and other aspects of life in central and southeast Georgia," that
supported the conclusion that there were no communities of interest
of those kinds shared by the residents of the district.... The district
court also found, as it had to, that "some degree of vote polarization
exists," 2 a finding the Supreme Court majority simply ignored.
The Court had little difficulty in concluding that race was the
predominant factor leading to the adoption of the Eleventh Congres-
A28 Id. at 911-12 (citations omitted).
R1 Id. at 919; cf Abrams v. Johnson, 521 U.S. 74, 111-12 (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(discussing the possibility of common interests being shared by rural and urban Afri-
can American voters).
13 Miller, 515 U.S. at 919.
.31 Johnson v. Miller, 864 F. Supp. 1354, 1389-90 (S.D. Ga. 1994) (three-judge
court), affd, 515 U.S. 900 (1995).
." 21 Id. at 1390.
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sional District.333 The state had conceded, as the history of the adop-
tion of the final Georgia Plan in response to the Attorney General's
denial of preclearance in any event made clear, that "Georgia's elev-
enth is the product of a desire by the General Assembly to create a
majority black district."3 34 Whatever hesitation the Shaw Court had
had about relying on this fact-present in almost every similar case-
was evidently overcome.
Having found race the "predominant factor" in Georgia's district-
ing plan, the Court applied strict scrutiny. Without acknowledging
that race must sometimes be used in order to avoid the discriminatory
purpose or effect prohibited by section 5 of the V.R.A., which is pre-
cisely why a districting authority would use race in order to obtain
preclearance, the Court concluded that the district at issue did not
serve the purpose of "remedy[ing] past discrimination," since "the
State's true interest.., was creating a third majority-black district to
satisfy the Justice Department's preclearance demands."31 The Court
did not explore the fact that the Justice Department's preclearance
demands, if employed properly, might have been imposed only to pre-
vent adoption of a dilutive plan drawn with a discriminatory purpose.
The Court left open the question "[w]hether or not in some cases
compliance with the Voting Rights Act, standing alone, can provide a
compelling interest independent of any interest in remedying past
discrimination." 36 It concluded, however, that compliance with the
Act could not justify the districting plan at issue, because the district-
ing plan was not required under section 5 of the Act.
337
Pulling out the heavy guns-United States v. Nixon,338 Marbury v.
Madison,3 9 Cooper v. Aaron'°-the Court explained that it retained an
independent obligation to evaluate the propriety of a state's use of
race even when the Justice Department exercising its section 5 power
has concluded that that use of race is compelled by the V.RA .34' The
Court's reasoning here was correct as far as it went. The statute gives
the state exclusive standing to challenge an administrative denial of
333 See Miller, 515 U.S. at 921.
324 Brief of Appellants Miller, et al. at 30, Miller (No. 94-"31).
335 Miller, 515 U.S. at 920-21.
33 Id. at 921.
337 See id.
33 418 U.S. 683, 704 (1974).
339 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
MO 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958).
341 Miller, 515 U.S. at 923.
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preclearance by seeking de novo review in an action in the District
Court for the District of Columbia. Furthermore, a decision by the
Attorney General not to interpose an objection is not subject to judi-
cial review. 3 2 Nonetheless, if the Attorney General refuses to preclear
a plan, and the state fails to challenge that action but adopts a new
plan that then is precleared, a citizen aggrieved by the new plan must
have standing directly under the Constitution (and, for that matter,
under section 2 of the Act) to challenge it.
The basis, however, for the Court's conclusion that section 5 did
not require the denial of preclearance in this case to any districting
plan that failed to create a third black-majority district was incompre-
hensible. First the Court concluded-again, correctly-that preclear-
ance could not have been denied to any and all such plans merely on
the basis that the state had failed to prove an absence of any discrimi-
natory effect. The Court concluded that Georgia's original, dilutive
plans that contained two black-majority districts met the Beer nonret-
rogression standard, "increas[ing] the number of majority-black dis-
tricts from 1 out of 10 (10%) to 2 out of 11 (18.18%). "m3 In a racially
polarized jurisdiction that, like Georgia, is 27% black, this would have
been enough to prevent the only discriminatory effect with which sec-
tion 5 is concerned after Beer, "retrogression."3"
The Court then held that the Justice Department incorrectly con-
cluded that the state had not borne its burden of proving an absence
of discriminatory intent in its initial plans even though those plans
would have had a discriminatory effect. The Court observed that the
district court had found no discriminatory intent in the initial plans
and concluded that "[t]he State's policy of adhering to other district-
ing principles instead of creating as many majority-minority districts as
possible... cannot provide any basis under § 5 for the Justice De-
partment's objection." The basis for this statement appears to have
been a conclusion that the Justice Department was engaged in a "pol-
icy of maximizing majority-black districts," and that failure to "create
majority-minority districts wherever possible" could not provide evi-
dence of an intent to discriminate.Yr
If the Justice Department had, indeed, required maximization of
-4 See Morris v. Gressette, 432 U.S. 491, 499-507 (1977) (explaining that "judicial
review of the Attorney General's actions... is necessarily precluded").
Miller, 515 U.S. at 923.
"Id.
" Id. at924.
"Id. at 924-25.
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majority-black districts, this would make sense. As the Court sug-
gested in its V.R.A. decision in Johnson v. DeGrandy, failure to maxi-
mize is not evidence of vote dilution. 47 But the Georgia Plan that was
precleared did not maximize the number of black-majority districts, it
created a roughly proportional number of them: three of eleven
(27.27%) in a state whose population is approximately 27% black. (In
fact, by distributing almost all of Georgia's African Americans into
black-majority districts, the state could have created as many as five
black-majority districts.)
The failure even to notice the difference suggests a fundamental
problem in the Court's approach. Whether the state's failure to cre-
ate a roughly proportional number of majority-minority districts could
have justified a decision not to preclear at a time when any intent to
discriminate was thought a proper basis for denial of preclearance
under section 5 depended on the circumstances in Georgia: Was a
plan with only two such districts chosen with an intent to discrimi-
nate? The Supreme Court failed even to reach that question.
Through its failure to distinguish "maximization" from "propor-
tionality," the Court in Miller held (at least for purposes of that case)
that section 5 could not require the creation of a proportional num-
ber of black-majority districts. It is not clear what construction of sec-
tion 5 the Court rejected in Miller. Although it described the two-
black-majority-district plan as "ameliorative"4--which implies that
failure to draw a second black-majority district would have been retro-
gressive, and that preclearance could, in those circumstances, have
been denied until the state adopted a plan with two intentionally
drawn black-majority districts-the Court also said that the Justice De-
partment had misread section 5 by construing it to contain an "im-
plicit command that States engage in presumptively unconstitutional
race-based districting."3 49 It said that the Justice Department's con-
struction of the Act raised sufficiently troubling constitutional ques-
tions under the Fourteenth Amendment that it had to be rejected."
Whether the Court would really object to any reading of section 5
that would in any circumstances require the use of race to address vot-
ing discrimination is not clear. Yet whether the objection put forward
347 See 512 U.S. 997, 1016-17 (1994) (describing the way in which "failure to maxi-
mize," that is, to give a minority group "power... above its numerical strength," does
not indicate the presence of vote dilution).
M4" Miller, 515 U.S. at 923.
349 Id. at 927.
350 Id.
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in Miller is read broadly or narrowly its articulation suggests one way in
which a one-size-fits-all approach, in the end, could require aban-
donment of some of the most important tools that have been used to
address discrimination in voting.
Miller holds that section 5 did not require the use of "presump-
tively unconstitutional" race-based districting in that case. This could
be read narrowly. The context of this statement suggests that "pre-
sumptively unconstitutional race-based districting" refers only to race-
based districting for purposes of maximization of black-majority dis-
tricts. Indeed, the Court said:
[Wle recognized in Beer that "the purpose of § 5 has always been to in-
sure that no voting-procedure changes would be made that would lead
to a retrogression in the position of racial minorities with respect to their
effective exercise of the electoral franchise." The Justice Department's
maximization policy seems quite far removed from this purpose.351
But a broader reading of the limiting construction put on section
5 is possible. Miller could be read to suggest that preclearance may
not be denied if the denial would require subsequent race-based ac-
tion by the districting authority. Of course, this would be at variance
with the Court's implicit recognition that race-based districting to
avoid retrogression may well be required to satisfy the effect prong of
section 5 preclearance scrutiny. Perhaps more significant even than
the Court's failure to explain its holding was its apparent failure to see
that it cannot both praise "ameliorative" adoption of non-retrogressive
districting plans and condemn all those districting plans that inten-
tionally use race.
In any event, the Court in Miller clearly chose to resolve the ten-
sion between the V.R.A. and the cause of action recognized in Shaw
not by permitting race-conscious action to combat discrimination but
by weakening the requirements of section 5 of the V.ILA., at least as
they were being applied in the case before it. And, as described
above, with the recent decision in Bossier Parish fIf,2 the Court has
taken another step toward dismantling the section 5 tools for prevent-
ing discrimination that may require the creation of majority-minority
electoral districts.
The strictness of the approach to race-conscious districting de-
scribed in Miller and its uniform applicability to all race-conscious dis-
tricting was undermined to some extent by a concurring opinion filed
-51 Id. at 926 (citation omitted).
352 See supra text accompanying note 274.
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by Justice O'Connor. As the weakest of the five votes in the majority
in Shaw Iand all the cases to follow it so far, Justice O'Connor's voice
on this matter-as on so many matters in American constitutional law
at the present moment-is the controlling one. Despite joining the
Court's Miller opinion, she seemed to disagree with the scope of the
Shaw cause of action suggested by the majority. She wrote that "[tlo
invoke strict scrutiny, a plaintiff must show that the State has relied on
race in substantial disregard of customary and traditional districting prac-
tices. Those practices provide a crucial frame of reference and there-
fore constitute a significant governing principle in cases of this
kind."
353
This is closer to what the Court seemed to be saying in justice
O'Connor's own majority opinion in Shaw I, that strict scrutiny was
triggered by the use of race in a particularly unusual manner. It sug-
gests that strict scrutiny might not be triggered simply by the use of
race as the predominant motivating factor in districting, but only by
its use to the exclusion of traditional districting practices. This sense
is further reinforced by Justice O'Connor's statement in Miller that:
Application of the Court's standard does not throw into doubt the vast
majority of the Nation's 435 congressional districts, where presumably
the States have drawn the boundaries in accordance with their custom-
ary districting principles. That is so even though race may well have been con-
sidered in the redistricting process. But application of the Court's standard
helps achieve Shaw's basic objective of making extreme instances of ger-
rymandering subpct to meaningfiul judicial review. I therefore join the
Court's opinion.
iii. Bush v. Vera
What Miller gave in terms of an apparent expansion of Shaw Iscru-
tiny to all race-conscious districting was-again, a least apparently-
taken away the following Term in a decision written by Justice
O'Connor in Bush v. Vera.! 5 That case addressed not only the signifi-
cance of bizarre shape, but also the potential conflict between the
command of Shaw and section 2 of the V.R.A. The results, however,
were again less than satisfactory.
In Bush, the Court pulled back from the broad reading of Shaw I
given in justice Kennedy's opinion for the Court in Miller. In justice
O'Connor's opinion, in which Chief justice Rehnquist and Justice
$53 Miller, 515 U.S. at 928 (O'ConnorJ., concurring) (emphasis added).
354 Id. at 928-29 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
355 517 U.S. 952 (1996).
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Kennedy joined, a plurality of the Court made clear that strict scrutiny
only applies where "traditional race-neutral districting principles" are
"subordinated... to racial considerations. " 56 The plurality concluded
that
Strict scrutiny does not apply merely because redistricting is per-
formed with consciousness of race. Nor does it apply to all cases of in-
tentional creation of majority-minority districts.... For strict scrutiny to
apply, the plaintiffs must prove that other, legitimate districting princi-
ples were "subordinated" to race. By that we mean that race must be "the
predominant factor motivating the legislature's [redistricting] decision."
... The Constitution does not mandate regularity of district shape,
and the neglect of traditional districting criteria is merely necessary [to
the application of strict scrutiny], not sufficient. For strict scrutiny to
apply, traditional districting criteria must be subordinated to race.3'7
Although the plurality elsewhere did insist "that bizarreness is not
necessary to trigger strict scrutiny,' 38 as a practical matter, the subor-
dination of "traditional" districting criteria appears to mean only the
creation of bizarrely shaped districts.
The Court did acknowledge that race and voting preference may
correlate, 3, and it said that a political gerrymander that happens to
coincide with race is not constitutionally suspect.30 But it held that a
classification that uses race "as a proxy for political characteristics" is
"a racial stereotype requiring strict scrutiny."3'
Having concluded that race did predominate in the drawing of
the district lines before it, the plurality turned to the question whether
the districts at issue could be justified by either "the interest in avoid-
ing liability under the 'results' test of VRA § 2(b), the interest in
remedying past and present racial discrimination, [or] the 'nonretro-
gression' principle of VRA § 5."32 Its discussion focused primarily
l' Id. at 958 (quoting Miller, 515 U.S. at 928 (O'ConnorJ., concurring)).
' 7 Id. at 958-59, 962 (quoting Miller, 515 U.S. at 916) (citations omitted).
35K 1d. at 980.
d59 Id. at 967 ("There was evidence that 97% of African-American voters in and
around the city of Dallas vote Democrat.").
3 Id. at 968 ("If district lines merely correlate with race because they are drawn on
the basis of political affiliation, which correlates with race, there is no racial classifica-
tion to justif.. . regardless of [the State's] awareness of [the districting plan's] racial
implications....").
Id.
M Id. at 976.
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upon the first of these interests.
The plurality "assume [d] "-but, more importantly, in an unusual
(and, again, ultimately controlling) opinion concurring in her own
plurality opinion, Justice O'Connor concluded-that "compliance with
the results test [of section 2], as interpreted by our precedents, can be
a compelling state interest."363 The plurality purported to hold that
districts drawn to comply with section 2 could be sustained under the
strict scrutiny standard articulated in Shaw I:
[T]he "narrow tailoring" requirement of strict scrutiny allows the States
a limited degree of leeway in furthering such interests. If the State has a
"strong basis in evidence," Shaw I, 509 U.S. at 656 (internal quotation
marks omitted), for concluding that creation of a majority-minority dis-
trict is reasonably necessary to comply with § 2, and the districting that is
based on race "substantially addresses the § 2 violation," Shaw II, ante at
364918, it satisfies strict scrutiny.
The plurality, however, limited the significance of this ruling in
two ways. First, it narrowed the scope of the protection against minor-
ity vote dilution provided by section 2, thus limiting the class of cases
in which a state will actually be required to draw districts to prevent
minority vote dilution. It did this by emphasizing the first Gingles fac-
tor necessary for finding a section 2 violation, "'that [the minority
group be] sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a
majority in a single member district.'" 36 5 As described above, 6 this
Gingles factor was, from the start, the least intelligible. It appeared, in
the original opinion, to mean to limit claims of vote dilution to cir-
cumstances where there was a practical alternative that would not re-
sult in the submergence of minority voting strength. Understood in
this way, the possibility of "compactness" meant that vote dilution was
prohibited whenever an alternative district could be drawn. In Bush,
however, the plurality held that "[i]f... a reasonably compact majority-
minority district cannot be created, § 2 does not require a majority-
minority district."
367
Second, the plurality held that the "narrow tailoring" prong dealt
not only with the racial composition of the nondilutive district, but,
363 Id. at 977 (citations omitted); id. at 990 (O'ConnorJ., concurring).
4 Id. at 977.
35 Id. at 978 (quoting Thomburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 50-51 (1986)) (emphasis
added by the Bush Court).
36 See supra text accompanying notes 231-33.
367 Id. at 979 (emphasis added). The Court reached the same conclusion in Shaw
v. Hunt (Shaw I), 517 U.S. 899, 916 (1996), decided the same day.
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again, with its shape. After observing that "nothing in § 2 requires the
race-based creation of a district that is far from compact," the plurality
held that "[d]istrict shape is not irrelevant to the narrow tailoring in-
quiry."3 The plurality held that, where bizarre shape is "predomi-
nantly attributable to racial, not political, manipulation," the resulting
districts cannot be justified by the need to comply with section 2."'
These principles were spelled out in Justice O'Connor's concur-
ring opinion, which, because it represents the controlling voice on
this matter, is worth quoting at length.
First, so long as they do not subordinate traditional districting criteria
to the use of race for its own sake or as a proxy, States may intentionally
create majority-minority districts, and may otherwise take race into con-
sideration, without coming under strict scrutiny. Only if traditional dis-
tricting criteria are neglected and that neglect is predominantly due to
the misuse of race does strict scrutiny apply.
Second, ... [.R.A. section 2] may require a State to create a major-
ity-minority district where the three Gingles factors are present ....
Third, the state interest in avoiding liability under V.R.A. § 2 is com-
pelling....
Fourth, if a State pursues that compelling interest by creating a dis-
trict that "substantially addresses" the potential liability, and does not de-
viate substantially from a hypothetical court-drawn § 2 district for pre-
dominantly racial reasons, its districting plan will be deemed narrowly
tailored.
Finally, however, districts that are bizarrely shaped and noncompact,
and that otherwise neglect traditional districting principles and deviate
substantially from the hypothetical court-drawn district, for predominantly
racial reasons, are unconstitutional.
3 7
0
Justice O'Connor's concurrence purports to leave open the possi-
bility that a districting plan drawn to comply with section 2 and sub-
ject to strict scrutiny may be upheld. Under the principles she articu-
lates, however, at least as spelled out in Bush, the invalidation of any
1 Id. at 979-80.
.%9 Id. at 981. The plurality went on to hold that its conclusion that the district
lines at issue were not narrowly tailored to comply with section 2 of the Act "fore-
close[d]" any argument that they were justified by the need to remedy discrimination
in the form of vote dilution. Id. at 982. It also held that the one district that was de-
fended on the ground that it was justified by an interest in compliance with section 5
of the Act was not narrowly tailored to that interest because it "'went beyond what was
reasonably necessary to avoid retrogression.'" Id. at 983 (quoting Shaw I, 509 U.S. at
655).
370 Id. at 993-94 (O'ConnorJ. concurring) (citations omitted).
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such district would appear to be tautological: Strict scrutiny only ap-
plies "if traditional districting criteria are neglected and that neglect is
predominantly due to the misuse of race."37' Yet these appear to be
precisely the cases in which districting plans will be found not to be
narrowly tailored to serve the compelling interest in avoiding liability
under section 2. Where districts are drawn with a black majority in
order to comply with section 2, but "are bizarrely shaped and non-
compact, and ... otherwise neglect traditional districting principles
and deviate substantially from [a] hypothetical court-drawn district,
for predominantly racial reasons"37 2 -that is, in all the cases where
they are subject to strict scrutiny-they will never be "narrowly tai-
lored" to serve the interest in compliance with section 2 of the V.R.A.!
The tension between the antidiscrimination command of section 2
and the Shaw cause of action is thus relaxed not by an understanding
that prevention of vote dilution may justify a bizarrely shaped district,
but, again, by releasing districting authorities from the requirement
that they prevent vote dilution if the only way to achieve that goal is to
draw such a district.
b. Assessing the "Strict Scrutiny" ofShaw and Its Progeny
The approach that has begun to take solid form in Shaw, Miller,
and Bush threatens a rigid formalism unable to take account of the
particular circumstances in which race is being used to draw district
371 Id. at 993. Justice O'Connor also joined the Court's opinion in Shaw v. Hunt
(Shaw I), 517 U.S. 899 (1996), handed down the same day as Bush. Shaw/ /was the
Shaw v. Reno litigation back before the Court for a second time after a remand to the
district court. On remand, the district court had concluded that the districts at issue in
Shaw I survived strict scrutiny. The Court, in a decision written by Chief Justice
Rehnquist, reversed. The decision, somewhat intriguingly, described Shaw las holding
"that the plaintiffs whose complaint alleged the deliberate segregation of voters into
separate and bizarre-looking districts on the bases of race stated a claim for relief un-
der the Equal Protection Clause," id. at 901, a statement that acknowledges that the
Shaw cause of action has not been held to extend to districts whose shapes are not "bi-
zarre." The Court also construed the Miller standard-subordination of race-neutral
districting principles to racial considerations-to mean that a race-conscious district is
subject to strict scrutiny even where the State has effectuated traditional districting cri-
teria if "race was the criterion that... could not be compromised," that is, if tradi-
tional districting principles "came into play only after the race-based decision had been
made." Id. at 907. Read literally, this could mean that all intentionally created major-
ity-minority districts are subject to strict scrutiny. Because Shaw H involved the quintes-
sential bizarrely shaped districts, the Court's statement is in any event only dictum, and
Justice O'Connor's specific statement to the contrary in her concurring opinion in
Bush is undoubtedly a better indicator of her understanding of the requirements of the
Shaw cause of action.
372 Bush, 517 U.S. at 994.
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lines. Coming as these decisions do contemporaneously with Adarand,
a case notable for its insistence upon "consistency" in the evaluation of
race-conscious government action, they threaten a cookie-cutter vision
of equal protection concerned more about prohibiting the use of race
than about the prevention of discrimination. Indeed, in relaxing the
requirements of the V.RA., as it did in Miller, in Bush, and in the Boss-
ier Parish cases, the Court appears to suggest that it believes the harm
of using race in districting is greater than the harm of unredressed
discrimination against the members of racial minority groups.
These decisions suggest a new and troubling conception of equal
protection, one that appears to be unable to take account of the dif-
ferent ways and contexts in which government may seek to use race,
particularly in order to combat discrimination. Indeed, at least as a
rhetorical matter, the Court equates race-conscious districting with
the constitutional anathema of segregation, eliding all distinctions es-
sentially with a play on the verb "to separate." The Court equates
"separating voters into districts" on the basis of race, that is, separating
in the intermediate sense of sorting, with "segregating citizens on the
basis of race," that is, separating people in the ultimate sense of keep-
ing the races apart. The Court thus suggests that all such uses of race
are equally harmful and therefore equally suspect. This impression is
reinforced by the fact that the plaintiffs' only cognizable complaint in
the Shaw line of cases appears to be their very assignment to a particu-
lar (integrated) district on the basis of race.
This suggests a completely undifferentiated approach to the gov-
ernment's various uses of race. And it goes beyond rhetoric. In apply-
ing Shaw strict scrutiny, the Court has so far refused to give constitu-
tional credence to the possibility of electoral cohesion among
members of a racial minority group. In Shaw I, the Court said that
race-conscious districting "reinforces the perception that members of
the same racial group.., think alike, share the same political inter-
ests, and will prefer the same candidates at the polls." 37 3 In Miller, the
Court went further, stating that race-conscious districts, regardless of
their genesis, are based on the "assumption that voters of a particular
race, because of their race" will vote in a similar fashion.3 4 It said that
the assignment of voters to districts in a race-conscious manner em-
bodies impermissible "'stereotypes. ' '"75
,7,4 Shawv. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 647 (1993).
' 74 Miller v.Johnson, 515 U.S. 900,912 (1995).
,X7: Id. (quoting Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 604 (1990) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting)).
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In the absence of demonstrable political cohesion among mem-
bers of a racial minority group, these statements would be correct.
However, it should be no surprise that the members of a community
that has long suffered both private and official discrimination, and
whose members are on average disadvantaged in a wide range of ma-
terial ways as a result of it, would share common concerns and might,
as a general matter, support the same candidates, ones they believe
will address their concerns and represent their interests. One must
turn a blind eye to common knowledge about voting patterns to deny
that this happens.
Where voting is adequately demonstrated to be polarized along
racial lines, race-based districting assignments that address polariza-
tion are based on fact, not assumptions. Nor do these assignments re-
flect invidious "stereotypes" about inherent differences between
members of different racial groups. It is unremarkable that members
of a group subjected to a common history of discrimination would
largely share a similar political outlook. And to prohibit the conscious
use of race in drawing electoral district lines in the face of racial po-
larization is simply to advantage the majority racial group, permitting
them to control the outcome of elections in most or all electoral dis-
tricts.
The Court in Shaw and Miller refused to examine the factual situa-
tions in which North Carolina and Georgia decided to draw race-
conscious districts. If the Attorney General was correct in his initial
denial of preclearance in each case, North Carolina and Georgia were
both faced with racially polarized bloc voting, and the additional
black-majority congressional district in each case served to combat
vote dilution. Certainly the complete absence of blacks from either
state's congressional delegation over a ninety-year period suggests that
the Attorney General's determination was not without support.
Without some shift in emphasis, the Court thus seems poised to
codify an approach that can only be explained by a counterfactual be-
lief that racial differences in America have vanished and that, there-
fore, race-conscious districting must be based on impermissible stereo-
types. Denying the reality of racial inequality might make the
imposition of a requirement of colorblindness seem more morally
palatable. In light of even the plainly observable reality of elections in
many parts of America, however, the view suggested by this line of de-
cisions is simply unjustified.
And, although, as I will explore below, the imposition of Shaw
strict scrutiny need not spell the end of attempts to prevent minority
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vote dilution, such scrutiny as has been applied in the Shaw line of
cases also raises a number of practical concerns.
Even if the Court ultimately upholds the creation of race-based
districts in some circumstances because it is necessary for compliance
with the V.R.A., the impact on voting rights wrought by the Shaw line
of cases Will be significant. The imposition of strict scrutiny on dis-
tricts in which race is taken into account in order to comply with the
Act shifts the burden to prove the existence of racially polarized vot-
ing onto the state or its political subdivision. While states may ulti-
mately be permitted to engage in race-conscious districting where
needed to address racially polarized voting, unless the Court makes
clear that in such circumstances the State's burden can easily be met,
the result will be an enormous amount of litigation over plans volun-
tarily adopted to obtain preclearance under section 5 or to avoid li-
ability under section 2 of the V.R.A.
Indeed, although placement of the burden of proof may seem like
a mere formality, as the Court has observed in another context,
"[w]here the burden of proof lies on a given issue is, of course, rarely
without consequence and frequently may be dispositive to the out-
come of the litigation.""6
This may be especially true in cases like Shaw and Miller. One
must not forget that the state's first choice in each case was a plan with
fewer black-majority districts. Each state defended its first plan before
the Attorney General in an attempt to show that it was not discrimina-
tory. The states only adopted the plans that were challenged in the
Supreme Court after the Attorney General denied preclearance of
their original plans on the basis of their discriminatory purpose.
Any state that has adopted a nondilutive plan only after an initial
plan was denied preclearance by the Attorney General or struck down
by a court as a violation of section 2 of the V.R.A. will now be called
upon to defend a new plan that it may feel it was forced to adopt in
the first place by what it considers an intrusive and hostile federal
government. It may now have to prove that the plan it originally
adopted was discriminatory. And it may not want to. This is one place
where the approach taken by the Court in Shaw may work real mis-
chief.
Ironically, the failure to obtain preclearance of an original plan
and the subsequent need to adopt a plan that could meet the pre-
clearance requirements of section 5 of the V.RA. were the dispositive
376 Lavine v. Milne, 424 U.S. 577, 585 (1976).
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pieces of evidence supporting the Court's conclusions in both Miller
and Shaw II that the new plans at issue were drawn predominantly on
the basis of race. This means that every time a state has redrawn its
districting plan in response to a finding that its original plan had a
discriminatory purpose or effect it will now have to defend the new
grudgingly adopted plan that increases minority voting strength.
These cases thus may put the fox squarely in the chicken coop. Un-
less the Court creates procedures to deal with the perverse incentives
not to defend such new plans that traditional strict scrutiny would
create, the procedural aspects of Shaw could have quite sweeping sub-
stantive consequences.
A court charged with guaranteeing equality must distinguish those
uses of race that impose inequality from those that attempt to rectify
inequality. In treating a use of race that responds to present discrimi-
natory conditions in the same harsh manner as if it were one need-
lessly perpetuating notions of racial difference, the Court condemns
the presently disadvantaged group to remain in its unequal position,
without hope of redress from the political branches. In employing its
apparently undifferentiated approach to race-conscious government
action-and regardless of whether it ultimately finds some small class
of cases in which strict scrutiny does not apply-the Court in Shaw,
Miller, and Bush failed to discharge this special responsibility.
2. The Dissenters' Argument for Rational Basis Review
The only alternative for addressing race-conscious districting put
forward by any member of the Court has been to reject any type of
heightened scrutiny absent a showing of minority vote dilution. Be-
cause it would be extremely deferential to a governmental use of race,
however, this approach is flawed in principle. Perhaps even more im-
portant, it is unlikely to be adopted in practice (at least without some
change in composition of the Court) because it would require some
member of the Shaw Imajority to repudiate the Shaw cause of action.
As that majority has made dear, that is a step none of its members is
prepared to take. s77
37 See, e.g., Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 985-86 (1996) (plurality opinion of
O'ConnorJ.). AsJustice O'Connor wrote for the plurality in Bush.
This Court has now rendered decisions after plenary consideration in five
cases applying the Shaw Idoctrine (Shaw I, Miller, Hays, Shaw H, and this suit).
The dissenters would have us abandon those precedents, suggesting that fun-
damental concerns relating to the judicial role are at stake. While we agree
that those concerns are implicated here, we believe they point the other way.
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The position against employing any form of heightened scrutiny
of race-conscious districting absent an allegation of vote dilution has
at its core the view that, unless votes are diluted, the use of race in dis-
tricting causes no cognizable harm. As Justice White wrote in his dis-
sent in the first of this line of cases, Shaw I, in which he was joined by
Justices Blackmun and Stevens: "The grounds for my disagreement
with the majority are simply stated: Appellants have not presented a
cognizable claim, because they have not alleged a cognizable in-
jury."3"' Justice White concluded that in the absence of a discrimina-
tory effect in the form of denial to members of one or another racial
group of the ability to participate meaningfully in the political proc-
ess, there could be no challenge to race-conscious districting under
the Fourteenth Amendment." In his dissent, Justice Souter agreed
that in the absence of such a cognizable injury, there was no call for
searching judicial scrutiny.""
Dissenting in Miller, Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justices Stevens
and Breyer, similarly complained that the Court wrongly employed
strict scrutiny regardless of whether the race-conscious districts "di-
lute[d] or enhance[d] minority voting strength, "xI and in Bush, Jus-
tice Stevens, in a dissentjoined by Justices Ginsburg and Breyer, stated
that he would "return to the well-traveled path that we left in Shaw
Justice Souter's dissent in Bush can be read as more contingent,
implicitly suggesting the possibility of applying to race-conscious dis-
tricts some type of closer-than-rational-basis examination. Justice
Souter, who wasjoined by Justices Ginsburg and Breyer, did essentially
reject the Shaw cause of action because he found no injury sounding
in equal protection. He wrote:
Far from addressing any injury to members of a class subjected to dif-
ferential treatment, the standard presupposition of an equal protection vio-
lation, Shaw I addressed a putative harm subject to complaint by any
Our legitimacy requires, above all, that we adhere to stare decisis, especially in
such sensitive political contexts as the present, where partisan controversy
abounds.... Our Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence evinces a commit-
ment to eliminate unnecessary and excessive governmental use and rein-
forcement of racial stereotypes. We decline to retreat from that commitment
today.
Id. (plurality opinion of O'ConnorJ.) (citations omitted).
Shawv. Reno, 506 U.S. 630, 659 (1993) (White,J., dissenting).
See id. at 663-70.
Id. at 683-84 (SouterJ., dissenting).
Miller -. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 947 (1995) (Ginsburg,J., dissenting).
Bush, 517 U.S. at 1005 (Stevens,J., dissenting).
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voter objecting to an untoward consideration of race in the political pro-
cess.
... [B] efore Shaw I, the Court required evidence of substantial harm
to an identifiable group of voters tosjustify any judicial displacement
of... traditional districting principles.
One of the "basic deficiencies" of Shaw I, he wrote, is its "failure to
provide a coherent concept of equal protection injury, there being no
separably injured class and no concept of harm that would not con-
demn a constitutionally required remedy for past dilution as well as
many of the districting practices that the Court is seeking to pre-
serve.
" 384
But while questioning the notion that there is any cognizable
equal protection harm wrought by the districts at issue in the Shaw
line of cases-and further, rightly rejecting the implication of some of
the Court's rhetoric that these race-conscious districts were tanta-• 385
mount to segregation -- Justice Souter's opinion actually does ac-
83 Id. at 1045, 1050 (SouterJ., dissenting) (emphasis added).
34 Id. at 1062. Justice Souter also noted that
[W]hat Shaw Ispoke of as harm is not confined to any identifiable class sin-
gled out for disadvantage. If, indeed, what Shaw Icalls harm is identifiable at
all in a practical sense, it would seem to play no favorites, but to fall on every
citizen and every representative alike.... [The injury recognized in Shawl] is
probably best understood as an 'expressive harm,' that is, one that 'results
from the idea or attitudes expressed through a governmental action, rather
than from the more tangible or material consequences the action brings
about.' Pildes & Niemi, [supra note 288, at 506-07]. To the extent that racial
considerations do express such notions, their shadows fall on majorities as
well as minorities, whites as well as blacks, the politically dominant as well as
the politically impotent. Thus, as an injury supposed to be barred by the
Equal Protection Clause, this subject of the 'analytically distinct' cause of ac-
tion created by Shaw I bears virtually no resemblance to the only types of
claims for gerrymandering we had deemed actionable following Davis v. Ban-
demer, 478 U.S. 109 (1986), those involving districting decisions that removed
an identifiable class of disfavored voters from effective political participation.
Id. at 1053-54 (some citations omitted).
AsJustice Souter explained in his opinion:
Although the Court used the metaphor of "political apartheid" as if to refer to
the segregation of a minority group to eliminate its association with a majority
that opposed integration, Shaw , supra, at 647, talk of this sort of racial separa-
tion is not on point here. The de jure segregation that the term "political
apartheid" brings to mind is unconstitutional because it emphatically implies
the inferiority of one race. See Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483,
494 (1954) ("To separate [minority children] from others of similar age and
qualifications solely because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as
to their status in the community"). Shaw I, in contrast, vindicated the com-
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knowledge the possibility that race-conscious districting simpliciter
might impose some other constitutionally significant harm upon the
individuals subject to it.
He noted that the racial composition of the districts before the
Court did not
reflect any purpose of racial subjugation, the district in question having
been created in an effort to give a racial minority the same opportunity
to achieve a measure of political power that voters in general, and white
voters and members of ethnic minorities in particular, have enjoyed as a
matter of course. 6
He went on to say that:
In light of a majority-minority district's purpose to allow previously sub-
merged members of racial minorities into the active political process,
this use of race cannot plausibly be said to affect any individual or group
in any sense comparable to the injury inflicted by de jure segregation. It
obviously conveys no message about the inferiority or outsider status of
members of the white majority excluded from a district. And because
the condition addressed by creating such a district is a function of num-
bers, the plan implies nothing about the capacity or value of the minor-
ity to which it gives the chance of electoral success.387
In actually examining the government's use of race to see if any of
the harms he mentioned were present, Justice Souter's dissent under-
took a closer look at the government's action than an opinion apply-
ing traditional, deferential rational basis scrutiny would have done.
Nonetheless, Justice Souter's Bush dissent does conclude at least as a
formal matter not that the challenged districts thus survive close ex-
amination, but that in the absence of any of these "equal protection
injur[ies] in the usual sense," only rational basis scrutiny should ap-
ply.
All the dissenters in Shaw and its follow-on cases have repeatedly
reached the conclusion that Shaw is untenable. They have been un-
plaint of a white voter who objected not to segregation but to the particular
racial proportions of the district. See Karlan, [supra note 309, at] 94 (noting
the irony of using the term "apartheid" to describe what are "among the most
integrated districts in the country"). Whatever this district may have symbol-
ized, it was not "apartheid."
Id. at 1054-55.
X-6 Id. at 1055.
M7 Id.
U Id. at 1056 (noting that the Court's conclusion that "not every intentional crea-
tion of a majority-minority district requires strict scrutiny" is a "sound one," but that
even this conclusion does not address the problem with the continued vitality of the
Shaw cause of action: that "there is no equal protection injury in the usual sense").
120 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LA WREVEW
able to rationalize or to apply the decision. Even in cases in which the
parties have not sought to overrule Shaw, the dissenting Justices have
reached the conclusion that it is fundamentally flawed, and that its
flaws are fatal."'
In light of the potential harms involved in any governmental use
of race, however, the dissenters' alternative approach of applying tra-
ditional rational basis scrutiny may well not provide sufficient over-
sight of state and local governments' use of race in electoral district-
ing. There are costs to race-conscious districting that, like all other
race-conscious government action, require justification. To the extent
that they conclude that only vote dilution is a cognizable harm, the
dissents written in the Shaw line of cases actually understate the uni-
verse of legitimate concerns that race-conscious districting raises. Fur-
thermore, from a practical standpoint, an unwillingness to grapple
with what animated the Shaw Court's move to strict scrutiny will leave
the Court's minority with no role in the formulation of rules for that
scrutiny's application.
III. PUTTING RAcE-CONSCIOUS DISTRIGTING IN ITS PROPER PLACE
With this as preparation, we can turn to the question this back-
ground presents: How should race-conscious districts drawn to pre-
vent minority vote dilution be evaluated under the Fourteenth
Amendment, and can they pass constitutional muster?
In Part IIIA I propose a way to undertake the "strict scrutiny"
called for by Shaw that is consistent with the framework for analysis I
set out in Part I. My purpose is to demonstrate what equal protection
scrutiny of race-conscious districts might look like under a method
that is consistent with the purposes that strict scrutiny should properly
serve.
This approach, which is sensitive to the harms that may be
wrought by race-conscious districting and in particular to the legiti-
mate concerns that seem to have given rise to the Shaw cause of action
in the first instance, is also consistent with the rhetoric of the control-
ling opinions in the Shaw line of cases-the opinions of Justice
O'Connor in this area-rhetoric that is itself in some tension with the
See, e.g., id. at 1005 (Stevens, J., dissenting, joined by Ginsburg & Breyer, Ji.)
(arguing that the Court should "return to the well-traveled path that we left in Shaw
f'); id. at 1046 (Souter, J., dissenting, joined by Ginsburg & Breyer, fJ.) (stating that
"no amount of case-by-case tinkering can eliminate" the "basic misconception about
the relation between race and districting principles" that is the cause of "Shaws prob-
lems").
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"strictest" version of Shaw's strict scrutiny. It is proposed as an alterna-
tive not only to the Procrustean bed that Shaw and its progeny
threaten to become, but also to the rational basis standard suggested
by the dissenters in Shaw and the cases applying it. In addition, this
approach would have the advantage of bringing more reason out of
the Shaw line of cases without overruling it, a step that has been re-
peatedly suggested by the Shaw dissenters, but that is unlikely without
some change in the composition of the Supreme Court. g'
In Part III.B I will address the Court's concern in the Shaw line of
cases with the shapes of the electoral districts before it, and I will con-
sider the rhetoric of the Court, which has likened districts with small
African American majorities to "segregation" and "apartheid." These
have presented perhaps the deepest puzzles about the meaning of the
Shaw line of cases. But, as I will describe, they may actually provide
the key to a new understanding of the Shaw cause of action, an under-
standing that would place it firmly within the long line of race-
discrimination cases decided by the Court, including Brown and Bakke.
This understanding would permit Shaw to be more readily harmo-
nized both with the Court's other equal protection decisions, and with
the rational approach to strict scrutiny that I have proposed. Finally,
then, in Part III.C, I will return to the question of narrow tailoring in
light of the availability of race-neutral alternatives for combating dis-
crimination in voting.
A. Evaluating Race-Conscious Districting Under a
Strict Scrutiny Attached to Its Moorings
1. The State of the Law
How then might one properly assess-scrutinize-the use of race
in the drawing of electoral district lines? The approaches suggested
by the two factions on the current Court, the Shaw majority and the
four dissenters, each leave something to be desired. The line of cases
since Shaw I, the confusion suggested by Miller and Bush, the ongoing
erosion of the V.R.A. in response to the Shaw line of cases, and the
likelihood of more of the same, all demonstrate both the urgent need
for, and the possibility of, a reexamination of the appropriate nature
Although there have been two changes of personnel on the Court in the seven
years since Shaw Iwas decided, no member of the five-member Shaw majority has left
the Court. The same five justices who formed the majority in Shaw I-Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas-have also formed a
five-member majority in Miller, Bush, and Shaw H.
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of Shaw scrutiny.
Contradictions in the cases also suggest that the doctrine in this
area is unstable. The tenor of Justice O'Connor's two opinions in
Bush suggests that she believes race-conscious districts that are subject
to strict scrutiny and that were drawn in part to comply with section 2
of the V.RA. may sometimes be upheld. 9' Yet the complex legal test
she has articulated seems to preclude that result. If applied literally,
that test would actually divide the world of intentionally drawn race-
conscious districts into two formal categories, neither one of which
would be assessed in terms of the actual and potential harms it en-
192tails. First would be those that respect traditional districting princi-
ples. Even though they are intentionally drawn on the basis of race,
these would, apparently, pass muster if they were merely rational. The
second category of intentionally race-drawn districts would be those
that are bizarrely shaped (and perhaps those that in some other way
deviate from traditional districting principles). These would be sub-
jected to strict scrutiny, and would invariably be struck down, again
without the inquiry into circumstance that would be appropriate.
Not only is this approach too rigidly formalistic to address the
genuine concerns that are raised by the government's use of race in
electoral districting, but in light of the dictum in Adarand that all race-
conscious government action is subject to strict scrutiny, an approach
in which some lines drawn on the basis of race are subject only to ra-
tional basis review may be unsustainable. The Shaw/Miller/Bush major-
ity is composed of the same Justices who were in the majority in Ada-
rand. When Justice Kennedy writes for that majority-as he did in
Miller-strict scrutiny even of race-conscious districting seems to ex-
pand to include all districting plans in which race was intention-
ally used. Indeed, in Bush, Justice Kennedy, who joined Justice
O'Connor's plurality opinion, also wrote separately to say:
[T] he statements in... the [plurality] opinion that strict scrutiny would
not apply to all cases of intentional creation of majority-minority dis-
tricts... are unnecessary to our decision, for strict scrutiny applies here.
I do not consider these dicta to commit me to any position on the ques-
tion whether race is predominant whenever a State, in redistricting,
foreordains that one race be the majority in a certain number of districts
391 See, e.g., Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 977 (1996) (plurality opinion of O'Connor,
J.); id. at 990 (O'ConnorJ, concurring).
392 See supra notes 355-72 and accompanying text (reviewing the Bush decision in
detail).
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or in a certain part of the State.
393
Justice Thomas, with whom Justice Scaliajoined in concurrence, more
definitely expressed his opinion that, as the Court had said one year
previously in Adarand, all race-conscious government action is subject
to strict scrutiny.
3
1
4
Although Justice O'Connor's controlling view is that mere "pre-
dominan [ce]" of race in electoral districting is not sufficient to trigger
strict scrutiny and that "traditional districting criteria" must also be
"neglected" in order for it to apply, 95 her apparently contradictory
statement that "bizarreness is not necessary to trigger strict scrutiny"
suggests that the last chapter on the formal approach to race-
conscious districts is far from being written."6 The need to rationalize
Shaw scrutiny, suggesting ways to make sense of it, therefore is particu-
larly great.
2. Applying the Approach Described in Part I
A properly tailored examination of the use of race in the drawing
of electoral districts-an examination that could appropriately be de-
nominated "strict"-would begin by identifying which of the possible
risks and harms associated with the government's use of race are pres-
ent in the context of race-conscious districting, and, more specifically,
which of these risks and harms are present in the particular districting
plan at issue. A reviewing court-or, indeed, a legislature or other
districting authority contemplating such a use of race-would then
have to assess whether the costs that in fact attend the use of race be-
fore it are justified by any sufficiently strong legislative purposes. It
would also have to determine whether there were race-neutral alterna-
tives available to the districting authority that would serve these pur-
poses. Finally, it would have to consider whether, in this context, the
use of race is sufficiently harmful that a polity seeking to achieve these
particular purposes should be required to bear whatever costs are at-
tendant upon using any such alternatives. Such scrutiny would ad-
dress the question which close examination of race-conscious gov-
3 3 Bush, 517 U.S. at 996 (KennedyJ, concurring).
AM See id. at 999-1000 (ThomasJ., concurring).
Id. at 959, 962 (plurality opinion of O'Connor, J.). Justice O'Connor's view, as
the narrowest one in support of the outcomes in Miller and Bush, states the law. See
Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (explaining that when there is no ma-
jority opinion, the narrowest reasoning of any concurring justice states the Court's
holding).
MA Bush, 517 U.S. at 980 (plurality opinion of O'ConnorJ.).
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ernment action must be designed to help answer: Is there a genuine
difference between these groups that renders the difference in treat-
ment rational, and does the disparate treatment serve a sufficiently
important goal that it transcends whatever harm is done by the use of
the line drawn by the particular law?397
Such an approach, based on the principles described in Part I,
would acknowledge the harms that may be caused by any use of race
by government, but would take care to define them more precisely
than the Court has in the Shaw line thus far. The use of race in dis-
tricting would still require justification, but a more careful description
of the harm caused by race-conscious districting, and a recognition of
the harms that some other types of race-conscious government action
entail but that are absent in the districting context, would permit the
Court to assess more precisely the adequacy of the justifications put
forward by districting authorities for the race-conscious plans they
have adopted. In addition, once one articulates the costs associated
with the use of race in districting, one may better assess any race-
neutral alternatives that could be used to achieve the government's
goals to determine whether the government should be required to
turn to them. Thus far, no Court majority applying Shaw has seen fit
even to discuss the alternatives to race-conscious districting that might
be used to combat discrimination in voting.
The approach I suggest here-an approach that could take ac-
count, for example, of the particular harms that may be wrought by
race-conscious districts that are bizarrely shaped-might well address
the concerns expressed by justice O'Connor, both as the voice of the
Court in Shaw and in her separate opinions since then, better than
any version of Shaw strict scrutiny yet articulated. Its results would
likely coincide with Justice O'Connor's understanding of the bottom
line of the Shaw lcause of action: that race-conscious districting is not
per se invalid, but that it must be carefully cabined. It would be pref-
erable to the line she otherwise appears headed toward drawing: a
formal line distinguishing the permissible from the impermissible
based on "predominance" of race. Instead, scrutiny that is actually tai-
lored to the particular harms at issue is more likely to result in the in-
validation of those districting plans that are actually most harmful or
for which the justification is the weakest. And, as I will describe in
Part Ill.B, it could both take account of Justice O'Connor's repeated
397 See supra pp. 12-15 (articulating this question and describing how strict scrutiny
can help to answer it).
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but inchoate concern about bizarrely shaped districts, and explain the
results in all the race-conscious districting cases that have come before
the Court since Shaw Iwas decided.
a. Identifying the Risks and Harms Attendant upon the Use of Race
A reviewing court, or a districting authority in the first instance,
confronted with a districting plan that has been intentionally drawn in
a race-conscious fashion must first evaluate the use of race in the con-
text before it to identify what harms the districting plan will actually
39 i
cause.
To begin with, one would have to consider whether race was being
used in this context in order to segregate voters on the basis of race.
The intentional separation of people into all-black and all-white elec-
toral districts would place the districting plan firmly in Category
One,' as a virtually unjustifiable use of race by government.
This was what happened, for example, in Gomillion v. Lightfoot.4°°
Gornillion involved manipulation of a municipal boundary that re-
sulted in the actual segregation of black voters. In that case-which
rested upon the Fifteenth Amendment and not the Fourteenth-a
municipality, Tuskegee, Alabama, had redrawn its city boundaries al-
legedly to exclude black voters on the basis of their race. As the Court
described:
The essential inevitable effect of this redefinition of Tuskegee's bounda-
ries is to remove from the city all save only four or five of its 400 Negro
voters while not removing a single white voter or resident. The result of
the Act is to deprive the Negro petitioners discriminatorily of the bene-
fits of residence in Tuskegee, including, inter alia, the right to vote in
municipal elections.... If these allegations upon a trial remained un-
contradicted or unqualified, the conclusion would be irresistible... that
the legislation is solely concerned with segregating white and colored
voters by fencing Negro citizens out of town so as to deprive them of
their pre-existing municipal vote.
4
0
1
Although the ordinance at issue there not only separated voters
on the basis of race, but excluded them from the polity altogether,
,,I The list of harms I describe here is taken from my discussion supra text accom-
panying notes 49-60 (cataloguing the possible risks and harms associated with govern-
mental uses of race).
"& See supra Part I.B.1 (setting out my taxonomy of four categories of race-
conscious government action).
1- 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
4Q1 Id. at 341.
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segregation of voters by race into separate electoral districts would
also fall squarely within the first category of race-based government
actions, those that are in essence flatly prohibited. A court reviewing a
race-conscious districting plan thus would have to examine the racial
mix of its component districts to ensure that they are not segregation-
ary, that they do not convey the message of inferiority and unfitness
the practice of segregation connotes.
Next, one would have to assure oneself that race was not being
used to deny any group an equal opportunity to participate in the
electoral process, that is, that race was not being used to dilute the
votes of one or another racial group. Again, this would require an ex-
amination of the racial composition of each district, but it would also
require inquiry into the extent of racial polarization in the polity at
issue. Because a districting plan that dilutes votes would deny the
members of one or another group the opportunity to participate in
the election of candidates of their choice, a dilutive plan of electoral
districting would have to be situated in Category One (in the case of
dilution of African American voting strength) or in Category Two (in
the case of dilution of white voting strength).4 °2 In either case, I can
think of no interest that could be said to justify such racial vote dilu-
tion.
Under a proper approach to strict scrutiny, a conclusion that a
race-conscious districting plan was neither segregative nor dilutive
would not automatically lead to its validation. Such an electoral dis-
tricting plan, however, would be much like the archetypal Category
Three use of race, a districting plan that draws school attendance
zones. Indeed, once a court has satisfied itself that race is not being
used to work the harm of diluion-a harm that can never be pre-
sented in the case of school attendance zones-a race-conscious dis-
tricting plan would fall squarely within Category Three.
Of course this is not to say that there are no costs involved in the
use of race in this context, or that such a plan will not require justifi-
cation. Just as an integrative plan of school attendance zones denies
no one any good or benefit, however, such an electoral districting
plan will not deny anyone the power to vote in an election, or to be
represented in the legislature. And, so long as the district lines are
not dilutive of minority voting strength and do not give members of
the minority group political strength beyond their numbers, there is
402 Cf. Johnson v. DeGrandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1017 (1994) (describing the possibility
of providing a minority group with "political power... above its numerical strength").
[Vol. 149: 1
2000] A COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH TO STRICT SCRUTINY 127
no risk that the districting plan reflects mere racial politics. In such a
circumstance neither group is being given a "reward," nor should the
plan cause members of either group to feel that they are not full
members of the polity. Indeed, the opposite should be true.
Risks and costs, however, do remain. There is some risk that race
has been used for no reason other than erroneous stereotype. In a
jurisdiction in which there were no racial polarization, in which voting
did not correlate at all to race, the creation of integrated districts
would not dilute voting strength-the very concept of one or another
racial group's "voting strength" would, indeed, be meaningless-but it
would be unnecessary, and would rest, presumably, upon nothing
more than an erroneous belief in the relevance of race.
There is also the risk that the use of race in this context will per-
petuate a negative racial stereotype. Although this is ultimately an
empirical question in this context, there may be some risk that the
creation of black-majority districts may be perceived as an exemption
for African Americans from the normal requirement of coalition-
building in American politics. Of course, this is not an inference of
incapacity in the same sense as the inference some people draw from
race-conscious affirmative action plans that supplant substantive, ar-
guably "merit-based" criteria for the distribution of some good. The
stereotype is now likely to be that members of the minority group are
not required to play by the same rules as everyone else.03
It is possible to view the significance of electoral districting lines in
this way precisely because, through the ability to aggregate their votes,
members of the racial minority group may be provided by race-
conscious districting plans with what they might otherwise be denied:
the ability to elect candidates of their choice. This feature of electoral
districts-their impact on the ability to aggregate votes-is what ren-
ders them different from the paradigmatic Category Three example.
Among other things, it means that there may be this additional cost, a
cost not present in all examples of integrative districting.
Now, indeed, whenever any group-say Democrats-is made a
majority in an electoral district, they could be said to have been "ex-
empted" from the need to build coalitions in the same sense. That
such groups are not ordinarily said to have been so exempted suggests
that any such inference of special, lenient treatment in this context
may be based at least to some degree on a pre-existing attitude toward
+, Thus, for example, Abigail Thernstrom, a critic of the use of race in electoral
districting, writes that "the question is: how much special protection from white com-
petition are black candidates entitled to?" THERNsTRoM, supra note 262, at 5.
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the racial minority group that happens to have been made the major-
ity in one or more of the districts at issue in the particular districting
plan under evaluation. At bottom, it would of course be unjust to for-
bid such districts on the ground that they reinforce stereotypes if they
are, in fact, responses to the unwillingness of other groups to form
coalitions across racial lines. But if this is a divisive and harmful nega-
tive racial stereotype that is reinforced by the use of race in this con-
text-a negative racial stereotype that is probably not reinforced by
integrative plans of school attendance zones-this may suggest that
race-conscious plans of electoral districting may be upheld only on a
somewhat stronger justification and a somewhat stronger showing of
necessity than integrative school attendance zone plans like those I
described in Part 1.404
Lastly, there are the two harms previously described that will al-
ways be present when government uses race to classify individuals. °'
At the margin there will be a divisiveness harm, as the use of race will
to at least some degree reinforce people's belief in racial difference.
Since the outcome of elections is so public, and since it involves po-
litical power, in the context of electoral districts, this divisiveness harm
can include some exacerbation of a highly corrosive us-against-them
mentality. Of course, in the presence of racial polarization, it will not
be the districting plan that creates this mentality. But at the margin,
there will inevitably be some divisiveness harm, even if the use of race
is responsive to a genuine difference in the way in which the races are
currently situated. Finally, there is the dignitary harm inherent in
classifying people on the basis of race. Indeed, this harm may have
played some role in the decision by the white Shaw plaintiffs to bring
suit in the first instance.
b. Examination of the Relevant Interests
After articulating which harms are actually presented by the dis-
tricting plan before it, a reviewing court engaged in appropriately
searching scrutiny of the use of race in this context would have to look
next to see if those harms might be justified by a sufficiently important
governmental interest. There are at least three relevant interests.
First, there is the interest in preventing minority vote dilution, the
discriminatory effect of racially polarized bloc voting. Drawing nondi-
lutive districts in order to avoid a violation of section 2 of the V.R.A. as
04 See discussion supra text accompanying notes 96-113.
405 See discussion supra p. 23.
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construed in Gingles serves this purpose precisely. This interest, an in-
terest in avoiding a discriminatory effect, is extremely strong. Even
the Shaw majority said, in an opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist in
Shaw H, that:
A State's interest in remedying the effects of past or present racial
discrimination may in the proper case justify a government's use of racial
distinctions. For that interest to rise to the level of a compelling state in-
terest, it must satisfy two conditions. First, the discrimination must be
'identified discrimination.' 'While the States and their subdivisions may
take remedial action when they possess evidence' of past or present dis-
crimination, 'they must identify that discrimination, public or private,
with some specificity before they may use race-conscious re-
lief.' ... Second, the institution that makes the racial distinction must
have had a 'strongmbasis in evidence' to conclude that remedial action
was necessary'....
Once the vote dilution that would occur in the absence of race-
conscious districting is understood as the consequence of using an
apparently neutral method of vote aggregation in the presence of pri-
vate acts of voter discrimination in the voting booth, the interest in
preventing such dilution through the use of race-conscious districts
would seem to meet even the current Court's stringent test for deter-
mining when an interest is "compelling."
Second, the interest in preventing minority vote dilution itself
subsumes an interest in integration or diversity. That interest was
held in Bakke to justify Category Two affirmative action plans that pre-
sent more risks and costs than do nondilutive electoral districts drawn
on the basis of race.0 7 It was also held in McDaniel to justify the arche-
typal Category Three use of race, race-conscious school attendance
zone lines."" The purpose of preventing vote dilution is to permit
representation of members of all politically cohesive racial groups.
The interest in providing an equal opportunity to participate in the
political process can be understood as an interest in ensuring diversity
in who is represented. When race is used to avoid minority vote dilu-
tion, it is being used-much as it was in McDaniel-to integrate.09 In
McDaniel, the integration was the physical integration of individual
4" Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 909-10 (1996) (citations omitted).
+,7 See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 315-20 (1978), discussed su-
pra note 87 and accompanying text.
+11 See McDaniel v. Barresi, 402 U.S. 38 (1971), discussed supra text accompanying
notes 103-13.
, See id.
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schools.4 In the context of race-conscious districting, the integration
is more abstract yet perhaps even more fundamental, the "integra-
tion" of the political process not by racial integration of the legislative
delegation, but by providing meaningful ballots to the racial minority
previously denied them. If the interest in diversity was strong enough
to uphold the uses of race in Bakke and McDanie it should also be suf-
ficiently strong to support a jurisdiction's voluntary decision to adopt
district lines that take race into account in order to avoid minority
vote dilution. The costs associated with race-conscious districting
cannot justify hobbling a government body that, faced with polarized
voting, voluntarily decides to prevent minority vote dilution, and that
therefore takes race into account in drawing its district lines.
Indeed, the interest in diversity is even stronger in this context be-
cause the alternative to using race will deny members of the minority
group political representation. As described above, in a racially polar-
ized jurisdiction, a decision not to permit race-conscious districting,
while formally even-handed, will result in the creation of a dispropor-
tionate number of white-majority districts. "Colorblind" districting
will result in having only one of the politically cohesive racial groups-
the majority group-represented. By contrast, even when race is not
used in the school-districting context, every child will still get to go to
school. In a world in which racial polarization exists, a prohibition on
race-conscious districting thus would amount to imposition by consti-
tutional edict of something very similar to separate-but-equal dis-
crimination. The races would be provided formal equality in a way
that would be detrimental only to the racial minority. A reading of
the Equal Protection Clause that requires states to discriminate
against racial minority groups in this way would be very difficult to de-
fend.
Finally, there is a third and related interest that could justify the
use of race to draw non-dilutive districts. Even if the interest in pre-
venting the discriminatory effect of a dilutive plan of electoral district-
ing were not considered sufficiently strong tojustify these uses of race,
the interest in complying with section 2 of the V.RA. could be suffi-
cient, because of the deference due to congressional legislation en-
acted to enforce the command of the Fifteenth Amendment.
411
410 See id. at 40 (upholding a plan which integrated schools by establishing geo-
graphic attendance zones drawn to allow for increased racial balance).
A similar interest would be present in the event that a state or local government
had to redraw a districting plan following a denial of preclearance under section 5 of
the V.RA. on the ground that a submitted plan had the purpose or effect of causing a
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For whatever reason, the Court has focused primarily on this in-
terest, rather than the interest in combating discrimination regardless
of the requirements of federal statutory law, and in Bush v. Vera, a ma-
jority of the Court-Justice O'Connor and the four dissenters-con-
cluded that the interest in compliance with section 2 of the V.RA.
was, indeed, a compelling state interest.
412
Ultimate acceptance of this interest, however, may face an objec-
tion not present in the case of the other two interests I have discussed.
The V.R.A. was enacted pursuant to Congress's power under section 2
of the Fifteenth Amendment.4 13 That provision grants Congress the
power to "enforce... by appropriate legislation" the substantive guar-
antee of section 1 of that Amendment that "[t]he right of citizens of
the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the
United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous
condition of servitude."4
In a series of cases over the last three years, beginning with City of
Boerne v. Flores, the Supreme Court has narrowly interpreted Con-
gress's enforcement power under the parallel provision of the Four-
teenth Amendment.' The Court has held that the power to "en-
force" a constitutional provision is only "remedial and preventive
', 16
and that, although Congress may in the exercise of its enforcement
power "prohibit[] conduct which is not itself unconstitutional," there
must be "a congruence and proportionality between the injury to be
"retrogression" in the electoral power of a racial or language minority group. How-
ever, because the Court has now eliminated the power of the Attorney General to deny
preclearance under section 5 on the basis of an intent to discriminate unless that in-
tent amounts to an intent to cause retrogression, see Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd. (Boss-
ier Parish fl), 120 S. Ct. 866, 878 (2000), such denials of preclearance, which were
common after the 1990 census, are far less likely to be interposed against the district-
ing plans that will soon be adopted following the 2000 census.
517 U.S. 952, 990 (1996) (O'Connor, J., concurring); id. at 1033 (Stevens, J.,
joined by Ginsburg & Breyer,1J., dissenting); id. at 1046 (SouterJ.,joined by Ginsburg
& Breyer,JJ., dissenting).
4:. See Lopez v. Monterey County, 525 U.S. 266, 269 (1999).
414 See U.S. CONST. amend. XV.
41. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (concluding that the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act was not within Congress's power under section 5 of the Four-
teenth Amendment); College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ.
Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666 (1999) (concluding that the Patent Remedy Act was not
within Congress's power under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment); Kimel v.
Florida Bd. of Regents, 120 S. Ct. 631 (2000) (concluding that the Age Discrimination
in Employment Act was not within Congress's power under section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment).
41i" Ciy ofBoerne, 521 U.S. at 524.
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prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that end.417
Any argument based on an interest in compliance with the V.R.A.
will therefore eventually have to contend with City of Boerne because
failure to draw districts in compliance with section 2 of the V.RA as
amended in 1982 would not necessarily violate the Constitution. City
of Mobile v. Bolden held that the Constitution did not forbid dilutive
districting plans unless the districting authority acted with an intent to
418discriminate. Section 2 prohibits such plans regardless of the intent
with which they are adopted.
Nonetheless, the amended section 2 of the V.RA. is a valid exer-
cise of Congress's power under section 2 of the Fifteenth Amend-
ment. City of Boerne itself makes clear that the V.RA. is a response "to
the widespread and persisting deprivation of constitutional rights re-
sulting from this country's history of racial discrimination," and the
Court there "acknowledge[d] the necessity of using strong remedial
and preventive measures to respond" to this deprivation. 419
Undoubtedly there is at least some moral difference between mi-
nority vote dilution that is the incidental effect of a districting plan
that serves some non-racial purpose and minority vote dilution that is
the intentional result of a plan discriminatorily designed to have that
effect. Although discrimination in the voting booth is a necessary
element of each, in the former the districting authority lacks invidious
intent. Yet there are many reasons that justify Congress's conclusion
that enforcement of the Fifteenth Amendment's guarantee required a
prohibition on all districting plans that have a dilutive effect.
First, it may have been Congress's judgment that a dilutive effect is
almost always intentional. The traditional concept that one intends
the natural consequences of one's actions has particular truth in the
area of electoral districting. As a rule, districting plans are drawn up
by or with the aid of state legislators who have an intimate familiarity
with the demographics in their own districts. Districting authorities
also rely on census figures that themselves are broken down by race.
Where race correlates with political preferences-which is always the
case where voters are polarized along racial lines-the choice of how
to draw a district line will almost always be an intentional choice about
which group to favor.420
417 Id. at 518, 520.
418 446 U.S. 55, 66-70 (1980) (plurality opinion).
419 City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 526.
40 Indeed, if "intentional discrimination" is not limited to that discrimination
based on racial favoritism, every district line drawn in a racially polarized jurisdiction
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Additionally, unlike other actors, state legislators may well have
the sophistication to hide their true intentions. Certainly this is the
history of voting discrimination.4 '  As politicians themselves, of
course, the members of Congress who adopted section 2 were inti-
mately aware of this reality.
Congress may also have wanted to avoid the divisiveness that
would have been created by requiring an inquiry into intent. If that
inquiry were expanded beyond the scope of the individuals drawing
up the districting plan, it would probably be relatively easy to find dis-
criminatory intent in virtually every case in which districts will have a
dilutive effect. Electoral districts are rarely cut from whole cloth.
They tend, rather, to reflect slight modifications of pre-existing plans
of electoral districting. Ordinarily districts are redrawn to maintain
the position of incumbents. Where no African American person has
ever been elected in a multiracial jurisdiction, to take the most ex-
treme example, it is likely that a historical inquiry will reveal that the
could be described as "intentionally" racially discriminatory. Electoral districts are
drawn by politicians precisely in order to have particular electoral effects. The infinite
number of ways of drawing district lines to create constitutionally compelled equipopu-
lous districts means that, unless those lines are generated randomly, politicians will
always have to make choices about who to include in each district, even as they also
seek to achieve other goals such as compactness or maintaining pre-existing political
subdivisions, such as counties or cities. The only substantive criteria upon which one
district line will be thought preferable to another will be its political consequence.
This political consequence will be among the reasons the district line is chosen. In the
presence of racially polarized voting, racial groups form the very political groups that
will be affected by any districting plan. Where in a racially polarized jurisdiction a dis-
tricting plan is adopted that underrepresents the strength of minority voters, district-
ing authorities who have made a deliberate choice thus inevitably will have adopted it
"'because of' ... its adverse effects upon" the minority group. Personnel Adm'r of
Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979).
This is not to say that the subjective motivation for such plans will necessarily in-
clude negative views about the members of one or another racial group as such. It may
be the fact that the black voters would not support the incumbents who seek re-
election, and whose re-election the legislators doing the districting want to ensure
(perhaps because of personal friendship, party loyalty, even a mutual agreement
among legislators that protecting each other is the only way to ensure one's own pro-
tection). "Discriminatory intent," however, as that term has been used in the equal
protection context, is the intent to "discriminate," to provide different treatment along
impermissible (in this case, racial) lines. It does not require antipathy toward the
group against whom one is discriminating. Because the intent of districting authorities
will always be to create political consequences, and because, in the presence of racially
polarized voting, those political consequences will necessarily be racial, the discrimina-
tory submergence of minority votes will always be an intentional effect of a dilutive
plan of electoral districting.
421 See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 309 (1966) (stating that the
V.R.A. was a response to "unremitting and ingenious defiance of the Constitution" in
some parts of the country).
134 UNIVERSITY OF PENNS YL VANL LA W RE[1EW
original plan on which the district lines were based was adopted for a
discriminatory purpose. For example, on remand from City of Mobile
v. Bolden, the district court undertook a lengthy examination of the
history of the adoption of various voting mechanisms in Mobile, Ala-
bama, and found that the city's electoral system had been adopted
prior to 1911 with a racially discriminatory purpose and had subse-
quently "been maintained... for racial motives. " 422 The city was over
one-third black, yet no African American had ever been elected to the
City of Mobile's governing Commission between 1874 and 1982.423
Whenever a districting plan has a dilutive effect, itself an artifact
of racial discrimination in voting, an historical inquiry is likely to show
that that effect of a districting plan is in part a vestige of some invidi-
ously discriminatory decision made in the past. There is also the like-
lihood that the very patterns of residential segregation that render
certain districting plans dilutive are themselves traceable to acts,
424whether public or private, of intentional discrimination.
Finally, of course, the dilutive effect of any districting plans does
reflect "discriminatory intent" on the part of the voters. Indeed, per-
sistent racial polarization in voting itself suggests that relations be-
tween the races in thatjurisdiction are fundamentally poor. Professor
Issacharoff's research suggests that racial polarization in voting re-
flects not mere coincidence of race with other views, but is itself in fact
about race: "The persistence and extremity of the polarized voting
practices in community after community, despite substantial numbers
of middle-class blacks and poor whites indicates that, beyond the di-
vergent socioeconomic interests, there must also be a more funda-
mental racial antipathy at work as well."4u
As the above discussion indicates, inquiry into motive may have
been thought by Congress not merely difficult, but particularly inap-
propriate when it comes to a racially discriminatory effect of a plan of
electoral districting. On the one hand, as City of Mobile v. Bolden dem-
onstrates, it may require courts to attempt to piece together the moti-
vation of state legislators acting over one hundred years ago. As Pro-
fessor Issacharoff's work suggests, because the effect of a plan of
districting is in part the result of private choices, the inquiry could in-
volve scrutiny of the racial attitudes of an entire community.411 This
42 Bolden v. City of Mobile, 542 F. Supp. 1050, 1054-68 (S.D. Ala. 1982).
423 Id. at 1076.
44 See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
42 Issacharoff, supra note 44, at 1879.
426 The Gingles Court unanimously agreed that a showing of legally sufficient ra-
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could be extraordinarily divisive. It would also itself raise constitu-
tional concerns of the highest order because it involves inquiry into
the reasons ballots were cast.0 7
One way in which the Court has determined the propriety of en-
forcement legislation under City of Boerne has been "by examining the
legislative record containing the reasons for Congress' action." 428 In
this case, Congress was presented with evidence at the time it
amended section 2 that the burden of proving discriminatory intent
would be virtually insurmountable, that the inquiry into intent would
be destructive, and that prohibiting only intentionally discriminatory
districting plans would leave a great deal of intentional discrimination
untouched. 42 " The legislative history reveals that by adopting the re-
sults test in section 2 of the V.R.A., Congress was indeed attempting to
address these difficulties.4
Congress's judgment in the exercise of its power under the Fif-
teenth Amendment is due great deference. And indeed, its authority
to prohibit discriminatory effects in the exercise of its power under
section 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment has been consistently upheld.4"
Whatever the limits of congressional power to address discrimination
under the Civil War Amendments,4 " where the exercise of that power
raises only the relatively few concerns presented in the districting con-
text, Congress's judgment of what is appropriate should be given ef-
fect. 4 -
cially polarized bloc voting does not depend on the motivation of white voters. See
Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 48-51, 56-58 (1986) (describing the test for racially
polarized bloc voting); id. at 100 (O'Connor, J., joined by Burger, C.J., and Rehnquist
& Powell,J., concurring) ("Insofar as statistical evidence of divergent racial voting pat-
terns is admitted solely to establish that the minority group is politically cohesive and
to assess its prospects for electoral success, I agree that defendants cannot rebut this
showing by offering evidence that the divergent racial voting patterns may be ex-
plained in part by causes other than race, such as an underlying divergence in the in-
terests of minority and white voters.").
,W See supra notes 186-87 and accompanying text.
4 Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 120 S. Ct. 631, 648 (2000).
42 SeeS. REP. No. 97-417, at 36-37 (1982) (discussing the V.R.A. Extension).
43 See id. at 36 (describing principal reasons for rejection of the intent test: it is
.unnecessarily divisive because it involves charges of racism on the part of individual
officials or entire communities," it places an "inordinately difficult burden" of proof on
plaintiffs, and it "asks the wrong question").
4M See City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 173-78 (1980); South Carolina v.
Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 323-28 (1966).
4 2 See, e.g., LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 5-14 (2d ed.
1988) (discussing Congress's enforcement power under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments).
433 And, indeed, in United Jewish Organizations of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Carey
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c. Narrow Tailoring
It is important to note here that the existence of the three gov-
ernmental interests I have outlined-the interests in preventing vote
dilution, in "integrating" the political process, and in complying with
section 2 of the V.R.A.--does not mean that all uses of race in elec-
toral districting will be found to serve them. This is the first place the
narrow-tailoring requirement comes in. One of its roles is to ensure
that the use of race is actually designed to serve the sufficiently strong
state interest. This requires an examination of the composition of the
electoral districts under review.
In this regard, there is some evidence that attempts to increase the
proportion of black voters in certain electoral districts have sometimes
gone too far. The Department of Justice in the late 1980s and early
1990s-and particularly during the reapportionment occasioned by
the 1990 census-began vigorously to insist upon the creation of
black-majority districts by jurisdictions subject to the preclearance re-
quirements of section 5 of the V.RA. As in Shaw and Miller, it would
do so by refusing to preclear the plan initially adopted by a covered
jurisdiction on the ground that that jurisdiction had not borne its
burden to prove the absence of discriminatory intent. As a conse-
quence, the electoral landscape was quite substantially altered: many
new black-majority districts were formed at all levels of government.
At the federal level, nonwhite faces began to appear in Congress in
record numbers as well: in 1992, the number of black and Hispanic
Representatives jumped from thirty-six to fifty-five.
4 4
Some critics argued, however, that black majorities were unneces-
sary in some of these cases to give full effect to minority votes-un-
necessary to prevent vote dilution or for compliance with section 2 of
(UJO), 430 U.S. 144 (1977), a four-member plurality of the Court voted to uphold a
race-conscious plan of electoral districting on the ground that the state was acceding to
a reasonable position of the Attorney General that creation of these districts was neces-
sary to achieve the nonretrogression in black voting strength required under section 5
of the V.R.A., and that the use of race to comply with the Act was constitutional. See id.
at 162-65 (plurality opinion); see also id. at 168-79 (Brennan, J., concurring in part).
With the plurality in uJO,Justices Stewart and Powell made up a six-person majority for
the proposition that the V.R.A. and the use of race in order to comply with the V.RA.
are constitutional. See id. at 180 n.* (Stewart, J., joined by Powell, J., concurring).
ChiefJustice Burger later characterized his dissenting opinion in UJO as standing for
that same proposition. See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 483 (Burger, C.J.,
joined by White & Powell, JJ.) (citing UJO, 430 U.S. at 180-87 (Burger, CJ., dissenting),
and describing ChiefJustice Burger's opinion as "dissenting on other grounds").
4 See Bob Benenson, GOP's Dreams of a Comeback Via the New Map Dissolve, 50
CONG. Q. WiLv. REP. 3580 (1992).
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the V.RIA. They argued that the Justice Department's insistence on
their creation was part of a strategy by Republicans, supported by
black leaders, to pack black Democratic voters into safe districts.
Some African Americans would be assured of election from these dis-
tricts, while surrounding districts would be drained of black voters,
leaving those districts more white-and more Republican.415 (That
view was lent credence by the Bush Justice Department's argument in
Voinovich--later rejected in DeGrandy-that creation of a proportional
number of black-majority districts should not be subject to a "packing"
challenge under section 2 of the V.R.A. on the ground that a larger
number of minority "influence districts" with a non-minority majority
could have been created. 4.b) If, indeed, the black-majority districts
that were created in order to obtain preclearance from the Attorney
General contained a greater percentage of black voters than was nec-
essary for compliance with the Act, such districting plans-which
would amount to packing black voters into districts-could not be
found to be narrowly tailored to serve the purpose of preventing vote
dilution.
Finally, the last step of a proper analysis would be to examine as
part of the narrow-tailoring inquiry any race-neutral alternatives that
might have been used to serve the government's purposes. The costs
inherent in any such alternatives would have to be weighed against the
costs of the use of race in the particular circumstances presented. In
the context of race-conscious districting, this is a topic whose impor-
tance warrants separate consideration, and about which I will defer
detailed examination until Part III.C.
Unlike either a virtually fatal "strict scrutiny," or an ineffectually
deferential rational basis test, ajudicial examination that followed the
steps I have outlined would be tightly moored to the purposes for
which it was undertaken in the first place. While acknowledging the
harms that are always caused by the classification of individuals ac-
cording to race, this type of examination would be far preferable to
any one-size-fits-all analysis. And in permitting the governmental use
of race in some circumstances where it is used to address or prevent
discrimination and inequality, this approach would be most faithful to
4" See, e.g., Karlan, supra note 173, at 1733-34 & nn.128 & 130 (1993) (describing
these allegations).
I-V See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellants at 12-16,
Voinoxich v. Quilter, 507 U.S. 146 (1992) (No. 91-1618) (arguing that section 2 of the
V.R.A. cannot require creation of districts in which minorities are not a majority of the
voting age population, and urging therefore that Ohio's plan with a proportionate
number of black-majority districts should be upheld).
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the underlying command of equal protection.
B. Can Bizarrely Shaped Districts Free Us from Misshapen Doctrines?
Making Sense of the Rhetoric That Animates Shaw
So is there any way to get there from here? Can the Shaw line of
cases be reconciled with the approach I have suggested? As described
above, the cases are confused and incoherent. At best they suggest a
scrutiny that is too rigid in most cases and too deferential in others.
At worst, they portend an effectively undifferentiated approach to the
use of race for districting purposes, an approach under which all such
uses of race are unconstitutional.
There is language in the opinions, and particularly in the opin-
ions of Justice O'Connor, whose vote has been controlling in these
cases, that strict scrutiny will not necessarily mean the invalidation of
all districts drawn with race in mind in order to combat the effects of
racial polarization in voting. In order to reconcile this rhetoric with
the approach I have described, however, one would need to glean
from the Court's Shaw line of decisions some principle that appropri-
ately distinguishes the more harmful uses of race in electoral district-
ing from the less harmful ones.
The key to reconciling the Shaw line of decisions with the Court's
pre-Shaw cases-and with the approach advocated here-may lie in
one of the most perplexing aspects of the Shaw series of cases: the on-
again, off-again focus on the shapes of electoral districts. This focus,
of course, began in Shaw Iitself, where justice O'Connor wrote for the
Court that strict scrutiny was to be applied to "redistricting legislation
that is so bizarre on its face that it is 'unexplainable on grounds other
than race.'" 437 This is a strange formulation to use, given that all par-
ties conceded that race had been used to draw the district lines in
Shaw. It suggests that injury inheres not in the use of race, but in the
fact that one could draw no other conclusion but that race had been
used. This was reinforced by the Court's statement that "we believe
that reapportionment is one area in which appearances do matter."4
As described above, the focus on bizarre shape seemed to fade in
Miller v. Johnson.439 In Miller the Court, this time with Justice Kennedy
writing, said that bizarre shape was not "a threshold showing" for seek-
437 Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 644 (1993) (quoting Arlington Heights v. Metro.
Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266 (1977)).
438 Id. at 647.
439 See supra text accompanying notes 321-25.
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ing relief under Shaw.44 It held that, to make out a claim under the
Equal Protection Clause, a plaintiff would have to show that race was
"the predominant factor motivating" the legislative decision to place
voters in particular districts." Although it said that this could only be
proved by demonstrating that "the legislature subordinated traditional
race-neutral districting principles. . to racial considerations, "42 it
also said:
Shape is relevant not because bizarreness is a necessary element of the
constitutional wrong or a threshold requirement of proof, but because it
may be persuasive circumstantial evidence that race for its own sake, and
not other districting principles, was the legislature's dominant and con-
trolling rationale in drawing its district lines.
Of course the Shaw Court's emphasis on bizarre shape would have
been totally unnecessary had that shape only been relevant as proof
that race was used in districting, since the state admitted that the dis-
tricts had been drawn purposely on racial grounds in order to obtain
preclearance under section 5 of the V.R.A. And, despite Justice Ken-
nedy's efforts in Miller to eliminate bizarre shape as the touchstone of
a Shaw cause of action, in Bush v. Vera, Justice O'Connor's plurality
opinion seemed to revive it.i There she wrote:
Strict scrutiny does not apply merely because redistricting is per-
formed with consciousness of race. Nor does it apply to all cases of in-
tentional creation of majority-minority districts ....
... For strict scrutiny to apply, the plaintiffs must prove that other,
legitimate districting principles were "subordinated" to race. By that we
mean that race must be "the predominant factor motivating the legisla-
ture's [redistricting] decision."...
... The Constitution does not mandate regularity of district shape,
and the neglect of traditional districting criteria is merely necessary [to
the application of strict scrutiny], not sufficient. For strict scrutiny to
apply, traditional districting criteria must be subordinated to race445
Miller v.Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 912 (1995).
41 Id. at 916.
442 Id.
44 Id. at 913.
"See Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952 (1996).
445 Id. at 958, 959, 962 (plurality opinion) (first alteration in original) (citations
omitted) (quoting Miller, 515 U.S. at 916).
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In Bush at least, this focus on "traditional districting principles"
turned out to mean in practice that bizarrely shaped districts that were
unexplainable on grounds other than race had to be subjected to
strict scrutiny.446 Indeed, the plurality engaged in detailed descrip-
tions of the "narrow and bizarrely shaped tentacles," and the resem-
blance to "a sacred Mayan bird" with "spindly legs" and an "open
beak," of the districts before iti
1 7
More significantly, the plurality concluded that bizarre shape was
relevant to the narrow tailoring inquiry, saying:
Our discussion in Miller served only to emphasize that the ultimate con-
stitutional values at stake involve the harms caused by the use of unjusti-
fied racial classifications, and that bizarreness is not necessary to trigger
strict scrutiny. Significant deviations from traditional districting princi-
ples, such as the bizarre shape and noncompactness demonstrated by
the districts here, cause constitutional harm insofar as they convey the
message that political identity is, or should be, predominantly racial. For
example, the bizarre shaping of Districts 18 and 29, cutting across pre-
existing precinct lines and other natural or traditional divisions, is not
merely evidentially significant; it is part of the constitutional problem insofar
as it disrupts nonracial bases of political identity and thus intensifies the empha-
sis on race.
The view that bizarreness might be a critical factor in the invalida-
tion of the districts in Shaw and its follow-on cases is consistent with
the Court's summary affirmance, on the very day Millerwas decided, of
the decision of a three-judge court in DeWitt v. Wilson, a case that up-
held against Shaw challenge the use of race in California's 1992 redis-
tricting plan.S Typically, that plan was adopted in part to gain pre-
clearance under section 5 of the V.R.A.-some California counties are
covered by its provisions-and to avoid challenge under the nondilu-
tion provisions of section 2 of the Act.450
The districting authority-three special masters appointed by the
California Supreme Court-refused to create either bizarrely shaped
majority-minority districts or majority-minority districts that grouped
together geographically dispersed minority populations by including
large stretches of sparsely populated land in between them. 5 On the
446 Id. at 965-73.
447 Id. at 965, 974 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
448 Id. at 980-81 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
449 DeWitt v. Wilson, 515 U.S. 1170 (1995).
450 See DeWitt v. Wilson, 856 F. Supp. 1409, 1410-11 (E.D. Cal. 1994) (three-judge
court).
451 Seeid. at 1413-15.
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other hand, "the Masters attempted to reasonably accommodate the
interests of every 'functionally, geographically compact' minority
group of sufficient voting strength to constitute a majority in a single-
member district."' 2 The district court explained that "the functional
aspect of geographical compactness takes into account the presence
or absence of a sense of community made possible by open lines of
access and communication." 4
Because the resulting majority-minority districts were responsive
to communities of interest, even though those communities coincided
with race, the district court concluded that they were not drawn
"based... solely on race."4 4 The district court held that the district-
ing authority had "properly looked at race, not as the sole criteria in
drawing lines but as one of the many factors to be considered." 5 It
concluded that "the Masters' Report evidences ajudicious and proper
balancing of the many factors appropriate to redistricting, one of
which was the consideration of the application of the Voting Rights
Act's objective of assuring that minority voters are not denied the
chance to effectively influence the political process."4'5
The district court concluded that the plan was "a thoughtful and
fair example of applying traditional districting principles, while being
conscious of race."45 7 The court held that "where race is considered
only in applying traditional redistricting principles along with the re-
quirements of the Voting Rights Act, . . . strict scrutiny is not required.
However, if it were required, we conclude that this California redis-
tricting plan has been narrowly tailored to meet a compelling state
interest"4 ' The district court upheld the race-conscious districting
plan.
The significance of the Supreme Court's summary affirmance in
DeWitt was a point of controversy in Bush. In her plurality opinion in
BushJustice O'Connor wrote:
Strict scrutiny does not apply merely because redistricting is performed
with consciousness of race. Nor does it apply to all cases of intentional
creation of majority-minority districts. See DeWitt v. Wilson, 856 F. Supp.
45 Id. at 1411 (citations omitted) (quoting Wilson v. Eu, 823 P.2d 545, 549-50
(1992)).
453 Id.
414 Id. at 1413.
4 5 Id. at 1413.
4,% Id. at 1413-14.
4W Id. at 1415.
459 Id.
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1409 (E.D. Cal. 1994) (strict scrutiny did not apply to an intentionally
created compact majority-minority district), summarily aff'd, 515 U.S.
1170 (1995). P
9
Justice Kennedy, who joined the plurality opinion, wrote sepa-
rately to explain that:
[the] question [whether strict scrutiny would apply to all cases of inten-
tional creation of majority-minority districts] was not at issue in DeWitt v.
Wilson.... [O]ur summary affirmance in DeWitt stands for no proposi-
tion other than that the districts reviewed there were constitutional. We
do not endorse the reasoning of the district court while we order sum-
460mary affirmance of the judgment.
But whatever the meaning of DeWitt regarding the district court's
decision not to apply strict scrutiny, its significance surely lies in the
Supreme Court's decision to uphold the constitutionality of a plan in
which race was considered in drawing electoral district lines, but in
which the resulting plan did not contain any bizarrely shaped districts.
Justice O'Connor's opinions for the Court in Shaw and for the plural-
ity in Bush undeniably state that bizarreness of district shape is consti-
tutionally harmful. An absence of bizarrely shaped districts is at least
one basis upon which DeWitt can be distinguished from all the cases in
which the Court has invalidated districting plans under the Shaw cause
of action.
Why, all things being equal, including an identical community of
interests among minority group voters, a majority-minority district that
is bizarrely shaped should raise more constitutional concern than an
identically composed one that is more compact, remains largely unar-
ticulated by the Court. Yet, if we seek a "strict scrutiny" tailored to the
harms wrought by particular governmental uses of race-and, perhaps
more importantly from a practical point of view, if we seek a way to
explain the Shaw line of cases that is consistent with such an ap-
proach-it would certainly behoove us to examine closely a statement
like that of the Bush plurality that "bizarre shape [s] ... cause constitu-
tional harm insofar as they convey the message that political identity
is, or should be, predominantly racial."
461
Several commentators have sought to address the significance of
bizarre district shape. In an article written shortly after Shaw was de-
cided and before Miller and Bush were handed down, Professors Pildes
49 Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 958 (1996) (plurality opinion) (some citations omit-
ted).
40 Id. at 996 (KennedyJ, concurring) (citations omitted).
461 Id. at 980 (plurality opinion).
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and Niemi concluded that Shaw's emphasis on bizarre district shape
could best be understood to reflect a concern with race becoming
"the dominant value [that] ... subordinates all others." 2 They ar-
gued that the bizarreness of the district's shape sends out a "sig-
nal ... that, to government officials, race has become paramount and
dwarfed all other, traditionally relevant criteria."
46
On this view, bizarrely shaped districts were problematic because
they sent a message of "inappropriate respect for relevant public val-
ues." 41 Professors Pildes and Niemi argued that Justice O'Connor's
opinion in Shaw resonates with Justice Powell's landmark opinion in
Bakke. They suggested that Shaw could be viewed as an attempt to en-
sure that race does not become, or appear to become, the dominant
consideration in governmental decisionmaking. In the context of
race-conscious districting, they contended bizarre shape sends the
message that race was the only factor considered, even though it (a)
may not have been or, more significantly, (b) may equally well have
been in other cases in which it was possible to achieve the districting
authority's "racial" ends with more compact districts. Professors Pildes
and Niemi argued, therefore, that the harm the Shaw Court believed
was wrought by bizarrely shaped districts must come either from some
intrinsic wrong in sending out a message that race is dominant in a
governmental decision or from the impact of that message on social
perceptions. 
465
Similarly, Professors Aleinikoff and Issacharoff have argued that
the noncompactness of the district may send a message that "under-
scores the deep racial divisions" in American society.46 They, too,
compared Shaw to Bakke, writing-again before Miller and Bush-that
Shaw's emphasis on shape could best be understood to express a con-
cern with the "excessive reliance" on race, and a view that race could
permissibly be used as a "factor," but only as one of many factors in
the districting decision. a7 In their view, Shaw's emphasis on bizarre-
ness reflects a concern that bizarrely shaped districts will "call[] atten-
tion" to race. 68 In compact districts, by contrast, one can at least
462 Pildes & Niemi, supra note 288, at 501.
41,4 Id.
41A Id. at 507.
41Z See id. at 509.
" T. Alexander Aleinikoff & Samuel Issacharoff, Race and Redistricting: Drawing
Constitutional Lines Afler Shaw v. Reno, 92 MIcH. L. REV. 588, 614 (1992).
40 Id. at 614, 618.46 Id. at 613.
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claim that the black majority was the result of residential housing pat-
terns and the like. 9
The concern about bizarre shape certainly must reflect some con-
cern about the dominance of the use of race in governmental deci-
sionmaking, but as the Bush plurality opinion now makes clear, Justice
O'Connor's concern about district shape goes beyond its significance
as an indication of the excessive use of race. And, undoubtedly, to
some degree, the concern about shape must include a concern about
obviousness, just as the concern expressed by Justice Powell in Bakke
must include such a concern.
But perhaps the significance of bizarre shape to the Shaw Court,
and to the Bush plurality (or at least to Justice O'Connor, who
authored the opinions filed on their behalf), lies, at least in part, else-
where. There are at least two possibilities.
The first, and perhaps most compelling, is actually suggested by
the district court opinion in DeWitt. Where an electoral district is
drawn to include as a majority members of a racial minority group,
but it does not adhere to traditional districting principles, it may be
more likely that the members of the racial minority group do not, in
fact, share a community of interests that could justify the district at is-
sue. In such circumstances, there is an increased probability that any
district reflects a stereotypical racial presumption of common inter-
ests, rather than the reality of common interests that could, in the
presence of racial polarization in voting, justify the use of race in dis-
tricting. In such a circumstance, one might want both districting
authorities and reviewing courts to operate with heightened sensitivity
because of this increased risk to ensure that communities placed to-
gether in a district, but widely disparate socially, economically, or geo-
graphically, in fact have the cohesion that would justify creating that
particular majority-minority district. If not, the government's use of
race will have been made on the basis of "race alone," not in the Bak-
kean sense of race being used simpliciter rather than as one among sev-
eral factors--district shape will always be the result of consideration of
many factors-but in the sense of race divorced from any justifica-
tion.47°
Reading Shaw, Miller, and Bush to reflect this concern would be
consistent with the Court's past practice and with the traditional un-
469 See id. at 614.
470 Cf Pildes & Niemi, supra note 288, at 500-06 (suggesting that the principle ani-
mating Shaw's focus on bizarrely shaped districts is that race not be permitted to ap-
pear to be paramount to all other traditionally relevant criteria for districting).
[Vol. 149: 1
2000] A COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH TO STRICT SCRUTINY 145
derstanding of the concerns addressed by strict scrutiny under the
Equal Protection Clause. It would also make sense of much of the
harsh language about communities of interest contained in the opin-
ion of the Millermajority:
A State is free to recognize communities that have a particular racial
makeup, provided its action is directed toward some common thread of
relevant interests. "[,rhen members of a racial group live together in
one community, a reapportionment plan that concentrates members of
the group in one district and excludes them from others may reflect
wholly legitimate purposes." But where the State assumes from a group
of voters' race that they "think alike, share the same political interests,
and will prefer the same candidates at the polls," it engages in racial
stereotyping at odds with equal protection mandates."'
Similarly, in Shaw ,Justice O'Connor wrote:
A reapportionment plan that includes in one district individuals who be-
long to the same race, but who are otherwise widely separated by geo-
graphical and political boundaries, and who may have little in common
with one another but the color of their skin, bears an uncomfortable re-
semblance to political apartheid. It reinforces the perception that
members of the same racial group-regardless of their age, education,
economic status, or the community in which they live-think alike, share
the same political interests, and will prefer the same candidates at the
polls. We have reected such perceptions elsewhere as impermissible ra-
cial stereotypes.
These statements could be read simply as a condemnation of the
use of race as a proxy for a community of interest. But these words do
not apply to all uses of race in drawing electoral district lines, but only
those where race is used in derogation of traditional districting prin-
ciples. That the Court is talking about district shapes is further sug-
gested by the verbs it uses: the districts about which the Court is con-
cerned "resemble" political apartheid; they "reinforce[] the
perception" that members of different racial groups vote in different
ways. The court also says that such "perceptions" have been con-
demned elsewhere as stereotypes, even though, in fact, what have
been rejected in the past have not been "perceptions," but actions
based upon stereotypes.
This suggests that, in some confused way, the Court may have
been trying to articulate the idea that when a districting body begins
to draw lines on the basis of race that gobble up voters from here and
471 Mfiller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 920 (1995) (alteration in original) (citations
omitted) (quoting Shawv. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 646 (1993)).
47Z Shawv. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 647 (1993).
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there, the original purpose of the district, to give adequate voting
strength to voters who actually share a community of interest and not
merely skin color, may more readily get lost. This would justify a more
skeptical examination of the resulting districting plan.
There is also a second, more intriguing possible explanation for
the significance of district shape to the Shaw majority. The emphasis
on district shape may, indeed, reflect the same intuition expressed in
Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke, but that intuition may be about
more than just "obviousness."
In Bakke, Justice Powell wrote that race can constitutionally be
taken account of in admissions to a state medical school even to the
point that it is the determinative factor in a decision whether or not to
admit an individual. He concluded, however, that the state may not
set aside a particular number of seats for which only members of racial
minorities may compete: each applicant has to be considered as part
of a pool of all the applicants, so that even where race is ultimately de-
terminative, every candidate has been considered for every place in
the class.4 3 "So long as the university proceeds on an individualized,
case-by-case basis," he wrote, "there is no warrant for judicial interfer-
ence in the academic process."
47 4
The significance of the line Justice Powell drew in his Bakke opin-
ion has of course been the subject of a great deal of comment, and it
remains controversial. On the one hand, the opinion can be under-
stood to draw a line between rigid quotas and targets that ultimately
may not be met in a given year after individualized consideration of
each applicant for all the spaces in, for example, a medical school
class, even if race is given weight as a plus factor. On the other hand,
some have argued that Justice Powell's opinion holds in essence that
race may be taken account of in university admissions, but only so
long as it is not done in too obvious a way. Although Justice Powell's
opinion in Bakke distinguishes between fixed "quotas" and the consid-
eration of race in admissions where it "is simply one element-to be
weighed fairly against other elements-in the selection process," each
of these elements, including race, may be given a different weight by
school authorities ex ante, so that the race-as-an-element process ap-
proved by Justice Powell will serve simply as a different means toward
achieving precisely the same desired quantum of "educational diver-
473 SeeRegents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 315-20 (1978) (Powell,J.).
474 Id. at 319 n.53.
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sity."4 7r' That is, in practice, the weight given to race in an admissions
plan deemed permissible under Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke will
not be determined behind a veil of ignorance concerning its practical
impact: university officials will determine how much "weight" to give
race in order to achieve the level of diversity they desire.
Justice Powell's opinion actually suggests that this is not consti-
tutionally problematic: the Harvard College Admissions Program,
which Justice Powell cited as an example of a permissible plan, can-
didly stated that the diversity it sought to create "cannot be provided
without some attention to numbers."475 Indeed, under the Harvard
Plan, as described in the appendix to Justice Powell's opinion, al-
though the admissions committee could not know before examining
the applicants in a given year whether the last few places in the class
would go to white or minority students, there was nonetheless a floor
in terms of minority percentage below which the admissions commit-
477
tee would not go.
On this reading, nothing in Bakke appears to prevent a state uni-
versity from giving racial diversity precisely enough weight that it will
necessarily be dispositive in the same number of cases in which it
would have been dispositive under a system like that invalidated in
Bakke in which members of minority groups were considered sepa-
rately for admission to a fixed minimum number of places in the class.
Under this view of Justice Powell's Bakke opinion, therefore, the state
is permitted to achieve in substance the same result as if it adopted a
program that provides a certain number of seats to members of a par-
ticular racial group. It is on this reading that Justices Brennan, White,
Marshall, and Blackmun concluded in Bakke that, in substance, Justice
Powell's opinion struck down the U.C. Davis affirmative action plan
because it did not "proceed[] in a manner that is not immediately ap-
parent to the public."478
475 Id. at 316-18.
476 Id. at 323 (app. to opinion of Powell,J.).
477 Compare id. at 324 (describing the competition in the Harvard College Admis-
sions Program when there are "only a few places left to fill"), with id. at 323 (claiming
that Harvard has not set "target-quotas," or "a minimum number of blacks... who are
to be admitted," but stating that "some attention" must be paid to "numbers" because
in terms of diversity it "would not make sense" to admit only "10 or 20 black students").
At one point Justice Powell's opinion does suggest that it would be impermissible to
operate a "plus" factor affirmative action plan "as a cover for the functional equivalent
of a quota system." Id. at 318. He also states, however, that the "presumption of legal-
ity" of a "plus" factor system "might be overcome" only by a showing of a "systematic
exclusion of certain groups." Id. at 319 n.53.
47s Id. at 379 (Brennan, White, Marshall, & Blackmun, ij., concurring in part and
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This view ofJustice Powell's opinion has of course led to criticism
of that opinion.4 9 The gravamen of this criticism is in essence that the
only constitutional question at issue in Bakke was whether race can ever
be dispositive in medical school admissions; all Justice Powell's con-
trolling Bakke opinion accomplished was to require that the use of
race be less obvious.48 °
The position that obviousness may do a constitutionally relevant
harm, even an equal protection harm, however, is not without some
strength.48' Professors Aleinikoff and Issacharoff have suggested that
knowledge that government has used race in a dispositive way may
482well be racially divisive. Professors Pildes and Niemi have suggested,
arguably less persuasively, that people may be disturbed by the obvious
use of race because it will be perceived to reflect a breakdown of the
113deliberative process.
On the other hand, that obfuscation would be the constitutional
command in a democratic society certainly is counterintuitive. It
means that if the politically accountable branches of government do
choose to use race in drawing district lines, they are constitutionally
required to act in the way for which they are least likely to be held ac-
countable.
Justice O'Connor's opinion for the Court in Shaw does appear to
suggest that what is required by the Constitution in matters of race is a
maintenance solely of appearances: "[We believe that reapportion-
ment is one area in which appearances do matter."48 4 Under Shaw, at
least, strict scrutiny was reserved for those uses of race that can "not be
dissenting in part); cf. id. at 319 (Powell, J.) ("It tells applicants who are not Negro,
Asian, or Chicano that they are totally excluded from a specific percentage of the seats
in an entering class.").
479 See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, A MATrER OF PRINCIPLE 309-10 (1985); Vincent
Blasi, Bakke as Precedent: Does Mr. Justice Powell Have a Theory?, 67 CAL. L. REV. 21
(1979).
480 See DWORKIN, supra note 479, at 309-11 ("[T]here is no difference, from the
standpoint of individual rights, between the two systems at all."); Mark Tushnet, Justice
Lewis F. Powell and the Jurisprudence of Centrism, 93 MICH. L. REv. 1854, 1875 (1995)
(book review) ("The Harvard program was a more genteel way of accomplishing the
same results as the plan in Bakke, and ... on the margins a plus factor has precisely the
same effect as that plan; Powell's position was... 'pure sophistry.'").
481 Cf. LAURENCE TRIBE, CONSTrUTIONAL CHOICEs 223-28 (1985) (suggesting that
Justice Powell's distinction addressed a concern about procedural fairness, a concern
that might not be found "in the realm of equal protection").
42 See Aleinikoff & Issacharoff, supra note 466, at 613 ("[S]uch [racial] lines are
inherently divisive, calling attention to differences that have poisoned American soci-
etyin the past.").
See Pildes & Niemi, supra note 288, at 500.
484 Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 647 (1993).
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explained on grounds other than race."' 8 In other words, if it is at
least plausible to an outside observer that the district was drawn for
non-race-conscious reasons, it may not be subject to invalidation.
Shaw thus could be read to suggest that the Equal Protection
Clause is concerned, at least in this context, not with the substance of
government decisionmaking, but with the message sent by it, the way
it may be understood by the public. The closest analogy elsewhere in
constitutional jurisprudence is the view, first taken, again, by Justice
O'Connor, in Lynch v. Donnelly and subsequently adopted in practice
by a majority of the Court, that the Establishment Clause prohibits
government action that has the effect of "convey[ing] a message of
endorsement" of religion.4
In the Establishment Clause context, however, the message that is
impermissible, at least on Justice O'Connor's explanation of the en-
dorsement test, is "a message to nonadherents that they are outsiders,
not full members of the political community, and an accompanying
message to adherents that they are insiders, favored by members of
the political community."487 Certainly the Equal Protection Clause,
like the Establishment Clause, is motivated in part by concern with the
integrity of the political community. But, at least at first blush, Shaw
and its progeny suggest no real scrutiny of the social facts to deter-
mine whether the use of race is intended to ensure the inclusion of a
group that has been discriminated against, or the exclusion of indi-
viduals as not full members of the political community on the basis of
race. The message that appears to be forbidden, rather, is that there
is a difference in the situation of the races that might make race a
relevant consideration in a governmental decision.
The formulation in Shaw and in Justice O'Connor's subsequent
opinions also suggests that, unlike in the Establishment Clause area,
the Constitution is concerned here only with message and not with the
concrete effect of the government's action. Under the Establishment
Clause, the endorsement test is not the exclusive test for unconstitu-
tionality. A finding of endorsement is sufficient, but not necessary, for
4,5 Id. at 644.
4,, Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 690 (1984) (O'ConnorJ, concurring); see also
Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 395 (1993)
(upholding a state law under the Establishment Clause because it neither benefits nor
endorses religion). In their discussion of "expressive harms," Professors Pildes and
Niemi have also observed a connection between the opinion in Shaw and Justice
O'Connor's Establishment Clause jurisprudence. See Pildes & Niemi, supra note 288,
at 512.
47 Lynch, 465 U.S. at 688.
150 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LA W REVEW
constitutional invalidation: aid to religion is impermissible even if it is
disguised in such a way as to prevent the message of endorsement
from being conveyed.488 By contrast, if Shaw scrutiny is limited to
those cases where districting principles are transgressed, because such
districts "rationally cannot be understood as anything other than an
effort to segregate voters into different districts in the basis of race,"
any district line will be permissible, whatever its actual origin, as long
as it could be explained in nonracial terms.489 The Constitution under
this reading would appear to be concerned literally only with form
and not with substance.
Appearances, however, can be deceiving. Perhaps the choice of
form has some substantive implications. Justice Powell argued that
the distinction he drew was not about appearance so much as it was
about the "right to individualized consideration. "4'0 And he described
the unconstitutional University of California plan as operating "a sepa-
rate admissions system.., in coordination with the regular admissions
process."
491
This resonates precisely with language in Shaw I expressing a con-
cern that the districts at issue would be "understood" or "viewed" as an
"effort to 'segregate."' The Court repeatedly described the cause of
action it recognized as one alleging that voters had been "segregated"
on the basis of race. Indeed, the idea of segregation and separation of
the races recurs like an incantation throughout the opinion in Shaw,"92
488 See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 627 (1992) (SouterJ., concurring) (stat-
ing that the Establishment Clause prohibits government action that "favor[s] or en-
dorse [s]" religion); Allegheny County v. Greater Pittsburgh ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 591
(1989) (Blackmun,J.,joined by Brennan, Marshall, Stevens and O'ConnorJJ.) ("'Nei-
ther a state nor the Federal Government can, openly or secretly, participate in the af-
fairs of any religious organizations or groups and vice versa.'" (quoting Everson v.
Board of Educ. of Ewing, 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947))).
489 Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 649 (1993). Indeed, the Shaw Court said that "i]t
is unnecessary for us to decide whether or how a reapportionment plan that, on its
face, can be explained in nonracial terms successfully could be challenged." Id.
49 Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 318 & n.52 (1978).
491 Id. at 273.
492 See, e.g., Shaw, 509 U.S. at 658 ("Today we hold only that appellants have stated a
claim under the Equal Protection Clause by alleging that the North Carolina General
Assembly adopted a reapportionment scheme so irrational on its face that it can be
understood only as an effort to segregate voters into separate voting districts because
of their race, and that the separation lacks sufficient justification."); id. at 649 ("[We
conclude that a plaintiff challenging a reapportionment statute under the Equal Pro-
tection Clause may state a claim by alleging that the legislation, though race-neutral on
its face, rationally cannot be understood as anything other than an effort to separate
voters into different districts on the basis of race, and that the separation lacks suffi-
cient justification."); id. at 642 ("What appellants object to is redistricting legislation
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which, as described above, at one point actually says that the North
Carolina district at issue in the case "bears an uncomfortable resem-
blance to political apartheid.""'
Similarly, the Court in Miller likened the creation of the black-
majority district there to officially enforced racial segregation: "Just as
the State may not, absent extraordinary justification, segregate citizens
on the basis of race in its public parks, buses, golf courses, beaches,
and schools, so did we recognize in Shaw that it may not separate its
citizens into different voting districts on the basis of race."4  The plu-
rality in Bush also reiterated the Shaw Iformulation 9
The language from Shaw-which actually purports to explain why
bizarrely shaped districts are problematic-is extraordinarily perplex-
ing, because the districts of which the plaintiffs' complained were, in
fact, not segregated. As described above, in North Carolina's Twelfth
Congressional District, the district whose shape was at issue in Shaw,
that is so extremely irregular on its face that it rationally can be viewed only as an effort
to segregate the races for purposes of voting, without regard for traditional districting
principles and without sufficiently compelling justification."); id. at 645 ("Gomillion
thus supports appellants' contention that district lines obviously drawn for the purpose
of separating voters by race require careful scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause
regardless of the motivations underlying their adoption."); id. at 646-47 ("In some ex-
ceptional cases, a reapportionment plan may be so highly irregular that, on its face, it
rationally cannot be understood as anything other than an effort to 'segre-
gat[e] ... voters' on the basis of race." (alteration in original) (citation omitted)); id.
at 651 ("The plaintiffs in UJO-members of a Hasidic community split between two
districts under New York's revised redistricting plan-did not allege that the plan, on
its face, was so highly irregular that it rationally could be understood only as an effort
to segregate voters by race. Indeed, the facts of the case would not have supported
such a claim."); id. at 652 ("Nothing in the decision [UJO] precludes white voters (or
voters of any other race) from bringing the analytically distinct claim that a reappor-
tionment plan rationally cannot be understood as anything other than an effort to seg-
regate citizens into separate voting districts on the basis of race without sufficient justi-
fication. Because appellants here stated such a claim, the District Court erred in
dismissing their complaint.").
4'3 Id. at 647.
04 Miller v.Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 911 (1995) (citations omitted).
4 5 The Court stated:
Strict scrutiny applies where "redistricting legislation .. , is so extremely ir-
regular on its face that it rationally can be viewed only as an effort to segregate
the races for purposes of voting, without regard for traditional districting
principles," Shaw I, [509 U.S.] at 642, or where "race for its own sake, and not
other districting principles, was the legislature's dominant and controlling ra-
tionale in drawing its district lines," Miller, 515 U.S., at 913, and "the legisla-
ture subordinated traditional race-neutral districting principles ... to racial
considerations," id., at 916. See also id., at 928 (O'Connor, J., concurring)
(strict scrutiny only applies where "the State has relied on race in substantial
disregard of customary and traditional districting practices").
Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952,958 (1996).
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blacks made up 53.34% of the voting age population and 54.71% of
the population overall.4" The use of the highly charged rhetoric of
segregation thus has frustrated dissenters and concerned commenta-
tors since Shaw was decided.497 In their analyses of Shaw, though, per-
haps because the districts at issue were integrated, commentators have
in general ultimately either ignored the language of segregation,4 8 or
have treated it as inflammatory exaggeration. 4&
But the concept of segregation-segregation evident in the bi-
zarre shape of a district-appears to have been central in the Court's
thinking when it decided to uphold the challenge to the districting
plan at issue in Shaw. If one could find an explanation for the Court's
apparent intuition that bizarrely shaped districts "segregate" voters,
one might perhaps be better able to determine whether there is any
way to harmonize the Shaw line of cases with those decided outside
the context of voting rights.
Every act of integration requires an intermediate act of segrega-
tion. To take the most obvious example, to integrate school class-
rooms through student assignments, one must first draw up separate
lists of black and white students, lists in which the names of the stu-
dents are segregated by race. In most cases of integration-most cases
in the third category of race-conscious government action I have de-
scribed-such lists would go no further than some administrators' of-
fices. But one can imagine a system in which the intermediate segre-
gatory step was done in such a public way that it independently
offended the command of Brown.
For example, imagine a city that had maintained by law a system
of "separate but equal" public transportation, not by segregating the
seats on each bus, but by providing different buses for the members of
496 See Shaw, 509 U.S. at 671 n.7 (White,J, dissenting); State Appellees' Brief, supra
note 284, at 24a. Two of the plaintiffs in Shaw lived in the Twelfth District. The dis-
trict in which the other plaintiffi' lived, the Second District, was also integrated. It had
a total population that was 21.94% African American, approximately the same as the
state population overall. Under the districting plan at issue in Shaw, five of the State's
congressional districts had populations that were less than ten percent black. See
Aleinikoff & Issacharoff, supra note 466, at 611-12 & n.100 (1993) ("If these data de-
scribed residential communities, we would consider them remarkably integrated by
usual American standards.").
497 See, e.g., Shaw, 509 U.S. at 671 n.7 (White, J., dissenting) (noting that the dis-
tricts at issue were not segregated); Karlan, supra note 309, at 94 (same).
498 See Pildes & Niemi, supra note 288.
499 See Aleinikoff& Issacharoff, supra note 466, at 611-12 (calling the Court's use of
the phrase "political apartheid" a "disturbing exaggeration").
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each race.o Now imagine that, following Brown, that city wanted to
desegregate this system of public transportation. The city might stop
the legal segregation. But members of each race might continue to
use their own racially identifiable buses. (Undoubtedly, the "black"
buses would have been, among other things, older and in poorer
condition than those reserved for white people.) One can imagine
the city deciding that, in order to ensure that the previously segre-
gated system of public transportation were now integrated, it would
set up separate "black" and "white" bus stops, from which each bus
would pick up a specified percentage of its passengers.
This would ensure a certain racial mix on each bus. Nonetheless,
this "integrative" action would be impermissible under Brown, be-
cause, in integrating the buses, the city would have used the means of
setting up segregated bus stops.
The same type of fact pattern can be conceived of with respect to
most race-conscious acts of integration. For example, the Supreme
Court held in its one-line per curiam opinion in Tancil v. Woolts that
there is no constitutional obstacle to the collection by government on
the basis of race of statistical information concerning divorce, pre-
sumably because such information can be valuable in measuring the
lingering effects of oiscriminaton.f But government presumably
could not collect that data by setting up separate counters in county
offices for black and white people seeking a divorce."' At some point,
otherwise permissible race-conscious government action may trans-
gress the command of equal protection under Brown in part because
of its public nature, precisely because of the message that an interme-
diate segregative act may convey. The public bus case would no
longer belong in Category Three, but in Category One. Unless the
obviousness was absolutely necessary to achieve some overriding pur-
pose, it would be invalid.
- The Montgomery, Alabama ordinance invalidated in Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S.
903 (1956) (per curiam), required bus companies to segregate the seating on their
buses, but also provided that "[n]othing in this section shall be construed as prohibit-
ing [persons who operate bus lines in the city] from separating the races by means of
separate vehicles if they see fit." See Browder v. Gayle, 142 F. Supp. 707, 711 n.2 (1956)
(quoting MONTGOMERY, ALA., CODE § 10, Ch. 6 (1952)).
-,,Q See Tancil v. Woolls, 379 U.S. 19 (1964) (per curiam), affg Hamm v. Virginia
State Bd. of Elections, 230 F. Supp. 156 (E.D. Va. 1964), discussed supra notes 122-27
and accompanying text.
- Indeed, while upholding the collection of statistical data, Tancil also invalidated
Virginia's system of maintaining separate voting and property tax records for black and
white citizens. See Hamm, 230 F. Supp. at 156, aff/d sub nom. Tancil v. Woolls, 379 U.S.
10 (1964).
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This could help explain what Justice O'Connor was struggling to
get at in her opinion for the Court in Shaw, when she distinguished
district lines so bizarre that they could only be understood as an at-
tempt to "segregate" from other district lines drawn on the basis of
race. She may have been trying to say that the use of race to draw
bizarrely shaped districts itself causes harm to African Americans de-
spite the fact that the ultimate goal of the districting plan is to over-
come discrimination against African Americans in voting.
In this conception the harmful message that the district's bizarre
shape will send is not that race was used (or used excessively) in its
creation. The link between bizarre shape and that kind of knowledge
in any event seems speculative at best: someone living in a majority-
minority district may well be as likely to realize it in a compact district
as in a bizarrely shaped one.
Rather, the bizarrely shaped district may be constitutionally prob-
lematic because of what happens on the ground when, aided by com-
puters, bizarre electoral district lines are drawn through neighbor-
hoods in an attempt to obtain a district with a particular racial
composition. One can at least imagine a neighborhood in which the
voters all leave their houses on election day, the black voters turning
right to go to their polling place, the white ones left to go to theirs. It
may be even easier to imagine that the result of such districting might
well include polling places in mixed-race areas that are populated on
election day exclusively by members of one or another race. And one
can readily see why this would present a grave constitutional problem.
Of course whether this effect occurs is an empirical question and
the Shaw line of cases is notable for its failure to engage in any empiri-
cal analysis of the circumstances surrounding the districting plans
struck down. The only mention of the practical consequences of the
bizarre districts the Court has considered is contained in Justice
O'Connor's plurality opinion in Bush where she described a chal-
lenged districting plan as causing:
a severe disruption of traditional forms of political activity. Campaigners
seeking to visit their constituents "had to carry a map to identify the dis-
trict lines, because so often the borders would move from block to
block"; voters "did not know the candidates running for office" because
they did not know which district they lived in. In light of Texas' re-
quirement that voting be arranged by precinct, with each precinct repre-
senting a community that shares local, state, and federal representatives,
it also created administrative headaches for local election officials: "....
Harris County estimated that it must increase its number of precincts
from 672 to 1,225 to accommodate the new Congressional boundaries.
Polling places, ballot forms, and the number of election employees are
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correspondingly multiplied. Voters were thrust into new and unfamiliar
precinct alignments, a few with populations as low as 20 voters." 
°
0
Nonetheless, a concern about the practical consequences of draw-
ing bizarrely shaped but ultimately integrated districts is one way to
make sense of the rhetoric of segregation and apartheid repeatedly
utilized by the members of the Shaw majority. Brown itself held that
the harm caused by segregation is in part a harm caused by the mes-
sage segregation sends. 4 In this light, the Shaw Court's focus on the
appearance of the districts at issue may be understood less as an at-
tempt to elevate form over substance, and more as an attempt to rec-
ognize a very real type of harm.
This may also help explain the distinction drawn by Justice Powell
in his opinion in Bakke-a distinction with which commentators have
struggled mightily"-between affirmative action plans for school ad-
missions that select students from separate lists drawn up on the basis
of race and plans that obtain a functionally equivalent result through
the less-obvious weighting of racial criteria by admissions officers sort-
ing through applications that have not been separated on that basis.5"
PerhapsJustice Powell understood that there was an affront to the
dignity of the minority applicants in separating their applications out
from those of the other applicants seeking admission to U.C. Davis, an
affront that was not justified by the need for diversity even though the
use of race was.- Under this view, Justice O'Connor's opinion in
Shaw can be seen as an adoption of an approach similar to that taken
by Justice Powell in Bakke. The invalidation of the bizarrely shaped
electoral districts in Shaw, Miller, and Bush, under this reading, would
be a reflection of the additional harm wrought by what the Court
viewed as their intermediate segregative effect. The Court's rigid ap-
proach might then be limited, by its own logic as well as its own terms,
to those districts that actually have this effect.
While this reading of Shaw's concern with bizarrely shaped dis-
50 Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 974 (1996) (quoting the opinion of the district
court, Vera v. Richards, 861 F. Supp. 1304, 1340, 1325 (S.D. Tex. 1994)).
W4 Cf. Lawrence, supra note 118, at 351.
5,5 See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 319 (1978).
r- 1 Cf. TRIBE, supra note 481, at 223-28 (focusing on Justice Powell's concern that
affirmative action plans in University admissions include individualized consideration
of applicants for all available seats). Of course, Justice Powell spoke of the right of the
white applicant to individualized consideration. A white person, however, probably
can make no claim to having been stigmatized by segregation. See Brown v. Bd. of
Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (describing the stigmatic harm imposed by segregation on
African American children).
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tricts does suggest a way to harmonize the Shaw cases with a more ra-
tional approach to judicial scrutiny of racial classifications, it is not
completely satisfactory. To begin with, there is little evidence that the
districts at issue in any of the Shaw line of cases actually caused the
segregative effect just described. Certainly none of the challenges to
come before the Court have been brought by African American voters
concerned about this unintended consequence of the creation of ma-
jority-minority districts.5° Thus, although this reading of Shaw and its
progeny might be able to locate the cases within the Court's tradi-
tional paradigm for addressing race-conscious government action, the
casual placement of the cases in the most harmful category of race-
conscious action on this basis would suggest a less-than-rigorous appli-
cation of appropriate equal protection principles.'0 8 Where communi-
ties of interest can only be recognized by drawing noncompact dis-
tricts, a per se rule that bizarrely shaped districts are "unexplainable"
other than as a contrivance to segregate voters will restrict without
warrant the ability of the government to address discrimination in vot-
ing. A holding that race-conscious action to comply with the V.R.A.
actually includes an element of "segregation" without any factual sup-
port for that conclusion (or indeed, any complaint from a black voter)
would suggest again an approach that would prefer not to counte-
nance the use of race, regardless of the reality of the circumstances of
its adoption.
In addition, a rule under which constitutionality turns on district
shape or inclusion of geographically distant minority communities
within a single district will have at least two perverse results worthy of
mention in terms of government's attempt to address voting discrimi-
nation. First, in the presence of racially polarized bloc voting, the
need to draw a bizarrely shaped district to offset voter discrimination
may arise, at least in part, because of black success in ending patterns
of residential segregation. Where residential areas are segregated, of
course, a black-majority district can more easily be drawn in a way that
adheres to traditional districting principles. Only where residential
segregation has broken down, resulting in the dispersal of minority
group members within integrated communities, will black-majority
districts be more likely to violate those principles. A traditional-
507 This theory of an intermediate segregative effect would also be difficult to
square with the conclusion that the plaintiffs in Shaw, who were white, had standing.
508 As, similarly, the casual use of the rhetoric of segregation and apartheid in such
circumstances suggests a less-than-rigorous recognition of the uniquely pervasive and
degrading regimes those words describe.
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districting-principles limitation then will place a judge-made obstacle
in the path of giving effective electoral strength to those members of
minority groups who have been fortunate enough to break out of pat-
terns of residential segregation but who still suffer from discrimina-
tion in voting.
At least in the case of North Carolina in 1992, however, a reasona-
bly contiguous and compact second black-majority congressional dis-
trict could have been drawn to give effect to black voting strength.
Indeed, this was the suggestion put forward by the Attorney General.
The bizarreness of the Twelfth District was caused not merely by the
desire to draw a second such district, but by the desire to do so while
protecting the incumbency of sitting representatives'.
A second irony of any approach that turns on district shape is that,
in a racially polarized jurisdiction, only race-conscious districts that re-
spond to discrimination against minorities will in practice be subject
to invalidation. Districting plans with compact districts that have the
effect of discriminating against minority groups will normally be easy
to construct. The reality is that, with or without a limitation on the
scope of Shaw scrutiny, there is no reason that the strict scrutiny pro-
vided by Shaw will ever be available in a challenge to a district that in
fact submerges the votes of a racial minority group.510
Nonetheless, the possibility of at least rationalizing the Shaw line
of cases with the proper concerns of equal protection could have a
great deal of practical value. Despite the dissenters' repeated conclu-
sion that Shaw and its progeny are not coherent, the five-member
Shaw majority has repeatedly declared its intent to adhere to that deci-
sion. Alth no realistic possibility of overruling Shaw, the best that can
be hoped for may be that Shaw may, at least in theory, and in the long
run in practice, be situated within a rational framework for the ex-
amination of race-conscious government action.
The approach outlined in Part III.A above is capable of taking ac-
count of the particular harms that may be wrought by race-conscious
districts that are bizarrely shaped or that have an intermediate segre-
gative effect. The Court could acknowledge that the unique harms
attendant upon a race-conscious districting plan that includes
bizarrely shaped districts (in the form of a higher risk either (a) that
there is no community of interest among the minority voters placed in
" See Pildes & Niemi, supra note 288, at 489-91, 516-26.
5W Cf. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 650-51 (1993) (arguing that the Court's equal
protection analysis is the same regardless of whether a government's use of race favors
the majority or the minority).
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the district or (b) that there is an intermediate segregative effect)
mean that any such plan requires a greater degree ofjustification and
a stronger demonstration of necessity than would a districting plan
that adhered to traditional districting principles. The inquiry could
be calibrated to the circumstances in which race is used.
This might well address the concerns voiced by justice O'Connor,
both in her opinion for the Court in Shaw and in her separate opin-
ions since then, better than any version of Shaw strict scrutiny yet ar-
ticulated. It might permit race-conscious districts drawn to comply
with the V.R.A. to be upheld, but it would not require repudiation of
Shaw's call for "strict scrutiny." Nor would it permit any governmental
use of race to be approved without close examination. The results of
such an approach would likely coincide with Justice O'Connor's un-
derstanding of the bottom line of the Shaw I cause of action: that
race-conscious districting is not per se invalid, but that it must be care-
fully cabined. This would be preferable to the line she otherwise ap-
pears headed toward drawing. Indeed, scrutiny that is actually tai-
lored to the particular harms at issue is far more likely to result in the
invalidation only of those districting plans that actually do more harm
or for which the justification is the weakest.
C. Narrow Tailoring Again: Examining the Costs
of Race-Neutral Alternatives
This leads finally to the question of necessity. As described above,
race-conscious districting can be used to help combat the effects of
racially polarized voting. If the Court adheres to the rigid approach
suggested by Shaw, Miller, and Bush-whether those decisions are lim-
ited to cases in which the districting authority has drawn bizarrely
shaped districts or not-the results consequently will be significant.
One possibility is that the state and federal governments will be lim-
ited in their ability to address discrimination in voting. Current pat-
terns of discrimination will be locked in place, untouchable, frozen in
constitutional amber.
There is also a second possibility, however, which is in its own way
even more radical, a possible unintended consequence of superimpos-
ing a rigid command of colorblindness under the Equal Protection
Clause upon the command of nondilution and nonretrogression al-
ready contained in the V.R.A.
There are colorblind alternatives to race-conscious districting that
could be used to meet the statutory commands of nondilution and
nonretrogression. In particular, systems of cumulative or preference
Vol. 49: 1
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voting have recently gained support in some academic circles, pre-
cisely because they combat vote dilution without requiring race-
conscious government action. The availability of these race-neutral
alternatives presents the very question of necessity described above in
Part I"' In Bush, a majority of the Court concluded that compliance
with section 2 of the V.R.A. was a "compelling" state interest. To what
extent then will the "narrow tailoring" requirement of strict scrutiny
nonetheless act to prevent the use of race in drawing districts de-
signed to comply with this interest, given the availability of the "less
restrictive" alternative of some nongeographical system for aggregat-
ing voter preferences? Under an appropriately designed system even
of formally strict scrutiny, the answer should depend upon the costs
inherent in abandoning the widely-but-not-universally-used system of
geographical districting.
An examination of those costs suggests the importance of adopt-
ing the kind of flexible system I have described rather than a uni-
formly rigid strict scrutiny that would condemn all race-conscious ac-
tion in the face of colorblind alternatives. Nongeographical systems
for aggregating votes are not precisely tailored to address racial dis-
crimination in voting. Rather, they work by giving representation to
any electoral minority whose candidates have previously been unable
to attract sufficient support for election. Rigid restrictions on race-
conscious districting could leave such electoral systems as the only
mechanisms available for addressing discriminatory voting patterns.
The consequence of a movement toward constitutionally prohibiting
race-conscious districting could thus be a radical transformation in
the very nature of American electoral democracy, one that might well
leave our polity more divided and polarized than before.
The Supreme Court in Hunt v. Cromartie will soon revisit the
meaning of Shaw for states seeking to comply with the V.R.A. The
next decennial census, with its accompanying redistricting, is also al-
most upon us. Whatever the precise scope of the antidiscrimination
command of the Act, the Court eventually will be faced with a case in
which the need to respond to racial polarization under the statute will
collide with one or another version of Shaw. When that occurs, the
Court will need a framework for analysis capable of appropriately ad-
dressing, as part of the narrow-tailoring inquiry, the question whether,
rather than being permitted to draw district lines on the basis of race,
51 See supra pp. 36, 44-46, 46-49 (describing the way in which the requirement that
the use of race be "necessary" varies from Category to Category among race-conscious
actions).
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the districting authority should be required to use one of these race-
neutral alternatives.
In examining any use of race by government, one must assess the
costs of any race-neutral alternatives. As demonstrated above, 12 race-
conscious action in Category One can be justified only if the costs of
any available race-neutral alternative are prohibitively high. In Cate-
gory Two, race-conscious action can be justified if the costs of a race-
neutral alternative are substantial, but perhaps slightly less prohibitive.
In Category Three, race-conscious districting has been permitted-for
example in McDaniel v. Barresi--despite the availability of race-neutral
alternatives when use of those alternatives would have imposed sig-
nificant, but again, even less substantial, costs.
In the case of preventing vote dilution, the cost for our democracy
of using race-neutral alternatives to drawing electoral districts that
take race into account could, at least arguably, be extremely high.
This alone should suffice to support a decision to permit race-
conscious districting to be used to prevent vote dilution even in the
face of these colorblind alternatives.
1. The Availability of Systems of Semiproportional Representation
The conventional wisdom is that Shaw and its progeny ultimately
are about the constitutionality of the non-dilution command con-
tained in section 2 of the V.R.A. This appears to have been one of the
reasons, for example, that Justice O'Connor went out of her way in
Bush to concur separately in her own opinion: she wanted to make
clear that, at least in theory, a race-conscious district drawn in compli-
ance with section 2 of the V.RA. could survive strict scrutiny under
Shaw.
What seems generally to have escaped notice is that invalidation of
the use of race to draw electoral district lines would not completely
invalidate the V.RA. There are non-race-conscious means of combat-
ing vote dilution, means that could be used to comply with the Act
even were the use of race for that purpose held completely invalid.
These include mechanisms that require the abandonment of geo-
graphically based districting altogether, such as limited and cumula-
tive voting, described by political scientists as systems of "semipropor-
tional representation."
These alternatives rely upon the abandonment of winner-take-all
512 See supra pp. 30, 36, 44-46.
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elections to represent geographical areas. In cumulative voting, in-
stead of dividing a jurisdiction into districts corresponding to the rep-
resentative seats to be filled, an at-large election is held to fill all the
seats and each voter is given a number of votes equal to the number of
offices to be filled. Each voter may cast as many of those votes for any
candidate or candidates he or she chooses.
In limited voting, the elections are again held at large, but each
voter is given a number of votes less than the total number of seats to
be filled. Each voter may cast a single vote for the candidates he or
she prefers, until all his or her votes are cast.
These systems work to ensure minority representation by lowering
what political scientists refer to as the "threshold of exclusion," the
minimum number of like-minded votes needed to guarantee an elec-
toral success.53 Imagine ajurisdiction which is entitled to four repre-
sentatives, in which the population is 75% white and 25% black, and
in which the black voters are politically cohesive and most of the white
voters are unwilling to vote for any black-supported candidate. 1 4 If
the jurisdiction is treated simply as a multimember at-large district
from which all four representatives will be elected, electing a repre-
sentative can only be assured by a vote of 50% of the electorate plus
one. This is the threshold of exclusion. Although it comprises 25% of
the population, the minority group will be submerged within the
white majority. Representation for the cohesive minority group even
by a single representative will be out of reach.515
If the jurisdiction is divided at random into four single member
districts, each of which has the same racial breakdown as the jurisdic-
tion as a whole, again it will require a group to have 50% plus one
within any district to elect a representative. Although it will only take
a total of 12.5% of the total number of voters in the jurisdiction plus
one to guarantee any candidate victory, because of geographical dis-
tricting, a candidate must have a majority among the 25% of the
population in a particular district for him or her to succeed. In our
example, unless a black-majority district is intentionally created, the
minority will most likely lose the election in each single-member dis-
711 See, e.g., Lani Guinier, The Triumph of Tokenism: The Voting Rights Act and the The-
ory of Black Electoral Success, 89 MICH. L. REv. 1077, 1138 n.296 (1991).
24 This example is taken from id. at 1138.
515 Smaller groups may succeed in electing candidates, but only when their opposi-
tion is divided in supporting more than one alternative candidate. Pamela S. Karlan,
Undoing the Right Thing: Single-Member Offices and the Voting Rights Ac 77 VA. L. REV. 1,
32-33 n.117 (1991).
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trict.
A cumulative voting system compensates for this effect by lowering
the threshold of exclusion. The threshold of exclusion under a sys-
tem of cumulative voting can be expressed as 1/(l+n) where n is the
number of seats up for election. 6 Thus, if our hypothetical jurisdic-
tion were to adopt an at-large cumulative voting mechanism to choose
its four representatives with each voter having four votes, it would re-
quire only 20% of the voters (1/(1+4) or 1/5) to elect a representa-
tive, if they all cast all four votes for a single candidate.
In a limited voting system, the threshold of exclusion would also
be lowered, but by an amount that can be calibrated by providing
various numbers of votes to each voter. The threshold of exclusion in
a limited voting system can be expressed as v/(v+n), where v is the
number of votes that may be cast by each voter, and n is again the
number of seats up for election.1 7 In our hypothetical jurisdiction,
giving each voter one vote under a system of limited voting would
mean that the threshold of exclusion was again 20%. Giving each
voter two votes would raise the threshold to 33 1/3%.
Under these non-geographical methods of vote aggregation mi-
nority vote dilution could be prevented without the race-conscious
government action that Shaw and its progeny have held to be (at least
in some circumstances) presumptively unconstitutional. Members of
a politically cohesive racial group that was geographically dispersed
could achieve representation by voting together for the candidate of
their choice without a need for drawing tortured electoral district
boundaries.1 8 Indeed, they could do so even if they were so evenly
distributed throughout the population that drawing a district in which
they formed a majority would be notjust difficult, but impossible.
The availability of such mechanisms might appear to put race-
conscious districting at some risk after Shaw, Miller, and Bush. Because
it might be possible to comply with the Act without race-conscious
government action, whatever the strength of the state interest in com-
pliance with the Act in various circumstances, the availability of
nongeographical systems of election could be argued to render the
use of race less than narrowly tailored to its achievement.
Unsurprisingly, some litigants have suggested the adoption by
courts of mechanisms of cumulative voting as a remedy for violations
516 Karlan, supra note 171, at 225.
517 Id. at 224.
518 Success under a system of cumulative voting also requires that the members of a
particular group not split their votes between or among two or more candidates.
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of section 2 of the V.RA., 5"' and at least one court has ordered such a
remedy.5"' Such systems have also been adopted voluntarily in re-
sponse to litigation brought under section 2 of the V.R.A., and are
now in place in a number of southern jurisdictions in which the votes
of a black minority were previously submerged in multimember dis-
tricts with anti-single-shot provisions.5"
Indeed, the threejudge district court in Miller, in striking down
Georgia's districting plan, said:
Single-member majority-black districts are not a constitutional or statu-
tory requirement. The assumption that the sole means of enhancing
blacks' political influence is to pack them into such districts is unimagi-
native.
The time has come to contemplate more innovative means of ensur-
ing minority representation in democratic institutions. 2
The idea of adopting these race-neutral alternatives to race-
conscious electoral districting has appeal beyond those commentators
unwilling to countenance almost any use of race by government.
Some recent scholarship emphasizing the inadequacy of race-
conscious districting in achieving the enactment of laws responsive to
black interests suggests adoption of such systems as a third way of or-
ganizing elections, one that neither requires the use of race by gov-
ernment nor relegates minorities in communities in which there is
bloc voting to a persistent position in which their interests are unrep-
resented.52 Professor Guinier has argued that adoption of electoral
q, See, e.g., Nipper v. Smith, 39 F.3d 1494 (11th Cir. 1994); League of United Latin
Am. Citizens, Council No. 4434 v. Clements, 999 F.2d 831, 873 (5th Cir. 1993) (en
banc); see also id. at 920 (King, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority's refusal to con-
sider cumulative voting as a less intrusive means by which the state could achieve its
goals).
" Cane v. Worcester County, 847 F. Supp. 369, 373-74 (D. Md. 1994) (ordering
that the county impose a cumulative voting system and discussing the benefits of such a
system). This ruling was reversed on appeal on the ground that imposition of such an
election method did not "to the greatest extent possible give effect to the legislative
policy judgments underlying" the plan that had been held to violate section 2, or any
unacceptable remedy offered by the relevant legislative body. Cane v. Worcester
County, 35 F.3d 921, 928 (4th Cir. 1994). Justice Thomas noted in his concurrence in
Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 910 (1994) (Thomas, J., concurring), that cumulative vot-
ing might properly be ordered as a remedy for a violation of section 2 as it has been
construed in previous Supreme Court decisions.
%I See, e.g., ISSACHAROFF ET AL., supra note 268, at 745-47 (describing jurisdictions
in which cumulative voting has been adopted).
' Johnson v. Miller, 864 F. Supp. 1354, 1393 (S.D. Ga. 1994) (three-judge court),
affd, 515 U.S. 900 (1995).
5 See, e.g., Lani Guinier, No Two Seats: The Elusive Quest for Political Equality, 77 VA.
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systems that "do not rely on territorial or residential location" "may
work better than [race-conscious] districting as a remedy for vote dilu-
,,524tion.
An unreconstructed version of Shaw scrutiny would, at least with
respect to state and local elections, leave mechanisms like cumulative
and limited voting as perhaps the only methods legally available in ra-
cially polarized jurisdictions for compliance with the V.RA. For ex-
ample, were a state to adopt a legislative districting plan without tak-
ing race into account, it might have a dilutive effect and be held to
violate section 2 of the V.R.A. Ajurisdiction forbidden to use a race-
conscious districting plan by Shaw might then have no choice but to
adopt a system of semi-proportional representation in order to pre-
vent dilution.
Congressional elections present a slightly more complicated case
because a 1967 federal statute mandates that congressional seats be
filled by election from single-member districts. 5 25 If, however, the
nondilution command of the subsequently enacted 1982 amendments
to the V.R.A. can only constitutionally be met by non-geographically-
based mechanisms for vote aggregation, those amendments may be
deemed to have repealed by implication the single-member district
command to the extent that constitutionally acceptable single-
member districts would have a dilutive effect. In such a circumstance,
again, cumulative or limited voting could be used to fulfill the nondi-
lution command of the V.RA.
2. The Costs of This Race-Neutral Alternative
These mechanisms have great intuitive appeal and commentators
have found them attractive. The adoption of such systems, however,
could be far more fundamentally disruptive than the continued, nar-
rowly cabined use of race-conscious districting to prevent dilution of
minority votes.
Minority vote dilution is a breakdown in the operation of the
American political process. Because, as a general matter, American
democracy operates on the basis of a series of winner-take-all elec-
L. REV. 1413, 1461-66 (1991); see also Richard H. Pildes, GimmeFive: Non-gerrymandering
RacialJustice THE NEW REPUBLIC, Mar. 1, 1993, at 16.
524 Lani Guinier, The Representation of Minority Interests: The Question of Single-Member
Districts, 14 CARDOzO L. REv. 1135, 1135 (1993).
5 See 2 U.S.C. § 2c (1994) ("[T]here shall be established by law a number of dis-
tricts equal to the number of Representatives to which such State is so entitled, and
Representatives shall be elected only from districts so established .... ").
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tions, the election of representatives tends to require the formation of
coalitions. When those who feel most strongly about an issue within a
particular district do not amount to a majority, they cannot elect a
representative. They may attempt to persuade others to support their
candidate. They may attempt to build coalitions by trading their sup-
port on an issue that matters more to another group of voters. And
they may have to support someone sympathetic but more moderate
than they, in order to elect a representative who will be at least some-
what responsive to their concerns. This is an inherent characteristic
of an electoral system based on geographical districts.
The effect of the use of such a system should be in part to moder-
ate the stridency of those who are elected. This is part of what was in-
tended by those who developed our federal electoral system. Thus
James Madison, who was deeply concerned with faction, wrote that, as
compared to pure democracy, the election of representatives would
have the effect of "refin[ing] and enlarg[ing] the public views, by
passing them through the medium of a chosen body of citizens, whose
wisdom may best discern the true interest of their country, and whose
patriotism and love of justice will be least likely to sacrifice it to tem-
porary or partial consideration."526 Although in some circumstances
one or another point of view on an issue will dominate within a geo-
graphic region, the likelihood of electing representatives who are not
merely responsive to the views of one or another faction should, in
general, be increased by a system of election that gives victory only to
those who can appeal to a majority of the population in a given geo-
graphic region.5' 7
Racially polarized voting, with its attendant risk of vote dilution,
represents a breakdown in the ideal operation of this political process.
When, within a given district, coalitions persistently fail to form across
a racial divide, the ideal operation of the political process has broken
down.
The adoption of systems of semiproportional representation,
however, would do far more than correct the process failure that oc-
curs when voting is polarized along racial lines. Unlike the manipula-
tion of district lines to ensure equal electoral opportunity to members
of a particular racial minority group, systems that avoid vote dilution
%f THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 62 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
527 Of course, even where candidates represent geographically defined districts,
well-organized interest groups may be able to obtain a disproportionate share of power
within the legislative chamber because of their ability to deliver votes. See generally Sym-
posium on the Theoy of Public Choice, 74 VA. L. REV. 167 (1988).
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by lowering the threshold of exclusion could, at least in theory, grant
representation to every group which has historically been unable to
garner sufficient support within any geographical district to elect a
representative. Some commentators see this as an additional benefit
to schemes of semiproportional representation: traditionally unrep-
resented groups will gain representation."'
But it can at least be argued that, within the context of our politi-
cal system, the inability of a political group to succeed in obtaining
the votes necessary to gain representation-an inability that could be
overcome by mechanisms that provide semiproportional representa-
tion-is not ordinarily a political process failure, but a mark of its suc-
cess.
One of the premises of the American system of representative
democracy as it has been understood until now is that only those in-
terests whose adherents are able to attract others to support them will
succeed. The only justification for drawing districts on racial lines,
whether under section 2 of the V.R.A. or otherwise, is that a racial mi-
nority group has been unable to build the coalitions necessary to give
effect to their votes because of the racially polarized voting behavior
in the jurisdiction. Drawing a district to permit black voters to influ-
ence the outcome of elections is a narrowly targeted response to that
problem that does not fundamentally alter the nature of our system of
representation.
By contrast, systems of semiproportional representation that
would solve the problem of racially polarized bloc voting by lowering
the threshold of exclusion could (at least in theory) reduce or elimi-
nate across the board the need for minority political groups of suffi-
cient size to build coalitions. Any group that meets the threshold
should be able to elect a representative without appealing to any other
voters. Under systems of election that permit the representation of
minority interests but do not depend on geographic districting, ex-
treme ideologues of various stripes, who have in general been unable
to gain representation in winner-take-all district elections, might well
be able to win elections.529 Indeed, the election of at least somewhat
528 See, e.g., Lani Guinier, Groups, Representation, and Race-Conscious Districting: A
Case of the Emperor's Clothes, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1589, 1633 (1993) ("Under a modified at-
large system... politically cohesive minority groups are assured representation if they
vote strategically.").
529 Even under systems of geographical districting, of course, the most extreme
views will generally be able to obtain representation where their adherents are residen-
tially co-located. See, e.g., Jim Yardley, Around the South: Sheriff Rules Louisiana Parish
With an Iron Fist, but Chinese Lawman Denies Racism, ATLANTAJ. & CONST., May 1, 1994,
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more politically extreme candidates appears to have been one of the
effects of the adoption by Chilton County, Alabama, in a consent de-
cree, of a system of cumulative voting for elections to its County
Commission and Board of Education."" Thus a constitutional com-
mand that vote dilution can be addressed only in such a race-neutral
fashion would carry at least a risk of damage to the political fabric and
stability of the nation that is not posed by the creation of majority-
minority districts. '
Of course, to some degree any objection to semiproportional sys-
tems of representation can be seen as an objection to "more" democ-
racy. Cumulative or limited voting would permit interests to be repre-
sented that are abroad in the land and that are now excluded from
local and state governments as well as the federal legislature.
But representative democracy is designed in part (like the provi-
sions of the Bill of Rights) to limit the influence of popular sentiment
on the decisions of legislative bodies. To deny factions unable to mus-
ter enough votes the ability to be represented in legislative bodies is
consistent with the ideas behind representative democracy.
In addition, despite the primacy of the interest group pluralist
theory of American politics,5 32 and the widespread appeal of public
choice theory among commentators, representation in our democ-
racy is far more complex than mere preference aggregation. Interest
group representatives do voice the preferences of their constituents,
but they play other roles as well that may well argue against lowering
the threshold of exclusion. They legitimate, by their presence, the
at A3 (describing the parish from which David Duke was elected in 1988 to the Louisi-
ana state legislature).
See Richard H. Pildes & Kristen A. Donoghue, Cumulative Voting in the United
States, 1995 U. CH. LEGAL F. 241, 274 (describing a "sudden transformation" in which
not only African Americans, but also Republicans were elected to seats on the County
Commission, but noting also that, despite their theoretically enhanced chances,
"fringe" candidates have not been elected).
Professor Karlan has advocated the use of both limited and cumulative voting in
circumstances where, because of dispersion of black voters throughout a racially polar-
ized jurisdiction, it is not feasible to draw single-member district lines that will give
black voters effective voting strength. Karlan, supra note 171, at 221-36. My argument,
of course, is not that cumulative or limited voting is constitutionally infirm; in such cir-
cumstances, the need to prevent vote dilution could well outweigh the generally appli-
cable considerations I am suggesting here.
5 See Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival; 97 YALE LJ. 1539, 1542-43 &
n.9 (1988) (describing interest group pluralism).
5 IA Public choice theory involves the study of mechanisms for preference aggrega-
tion. See generally Pildes & Anderson, Slinging Arrows at Democracy: Social Choice Theory,
Value Pluralism, and Democratic Politics, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2121 (1990) (applying the
"social choice theory" branch of public choice theory).
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views of those they represent. They also play a role in their constitu-
ents' preference formation by the stands they choose to take. For ex-
ample, when a leader of a group signals his or her willingness to ac-
cept compromise, that is frequently a basis for his or her constituents
to accept it.
Indeed, the representative's role of exercising judgment inde-
pendent of his or her constituency seems like one most in need of re-
inforcement." One of the great complaints about modem political
life in the United States is that politicians, driven by modem polling
techniques and their own desire for re-election, tend to reduce their
role to that of preference aggregator, to the exclusion of their obliga-
tion to exercise independent judgment. The resulting lack of judg-
ment and courage on the part of politicians-characteristics whose
exercise by politicians was doubtless intended to be encouraged by a
system of government that deliberately placed legislative power in
representatives rather than in the people as a whole-is an important
part of the reason for widespread cynicism about politics.5 35 It would
be ironic if, rather than taking an approach that permits representa-
tives to be less responsive to the views of narrow constituencies, the
Court, in the name of a rigid and in any event unrealistic rule of col-
orblindness, imposed on the country an electoral regime that might
have just the opposite effect.11
6
54 The idea that legislators should exercise independent judgment has been de-
scribed as "Republican," see Karlan, supra note 171, at 216, but my understanding is
that it is part of the Republican conception of government only when it is coupled with
legislative deliberation, the sine qua non of civic Republicanism. Whether the legisla-
tor's judgment derives from deliberation with others, or from reflection in solitude, it
is clear that its exercise was essential to the founders' vision of representative democ-
racy. See THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 62 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961)
("[I]t may well happen that the public voice, pronounced by the representatives of the
people, will be more consonant to the public good than if pronounced by the people
themselves.").
535 For example, between 1964 and 1982, the percentage of Americans who be-
lieved that government was "run by a few big interests looking out for themselves"
rather than "for the benefit of all the people" increased from less than a third to over
sixty percent. Daniel A. Farber & Phillip P. Frickey, The Jurisprudence of Public Choice, 65
TEX. L. REV. 873,873 (1987).
56 Public choice theory demonstrates that well-organized interest groups made up
of single-issue voters will have a disproportionate impact on legislative outcomes. See
generally Issacharoff, supra note 44, at 1885-86 (describing the problem and collecting
sources). One of the reasons for this is that, within the legislature, representatives de-
pendent for re-election on voters with a high intensity preference on an issue (say, a
preference against gun control, to use Professor Issacharoff's example) will be able, in
exchange for votes on other issues, to persuade representatives to vote with them who
are dependent for re-election on voters with a low intensity preference in the opposite
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Put in terms of the approach to strict scrutiny that I have articu-
lated, a requirement that government use race-neutral alternatives to
serve its interest in combating racial polarization in voting (or to
comply with the V.R.A.'s provisions addressing it) could well impose
substantial costs on society. But because the use of race at issue does
not have all the risks and costs attendant upon the most harmful
forms of racial discrimination by government, districting authorities
should not be required to use such costly race-neutral alternatives to
race-conscious districting. Society should not be required to abandon
important values it concludes are served by geographically based dis-
tricting simply because the only way to address the problem of racially
polarized voting while maintaining those values is to use race in the
creation of electoral district lines.
CONCLUSION
Strict scrutiny must be calibrated to the goals it has inarticulately
but inescapably been designed to serve. It must be tailored to the very
harms that require close inquiry in the first place. In the equal pro-
tection area, because of the unique risks and harms wrought by the
government's use of race, close examination of such governmental ac-
tion is always warranted. But where a particular use of race involves
fewer risks and harms than the paradigmatic case of discrimination
against members of an historically disadvantaged racial group in the
provision of some good or benefit, the tools of strict scrutiny must be
tailored to meet those concerns that are actually present. In particu-
lar, the narrow list of accepted justifications for the government's use
of race and the requirements of narrow tailoring (particularly the re-
quirement that government seek to use any available race-neutral al-
ternative), should, depending on the precise circumstance in which
government seeks to use race, properly be calibrated to take account
of values that would otherwise have to be compromised.
If the Court were to adopt an approach that took sensitive account
of the context in which government sought to use race, the result
would be a better conception of equal protection. Without such an
approach, strict scrutiny is unmoored from its foundations. At best it
becomes a shorthand, trotted out episodically when the conclusion
has already been reached that a particular classification will be invali-
direction (that is, who oppose gun control but do not vote exclusively on that issue).
See id. Mechanisms of proportional representation should enhance the power of inter-
est groups of single-issue voters by increasing their chances of electing representatives
responsive only to them.
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dated. At worst it becomes an engine for the virtually automatic in-
validation of race-conscious government action-always employed and
always fatal.
But the close judicial examination of racial classifications was not
meant as the end of equal protection analysis. Rather, it should be
used as it was designed to be: as a tool for evaluating a law's consis-
tency with the constitutional command of "equal protection of the
laws."
The Court's pre-Shaw decisions can best be understood to reflect a
rational approach like the one I have described. The Shaw line of
cases itself contains the basis for being harmonized with such an ap-
proach. It is thus still open to the Court in its application of Shaw,
and indeed in the far more broadly significant application of Croson
and Adarand, to exercise its special responsibility to examine the con-
text in which the races are situated and to permit the use of race by
government where it is necessary to rectify inequality. The alternative
is likely the condemnation of any presently disadvantaged racial mi-
nority group to remain in its unequal position, without hope of re-
dress from the political branches.
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